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

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CÆSAR.

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The following translation of Cæsar's Commentaries is taken from the celebrated edition of the late Dr. Clarke, printed for J. Tonson in 1712. All possible care has been taken to render it exact, and to preserve the distinctness and perspicuity of expression, for which the original is so justly famous. The reader will perceive that the very turn and manner of Cæsar have been copied with the utmost attention; and though the success may not always answer expectation, yet candor will induce him to make great allowances, when he considers the inimitable beauty of the Latin, and the difficulty of expressing ancient manners and transactions in modern language.

It may be proper to mention, that besides the seven books of the Gallic War, and the three of the Civil, written by Cæsar himself, the Supplements of A. Hirtius are likewise inserted in the following translation, consisting of one additional book to the Gallic War, and three books of the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Wars.

ARGUMENTS.

CIVIL WAR.

BOOK I.

1. DIFFERENT opinions in the senate in relation to Cæsar's letter—3. The origin and causes of the opposition formed against him—4. The senate's severe decree, and flight of Cæsar's friends—5. War against Cæsar resolved on—6. Cæsar harangues his troops—7. Pompey sends proposals of peace—8. Cæsar's answer—9. Pompey sends proposals a second time—10. Which not pleasing Cæsar, he prepares for war—11. Cæsar makes himself master of Iguvium and Auximum—12. Which so alarms his enemies at Rome, that they hastily quit the city, and retire to Capua—13. Cæsar, by his expedition, obliges many of the towns in Italy to submit—23. Pompey, after the reduction of Corfinium by Cæsar, withdraws with his troops to Brundusium—24. Cæsar besieges him there—26. He escapes by sea, after which the town surrenders—28. Cæsar cannot pursue him for want of a fleet—29. Valerius and Curio, partisans of Cæsar, drive Cotta from Sardinia, and Cato from Sicily; Varus compels Tubero to desist from his design on Africa—30. Cæsar's speech to the senate—31. Which producing no effect, he sets out for Transalpine Gaul—32. The people of Marseilles shut their gates against Cæsar—34. Who commands Brutus and Trebonius to besiege the place—35. Fabius sent before into Spain—39. Cæsar follows, and comes up with Afranius and Petreius at Lerida—41. A skirmish, with almost equal advantage on both sides—46. A sudden storm having broke down his bridges, Cæsar is shut up between two rivers—48. And reduced to great straits for want of provisions—51. He extricates himself at length, and surprises the enemy's foragers—52. Brutus defeats the

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ALEXANDRIAN WAR.

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AFRICAN WAR.

1. Cæsar sets out for Africa—3. And lands at Adrumetum—4. He treats with Considius about the surrender of that town; but in vain—5. Thence he removes his camp to Ruspina—6. And again to Leptis, which he immediately takes possession of—7. Here he draws together his auxiliary troops—8. And afterwards returns to Ruspina to provide himself with corn—9. Whence preparing to sail in quest of his transports, they unexpectedly appear before the port—11. Skirmishes between Cæsar and Labienus, near Ruspina—17. Petreius and Piso advance to support Labienus, but they are nevertheless all repulsed—18. The number of Labienus' troops, and his presumption—19. Scipio joins Labienus; Cæsar fortifies his camp—21. Young Pompey, by Cato's advice, prepares for war, but without success—22. Cæsar suffers greatly for want of corn—23. King Juba, marching to the assistance of Scipio, is forced to return to defend his own kingdom against Bogud—24. Cæsar, resolving to fight the enemy, draws troops together from all parts—25. The manner of training Scipio's elephants—26. One of Cæsar's ships taken by the enemy—27. Labienus attacks Leptis in vain—28. Scipio draws out his troops; Cæsar keeps within his camp—29. A great number of Numidians and Getulians desert to Cæsar—30. The town of Acilia demands a garrison from Cæsar, and is immediately invested by the enemy—31. Cæsar receives a supply of troops and corn by sea—32. A body of Getulians, sent out as scouts by Scipio, desert to Cæsar—33. Cato sends supplies to Scipio; the city of Tisdra demands a garrison of Cæsar—34. Cæsar makes choice of a new camp, and strengthens it with works; which the enemy advancing to retard, are repulsed with great slaughter—38. On which, Cæsar draws out his army; but the enemy keep within their camp—40. The siege of Acilia raised—41. The surprising fortitude of one of Cæsar's centurions, taken prisoner by Scipio; and the cruelty of that general—42. The great mischief done by a sudden storm of rain—43. King Juba arrives in Scipio's camp, at the head of a great body of troops—44. Cæsar having dislodged Labienus, seizes the

hill on which he was posted—45. Cæsar's works for the security of his camp—46. Juba and Labienus, attacking a party of Cæsar's men, as they returned from the works, are repulsed with great slaughter—47. Two legions arrive to Cæsar's aid—48. Cæsar's steadiness in maintaining military discipline—49. The Getulians, revolting from Juba, oblige him to divide his forces—50. Cæsar feigns a design on Uzita, whence a great many persons of illustrious rank join him—51. Juba's pride—52. Both armies drawn up—53. The order of battle on each side—54. After a few skirmishes between the horse, both retire to their camps—55. Some of Cæsar's ships burned by the enemy, and others taken—56. Cæsar, embarking in person, follows the enemy, defeats them, and returns to his camp—57. Cæsar in want of corn—58. Which compels him to leave his camp; Scipio pursues him—59. He possesses himself of Zeta, a town beyond the enemy's camp—60. The enemy, attacking him as he returns, laden with plunder, are repulsed—61. Difficulty of fighting with the Numidians; Cæsar's contrivance for that purpose—62. The town of Vacca, demanding a garrison of Cæsar, is plundered by king Juba—63. The enemy declining a battle, Cæsar decamps, and repulses the troops sent to set on him in his march—64. But not caring to besiege Sarsura, he returns to his old camp—65. The Thabenenses demand Cæsar's protection—66. Cæsar receives fresh succors—67. A battle of the cavalry, in which Cæsar has the advantage—68. The enemy still declining an engagement, Cæsar besieges Thapsius—69. Scipio attempts to relieve it—70. Cæsar, encouraging his men, and finding them full of alacrity, attacks the enemy—72. The surprising bravery of a private soldier—73. Scipio's army defeated, and almost totally cut off—74. Cæsar marches for Utica—75. Whither Scipio's cavalry had retired—76. Cato kills himself; Utica surrenders—77. Cæsar, in his march to Utica, possesses himself of Usceta and Adrumetum—78. He pardons the Uticans—79. Juba flying to Zama, is refused admittance—80. Zama, and several of the king's generals, surrender to Cæsar—81. Considius surrenders Tisdra, and Vergilius, Thapsus—82. The death of Juba and Petreius—83. Also of Faustius and Afranius—84. And of Scipio—85. Cæsar converts Juba's kingdom into a province—86. And returns to Rome.

SPANISH WAR.

1. The commencement of the Spanish war—2. Cæsar marches to attack Cordova—3. At the same time throws succors into Ulia, besieged by Pompey—4. The attempt on Cordova obliges Pompey to raise the siege of Ulia—5. Pompey advancing to the relief of Cordova, Cæsar attacks Ategua, whither he is followed by Pompey—7. Both intrench themselves in mountainous places of difficult access—9. Pompey, attacking a fort belonging to Cæsar, is repulsed—10. Cæsar continues the siege of Ategua—11. Repulses a sally from the town—13. Various skirmishes between the two armies 15. Cruelty of the townsmen—16. Cæsar repulses them in a second sally—17. Tullius treats with Cæsar about a surrender—18. Continuation of the siege—19. The town surrenders—20. Pompey removes his camp towards Ucubis—22. Behavior of the Bursavolenses—23. Cæsar and Pompey both encamp near Ucubis, where some skirmishes happen—25. Single combat of Turpio and Niger—26. Great numbers of the enemy desert to Cæsar; some of Pompey's letters intercepted—27. Both parties encamp in the plain of Munda—28. A great battle ensues—31. In which Pompey is totally defeated—32. Cæsar besieges the runaways in Munda—33. Attacks and makes himself master of Cordova—35. Likewise of Hispalis; whence he is expelled, and again recovers it; the Mundenses, under a pretence of a surrender, preparing to attack our men, are themselves put to the sword 37. Carteia surrenders to Cæsar; Pompey makes his escape—39. Pompey is slain—40. Some of Cæsar's ships burned—41. Cæsar's troops take possession of Munda, and afterwards invest Ursao—42. Cæsar's speech to the people of Hispalis.

CIVIL WAR.

SUPPLEMENT

OF

DIONYSIUS VOSSIUS

TO

CÆSAR'S FIRST BOOK OF THE CIVIL WAR.

I THINK it needless to say any thing here, in opposition to those who pretend that the following Commentaries, concerning the Civil War, were not penned by Cæsar himself. We have not only the express testimony of Suetonius to the contrary, but the very style sufficiently declares that Cæsar alone could be the author of the work. There is room however to suspect, from the abrupt manner in which the subject is introduced, that the beginning of this first book is wanting; for history takes notice of several previous facts, of which no mention is made here. I have therefore collected out of Plutarch, Appian, and Dion, as much as was necessary to connect this and the former Commentary, and fancy it will not be disagreeable to the reader to offer it here by way of preface.

Gaul being wholly reduced, Cæsar, on his arrival in Lombardy, thought proper, for many reasons, to send deputies to Rome, to demand the consulship, and a prolongation of his command. Pompey, who, though averse to Cæsar's interest, had not yet openly declared against him, neither farthered nor opposed his request. But the consuls Marcellus and Lentulus, who had

already joined the party of his enemies, resolved by every method in their power to frustrate the design. Marcellus scrupled not to add other injuries to that of which we speak; for Cæsar had lately planted a colony at Novocomum in Cisalpine Gaul; and Marcellus, not satisfied with stripping the inhabitants of the privilege of Roman citizens, seized one of their chief magistrates at Rome, ordered him to be scourged, and then dismissed him to carry his complaints to Cæsar; an ignominy from which all free citizens were expressly exempted by the laws. While affairs were in this train, C. Curio, tribune of the people, came to Cæsar in Gaul. This nobleman, after many attempts in behalf of the commonwealth, and to promote Cæsar's interest, finding at length all his endeavors without effect, fled from Rome to avoid the malice of his enemies, and informed Cæsar of all that was transacted against him. Cæsar received him with great marks of respect, as well on account of his rank in the commonwealth, as the many services he had done himself and the state, and thanked him for the signal zeal he had shown in his cause. But Curio advised him, since his enemies were now openly preparing for war, to draw his army together without delay, and rescue the commonwealth from the tyranny of an aspiring faction. Cæsar, though fully satisfied of the truth of Curio's report, resolved to sacrifice all other considerations to the public tranquillity, that no man might justly charge him with being the author of a civil war. He therefore only petitioned, by his friends, that the government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with the command of two legions, might be continued to him; in all which his principal aim was, by the equity of his demands, to induce his enemies to grant peace to the commonwealth. These offers appeared so reasonable,

that even Pompey himself knew not how to oppose them. But the consuls still continuing inflexible, Cæsar wrote a letter to the senate, wherein, after briefly enumerating his exploits and services, he requested them not to deprive him of the benefit of the people's favor, who had permitted him to sue for the consulship in his absence. He protested his readiness, if such was the resolution of the senate and people of Rome, to dismiss his army, provided Pompey did the same: but could by no means resolve, so long as he continued in command and authority, to divest himself of troops, and lay himself open to the injuries of his enemies. Curio was commissioned to carry this letter, who, travelling with incredible dispatch, reached Rome in three days, (a distance of a hundred and sixty miles,) before the beginning of January, and ere the consuls could get any thing determined relating to Cæsar's command. Curio, on his arrival, refused to part with the letter, resolving not to deliver it but in full senate, and when the tribunes of the people were present; for he was apprehensive, should he do otherwise, that the consuls would suppress it.

CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES.

CIVIL WAR.

BOOK I.

1. CÆSAR'S letter being delivered to the consuls, the tribunes, with much difficulty, procured it a reading in the senate; but could by no means prevail to have his demands brought under deliberation. The consuls proposed to debate on the state of the republic. Lentulus promised 'to stand by the senate and people, if they would deliver their sentiments with freedom and courage; but if they regarded Cæsar, and affected to court his friendship, as had been the practice for some time past, he knew, he told them, what he had to do, and was determined to disclaim their authority; not doubting but [illegible] would find a ready admittance to coming a second Sy[illegible] of Cæsar.' Scipio spoke much of the commonwe[illegible]; 'that Pompey was firmly bent tained the sam[illegible] the republic, if he found the senators which he [illegible]pport him; but if they cooled, or were repey; [illegible] their resolves, it would be in vain for them to expect his aid, if they saw cause afterwards to apply for it.' This speech of Scipio, as the senate was held in the city, and Pompey resided in the suburbs, was considered as coming from Pompey's own mouth.

Some were for following milder counsels, of which number was M. Marcellus, who gave it as his opinion 'that it was not proper to enter on the present deliberation till troops were raised over all Italy, and an army got ready, under whose protection the senate might proceed with freedom and safety in their debates. Callidius was for sending Pompey to his government, to take away all occasion of discord; because Cæsar had reason to fear, as two of his legions had been taken from him, that Pompey retained them in the neighborhood of Rome, with a view to employ them against him.' M. Rufus nearly agreed in opinion with Callidius. But they were all severely reprimanded by the consul Lentulus, who expressly refused to put Callidius' motion to the vote. Marcellus, awed by the consul's reprimand, retracted what he had said. Thus the clamors of Lentulus, the dread of an army at the gates of Rome, and the menaces fo Pompey's friends, forced the greater part of the senate, though with the utmost reluctance and dislike, into a compliance with Scipio's motion, 'that Cæsar should be ordered to disband his army before a certain day then fixed; and that in case of disobedience, he should be declared an enemy to the republic.' M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, opposed their negative to this decree. Immediately a debate arose on the validity of the [illegible]sition. Many severe speeches were made [illegible] more warm and passionate any one [illegible] was he applauded by Cæsar's enemies.

2. In the evening the senate rose; and sending for all those of his party, commended the ward; confirmed them in their resolutions; reproved and animated the more moderate. Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under him, flocked to

him from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities. A great number of officers belonging to the two legions lately returned by Cæsar had likewise orders to attend him. Rome was filled with troops. Curio assembled the tribunes to support the decree of the people. On the other hand, all the friends of the consuls, all the partisans of Pompey, and of such as bore any ancient grudge to Cæsar, repaired to the senate: by whose concourse and votes the weaker sort were terrified, the irresolute confirmed, and the greater part deprived of the liberty of speaking their mind freely. L. Piso the censor, and L. Roscius the pretor, offered to go and acquaint Cæsar with the state of affairs, demanding only six days for that purpose. Some were for sending deputies to him, to inform him of the senate's disposition.

3. But all these proposals were rejected, because the consul, Scipio, and Cato, declared against them. Cato was incited by the remembrance of an old quarrel, and the disappointment he had sustained in standing candidate for the pretorship with Cæsar. Lentulus was oppressed with debt, and flattered himself with the command of armies, the government of provinces, and the largesses of the kings for whom he should procure the title of allies and friends of the Roman people. He was besides wont to boast among those of his own party that he doubted not of becoming a second Sylla, in whom the whole authority of the commonwealth should centre. Scipio entertained the same hope of commands and governments, which he expected to share with his son-in-law Pompey: add to this, his dread of a prosecution; his vanity and self-conceit; and the flatteries and applauses of his friends, who at that time bore a considerable sway in the commonwealth and courts of justice. Pompey

himself, instigated by Cæsar's enemies, and not able to endure an equal in dignity, was now intirely alienated from him, and had joined with their common adversaries, most of whom Cæsar had contracted during his affinity with Pompey. Besides, the fraudulent step he had taken, in detaining, for the purposes of his own ambition, the two legions destined to serve in Asia and Syria, determined him to use all his endeavors to bring on a civil war.

4. Thus nothing but tumult and violence was to be seen in the public debates. Cæsar's friends had no time given them to inform him of what passed. Even the tribunes themselves were not exempt from danger, nor durst they have recourse to that right of intercession which Sylla had left them, as the last bulwark of liberty; insomuch, that the seventh day after entering on their office, they saw themselves obliged to provide for their safety; whereas in former times, the most turbulent and seditious tribunes never began to apprehend themselves in danger till towards the eighth month of their administration. Recourse was had to that rigid and ultimate decree, which was never used but in the greatest extremities, when the city was threatened with ruin and conflagration, 'that the consuls, the pretors, the tribunes of the people, and the proconsuls that were near Rome, should take care that the commonwealth received no detriment.' This decree passed the seventh of January; so that during the five first days in which it was permitted the senate to assemble, after Lentulus' entrance on the consulship (for two days are always appropriated to the holding of the comitia), the most severe and rigorous resolutions were taken, both in relation to Cæsar's government, and the tribunes of the people, men of eminent worth and dignity. The tribunes immediately quitted

the city, and fled to Cæsar, who was then at Ravenna, waiting an answer to his late demands, whose equity he hoped would dispose all parties to entertain thoughts of peace.

5. The following days the senate assembled without the city, where Pompey confirmed every thing he had before intimated by the mouth of Scipio. He applauded the resolution and courage of the senators, acquainted them with the state of his forces, that he had ten legions already in arms, and was besides well informed that Cæsar's troops were by no means satisfied with their general; nay, had even refused to support and follow him. It was then proposed in the senate that troops should be raised over all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent propretor into Mauritania; that Pompey should be supplied with money out of the public treasury; and that king Juba should be declared friend and ally of the people of Rome: but Marcellus opposed the last of these; and Philippus, tribune of the people, would not agree to the propretorship of Sylla. The other motions were approved by the senate. The affair of the provinces was next decided; two of which were consular, the rest pretorian. Syria fell to the share of Scipio, and Gaul fell to L. Domitius. Philippus and Marcellus were set aside, through the private views of the prevailing party. The rest of the provinces were assigned to men of pretorian rank, who waited not to have their nomination confirmed by the people, as had been the custom in former years, but, after taking the usual oath, departed for their several commands in a military habit. The consuls left the city, a thing unheard of till that time, and lictors were seen walking before private men in the forum and capitol, contrary to the express practice of former ages. Troops were levied over all

hily, arms enjoined, money demanded of the colonies and free towns, and even taken from the very temples; in fine, neither divine nor human rights were regarded.

6. Cæsar, having intelligence of these proceedings, addressed himself to his troops: 'He took notice of the many injuries he had received on all occasions from his enemies, who had alienated Pompey from him, by filling him with an envy and jealousy of his reputation, though he had done every thing in his power to promote his glory, and favor his advancement to the highest dignities. He complained of the new precedent introduced into the commonwealth, in checking, and hindering by arms, the opposition of the tribunes, which of late years had been restored to its wonted force. That Sylla, who had almost annihilated the tribuneship, had yet left it the liberty of opposition; whereas Pompey, who valued himself on the re-establishment of that office, deprived it now of a privilege it had always enjoyed. That the decree enjoining the magistrates to provide for the safety of the commonwealth, which implied an order to the Roman people to repair to arms, was never wont to be used but on occasion of dangerous laws, seditious measures pursued by the tribunes, or a general secession of the people, when they possessed themselves of the temples and places of strength; crimes, which in former ages had been expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi. That at present nothing of this kind had been attempted, nor so much as thought of; no law promulged, no endeavor used to seduce the people, no appearance of revolt or disaffection. He therefore conjured them to defend against the malice of his enemies the honor and reputation of a general, under whom they had served nine years with so much ad-

to the commonwealth, gained so many battles; subdued all Gaul and Germany.' The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, who were present, and whom he had sent for in the beginning of the troubles (the rest not having yet arrived), cried out, that they were determined to maintain the honor of their general, and to revenge the wrongs done to the tribunes.

7. Being assured of the good-will of the soldiers, he marched with that legion to Rimini, where he was met by the tribunes of the people, who had fled to him for protection. He ordered the other legions to quit their winter quarters, and follow him with all expedition. While he was at Rimini, young L. Cæsar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, came to him; and after acquainting him with the occasion of his journey, added, that he had a private message to him from Pompey, 'who was desirous of clearing himself to Cæsar, that he might not interpret those actions as designed to affront him, which had no other aim but the good of the commonwealth: that it had been his constant maxim to prefer the interest of the republic to any private engagement: that it was worthy of Cæsar to sacrifice his passion and resentment to the same noble motive; and not prejudice the commonwealth, by pushing too far his revenge against his private enemies.' He added something more to the same purpose, mingled with excuses for Pompey. The pretor Roscius joined likewise in the negotiation, declaring he was commissioned so to do.

8. Though all this tended little to redress the injuries of which Cæsar complained, yet, considering these as proper persons by whom to transmit his thoughts, he begged of them, that as they had not scrupled to bring Pompey's demands to him, they would likewise carry back his proposals to Pompey;

that, if possible, so small a labor might put an end to mighty differences, and deliver all Italy from the fear of a civil war. He told them 'that the interest of the commonwealth had always been dearer to him than life; but he could not help grieving at the malice of his enemies, who had frustrated the good intentions of the Roman people in his favor, by cutting off six months from his command, and obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the consulship, though a law had been made dispensing with his personal attendance: that he had yet, for the sake of the commonwealth, patiently submitted to this assault on his honor: that even his proposal of disbanding the armies on both sides, which he had made by a letter to the senate, had been rejected: that new levies were making over all Italy: that two legions, which had been taken from him, under pretence of the Parthian war, were still retained in the service of his enemies: that the whole state was in arms. What could all this aim at, but his destruction? That, nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any proposal, and expose himself to any danger, for the sake of his country. Let Pompey go to his government: let all the armies be disbanded: let every body throughout Italy lay down their arms: let every thing that participates of terror and force be removed: let the elections of magistrates be made with perfect freedom; and let the republic be administered by the authority of the senate and people. And the better to settle all these articles, and corroborate them with the sanction of an oath, let either Pompey himself draw nearer, or suffer Cæsar to approach him; as all their differences may be most easily terminated by a conference.'

9. Roscius and L. Cæsar, having received this answer, departed for Capua, where they found Pompey

and the consuls, and laid before them Cæsar's proposals. After deliberating on the affair, they sent a reply, in writing, by the same messengers, the purport of which was, 'that Cæsar should quit Rimini, return to Gaul, and disband his army; which conditions performed, Pompey would go into Spain. In the mean time, till Cæsar gave security for the performance of what he had promised, neither Pompey nor the consuls would discontinue the levies.'

10. It was by no means a fair proposal, that Cæsar should be obliged to quit Rimini, and return to Gaul, while Pompey held provinces and legions that were none of his: that he should dismiss his army, whilst the other was levying troops: and, that only a general promise of going into Spain should be given, without fixing a day for his departure; by which evasion, were he to be found in Italy, even at the expiration of Cæsar's consulship, he could not yet be charged with breach of faith. His forbearing too to appoint a time for a conference, and declining to approach nearer, gave little reason to hope for a peace. He therefore sent Antony to Arretium, with five cohorts; remained himself at Rimini, with two, where he resolved to levy troops; and seizing Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, left a cohort in each for a garrison.

11. Meantime, being informed that Thermus the pretor had entered Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was endeavoring to fortify the town, as he knew the inhabitants to be well inclined to his interest, he detached Curio thither, with three cohorts, drawn from Pisaurum and Rimini. On this, Thermus, who could not confide in the townsmen, retired with his cohorts, and quitted the place: but his troops abandoning him in their march, returned severally to their own homes. Curio was received into the place with great demon-

strations of joy: which being reported to Cæsar, as he found he had the good-will of the colonies and free towns, he drew the cohorts of the thirteenth legion out of garrison, and marched to Auximum, which Attius held with a body of troops, and whence he had despatched senators to levy forces over all Picenum. Cæsar's arrival being known, the chief citizens of Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus, and told him 'that it did not belong to them to determine on which side justice lay; but that neither they, nor the other municipal towns, could endure to see their gates shut against Cæsar, who by his great actions had deserved so well of the commonwealth: that therefore he would do well to consult his own safety and reputation.' Attius, moved by this speech, drew off his garrison and fled. But some of Cæsar's first ranks pursuing him, obliged him to stop; and a battle ensuing, he was deserted by his men. Some of the troops returned home; the rest went over to Cæsar, and brought along with them L. Pupius, first centurion of the legion, who had formerly held the same rank in Pompey's army. Cæsar commended Attius' soldiers; dismissed Pupius; returned thanks to the inhabitants of Auximum; and promised to retain always a grateful remembrance of their attachment.

12. These things being reported at Rome, the consternation was so great over the whole city, that when the consul Lentulus came to the treasury, to deliver out the money to Pompey, in consequence of the decree of the senate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner door, but precipitately left the place, on a false rumor that Cæsar was approaching, and some of his cavalry already in view. He was soon followed by his colleague Marcellus, and the greater part of the magistrates. Pompey had left the town the day before, and was on

his way to Apulia, where he had quartered the legions he had received from Cæsar. The levies were discontinued within the city, and no place appeared secure on this side Capua. Here, at last, they took courage and rallied, and began to renew their levies in the colonies round about, which had been sent thither by the Julian law. Lentulus summoned into the forum the gladiators whom Cæsar had ordered to be trained up there, gave them their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him. But being afterwards admonished by his friends that this step was universally condemned, he dispersed them into the neighboring towns of Campania, to keep garrison there.

13. Cæsar meanwhile leaving Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum, where he was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who furnished his army with every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own expense, sent deputies to him, with an offer of their submission and services. He demanded a certain number of soldiers, which were sent immediately. Meantime the twelfth legion joined him; and with these two he marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum. Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten cohorts; who, hearing of Cæsar's approach, quitted the place with his troops, who almost all deserted him on the march. Being left with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum, to encourage his followers in those parts. Vibullius understanding from him the state of affairs in Picenum dismissed Lentulus, and took the soldiers under his command. He likewise drew together from the neighboring provinces as many as he could meet with of Pompey's levies; among the rest, Ulcilles Hirus, who was

flying, with six cohorts, from Camerinum, where they had been quartered. Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts, with which he posted, by great journeys, to Corfinium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus commanded; whom he informed that Cæsar was approaching with two legions. Domitius had already got together, with great expedition, twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of the Marsi, Peligni, and the neighboring provinces.

14. Cæsar having made himself master of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, ordered the soldiers who had deserted him to be sought after, and new levies to be made. He remained only one day there to settle what related to provisions, and then pursued his march to Corfinium. On his arrival there, he found five cohorts, whom Domitius had detached from the garrison, employed in breaking down a bridge about three miles distant from the town. But Cæsar's advanced parties attacking them, they quickly abandoned the bridge, and retired to Corfinium. Cæsar having passed with his legions, halted before the town, and encamped under the walls.

15. On this, Domitius engaged, by great rewards, persons well acquainted with the country, to carry letters into Apulia to Pompey, wherein he earnestly requested him to come to his aid. He told him, 'that it would be easy, in that close country, to shut up Cæsar between two armies, and cut off his provisions: that unless this course was followed, he himself, with above thirty cohorts, and a great number of senators and Roman knights would be exposed to imminent danger.' Meanwhile, having encouraged his men, he disposed engines along the walls, appointed every one his particular post; and the more to animate them, promised each soldier four acres of land out of his own

estate, and, in proportion, to every centurion and volunteer.

16. Meantime Cæsar was informed that the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, desired to put themselves under his protection, but were restrained by Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who held them in subjection with a garrison of seven cohorts. He therefore despatched M. Antony thither, with five cohorts of the seventh legion, whose ensigns were no sooner descried from the walls of Sulmona, than the gates were thrown open, and the whole people in a body, both soldiers and townsmen, came out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lucretius and Attius endeavored to escape over the wall: but Attius being taken, and brought to Antony, requested that he might be sent to Cæsar. Antony returned the same day, bringing along with him the cohorts and Attius. Cæsar joined these cohorts to his army, and set Attius at liberty.

17. Cæsar resolved to employ the three first days in strongly fortifying his camp, in procuring corn from the neighboring towns, and waiting the arrival of the rest of his forces. During this space, the eighth legion joined him, with two-and-twenty cohorts of new levies from Gaul, and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. This obliged him to form a second camp on the other side of the town, under the command of Curio. The remaining days were spent in drawing a line with redoubts round the place, which work was nearly completed when the messengers that had been sent to Pompey returned.

18. Domitius, perusing the dispatches, thought proper to dissemble the contents, and declared in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance. Meantime he exhorted them to behave with courage,

and provide every thing necessary for a vigorous defence. He conferred however privately with a few of his most intimate friends, and, in concert with them, determined on flight. But as his looks and speech were found to disagree; as he behaved not with his usual composure and firmness; and was observed, contrary to custom, to be much in secret conference with his friends; avoiding public appearances, and councils of war; it was not possible for the truth to remain any longer concealed: for Pompey had written back, 'that he could not put all to hazard for his sake: that he had neither advised nor consented to his shutting himself up in Corfinium: that he must therefore endeavor to extricate himself as well as he could, and come and join him with all his forces.' But as Cæsar had invested and carried his lines round the place, this retreat was now become impracticable.

19. Domitius' design being discovered, the soldiers who were at Corfinium began to assemble in the evening, and, by means of their tribunes, centurions, and other officers, made known their thoughts to one another: 'that they were besieged by Cæsar, who had already, in a manner, completed his works: that their general, Domitius, in whose promises of assistance they had placed their chief hope, abandoning all concern for their safety, was contriving to escape privately by flight: that it was therefore incumbent on them to look also to their own preservation.' The Marsi at first opposed this resolution, and possessed themselves of the strongest part of the town; nay, the dispute was so warm, that it almost came to be decided by the sword. But, shortly after, being made acquainted with Domitius' intended flight, of which before they had no knowlege, they all, in a body, surrounded Domitius, secured his person, and sent deputies to Cæsar:

'that they were ready to open their gates, receive his orders, and deliver up Domitius alive.'

20. Though Cæsar was fully sensible of how great importance it was to get possession of the town immediately, and join the garrison to his own army; lest by largesses, promises of speedy relief, or false reports, any change should be produced; as in war great revolutions often arise from very trifling causes: yet, fearing that if he introduced his soldiers in the dark, they would take that opportunity to plunder the town, he sent back the deputies, with thanks for their proffer, resolving to have the walls and gates watched with great care. To that end he disposed his men along the works, not at a certain distance, as usual, but in one continued rank, so as to touch each other, and completely invest the town. He ordered the military tribunes, and officers of the cavalry, to patrol about the works, and not only be on their guard against sallies, but even take care to prevent the escape of particular persons. And indeed so alert and vigilant were our soldiers, that not a man closed his eyes that night; each expecting the event with impatience, and carrying his thoughts from one thing to another; what would be the fate of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of Lentulus, and the other illustrious persons in the place: in fine, what was like to be the issue of so complicated a scene.

21. About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the guard, and desired to be conducted to Cæsar. His request being granted, he came out of the town, attended by some of Domitius' soldiers, who never left him till they had conducted him to Cæsar's presence. 'He begged him to spare his life, and pardon the injuries he had done him, in consideration of their former friendship. He owned

the many obligations he had laid him under, in procuring him an admission into the college of priests, obtaining for him the government of Spain, after the expiration of the pretorship, and supporting him in the demand of the consulship.' Cæsar interrupted him by saying, 'that he was not come out of the bounds of his province with an intent to injure any body; but to repel the injuries done him by his enemies; to revenge the wrongs of the tribunes; and to restore to the Roman people, who were oppressed by a small faction of the nobles, their liberty, and privileges.' Lentulus, encouraged by this speech, asked leave to return into the town, 'where,' he said, 'the assurances he had obtained of his own safety would contribute not a little to the consolation of others, some of whom were so terrified, that they were ready to take desperate resolutions.' Leave being granted, he departed for the town.

22. As soon as it was light Cæsar ordered before him all the senators, senators' sons, military tribunes, and Roman knights. There were of senatorian rank, L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, questor, L. Rubrius; also Domitius' son, and many young men of quality, with a great number of Roman knights, and some decurions, or senators of the neighboring municipal towns, who had been sent for by Domitius. As soon as they appeared, he gave orders to secure them from the insults of the soldiery; and, addressing them in a few words, remonstrated, 'that they had made a very ill requital for the many signal services received at his hands.' After which he set them at liberty. He likewise restored to Domitius six millions of sesterces, which that general had brought with him to Corfinium; and deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of the

town, who surrendered it to Cæsar. As this was public money, assigned by Pompey to pay the forces with, Cæsar might justly have seized it, but he was willing to show himself generous as well as merciful. He ordered Domitius' soldiers to take the usual oath to him, decamped that very day, made the ordinary march, and, after staying in all seven days before Corfinium, arrived in Apulia, through the territories of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates.

23. Pompey, having intelligence of what passed at Corfinium, retreated from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He ordered all the new levies to join him, armed the shepherds and slaves, furnished them with horses, and formed a body of about three hundred cavalry. Meanwhile the pretor, L. Manlius, flying from Alba, with six cohorts, and the pretor, Rutilus Lupus, from Tarracina, with three, saw Cæsar's cavalry at a distance, commanded by Bivius Curius; on which the soldiers immediately abandoned the two pretors, and joined the troops under the conduct of Curius. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some with the foot, others with the horse. Cn. Magius of Cremona, Pompey's chief engineer, being taken on his way to Brundusium, was brought to Cæsar, who sent him back to Pompey with this message: 'that as he had not yet obtained an interview, his design was to come to Brundusium, there to confer with him in relation to the common safety; because they soon would be able to despatch, in a personal treaty, what, if managed by the intervention of others, could not be hindered from running into a tedious negotiation.'

24. Having dismissed him with these instructions, he arrived before Brundusium with six legions, three of which were composed of veteran soldiers, and the

rest of new levies drawn together on his march; for as to Domitius' troops, he had sent them directly from Corfinium to Sicily. He found the consuls were gone to Dyrrhachium with great part of the army, and that Pompey remained in Brundusium with twenty cohorts. Nor was it certainly known whether he continued there with design to keep possession of Brundusium, that he might be master of the whole Adriatic sea, the extreme parts of Italy, and the country of Greece, in order to make war on both sides the gulf, or for want of shipping to transport his men. Fearing therefore that it was his intention to keep footing in Italy, he resolved to deprive him of the advantages he might receive from the port of Brundusium. The works he contrived for this purpose were as follows. He carried on a mole on either side the mouth of the haven, where the entrance was narrowest, and the water shallow. But as this work could not be carried quite across the port, by reason of the great depth of the sea, he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet square, which were each secured by four anchors from the four corners, to enable them to resist the fury of the waves. These extending all the way between the two moles, were covered over with earth and fascines, that the soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and have firm footing to defend them. The front and sides were armed with a parapet of hurdles, and every fourth float had a tower of two stories, the better to guard the work from fire, and the shocks of the vessels.

25. Against these preparations Pompey made use of several large ships, which he found in the port of Brundusium; and having fitted them with towers of three stories, which he filled with a great number of engines and darts, let them loose on Cæsar's floats, to break through the staccado, and interrupt the works.

Thus daily skirmishes happened with darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance. Amidst these hostilities, Cæsar's thoughts were still bent on peace; and though he could not but wonder that Magius, whom he had sent with proposals to Pompey, was not yet returned with an answer, and even saw his designs and undertakings retarded by his frequent offers of this kind, he nevertheless still persevered in these peaceable resolutions. Accordingly he despatched Caninius Robilus, one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him on this subject. He charged him to exhort that nobleman to think seriously of peace, and if possible procure an interview between him and Pompey. Could this be effected, he showed there was the greatest ground to believe that peace would soon be concluded on reasonable terms; the honor and reputation of which would, in a manner, wholly redound to Libo, if by his mediation both parties should be prevailed with to lay down their arms. Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited on Pompey: soon after he returned with this answer: that the consuls were absent, without whom Pompey had no power to treat of an accommodation. Thus Cæsar, having often tried in vain to bring about a peace, thought it now time to drop that design, and bend all his thoughts to war.

26. Cæsar having spent nine days about his works, had now half finished the staccado, when the ships employed in the first embarkation, being sent back by the consuls from Dyrrhachium, returned to Brundusium. Pompey, either alarmed at Cæsar's works, or because from the first he had determined to relinquish Italy, no sooner saw the transports arrive, than he prepared to carry over the rest of his forces. And the better to secure himself against Cæsar, and prevent

his troops from breaking into the town during t embarkation, he walled up the gates, barricaded t streets, or cut ditches across them, filled with point stakes, and covered with hurdles and earth. The t streets which led to the port, and which he left op for the passage of his men, were fortified with a doul palisado of very strong well-sharpened stakes. The preparations being made, he ordered the soldiers embark with great silence, having placed on the wa and towers some select archers and slingers, who we to wait till all the troops had got aboard, and then i tire, on a signal given, to some small ships that await them at a convenient distance.

27. The people of Brundusium, provoked by the i fronts they had received from Pompey, and the insu of his soldiers, wished well to Cæsar's cause; and ha ing notice of Pompey's intended departure, while t soldiers were busied with the care of embarking, fou means to signify it from the tops of their houses. C sar, on this intelligence, ordered scaling ladders to prepared, and the soldiers to repair to their arms, th he might not lose any opportunity of acting. Pomp weighed anchor a little before night, and gave the si nal for recalling the soldiers that were on the wal who repaired with all expedition to the ships prepar for them. Meantime the scaling ladders were appli to the walls, and Cæsar's troops entered the tow But being informed by the Brundusians of the snar and ditches provided for them by the enemy, they we obliged to take a great circuit, which gave Pomp time enough to put to sea. Two transports only, i peded by Cæsar's mole, were taken with the troops board.

28. Though Cæsar was fully sensible, that to fini the war at a blow, he must pass the sea immediatel

and endeavor to come up with Pompey before he could draw his transmarine forces together, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time that such a project might require; because Pompey, having carried with him all the ships on that coast, rendered the present execution of the design impracticable. He must therefore wait the arrival of ships from Picenum, Sicily, and the remoter coasts of Gaul, which was a tedious business, and, at that season of the year, subject to great uncertainty. It appeared likewise of dangerous consequence, to suffer a veteran army, and the two Spains, one of which was wholly devoted to Pompey, to strengthen themselves in his rival's interest; to let them grow powerful by levies of horse and foot, and leave Gaul and Italy open to their attacks in his absence. He determined therefore to lay aside, for the present, the design of pursuing Pompey, and turn all his thoughts towards Spain. He ordered the magistrates of the municipal towns to assemble all the vessels they could, and send them to Brundusium. He sent Valerius, one of his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion, and the propretor Curio into Sicily with three; ordering him, as soon as he had mastered Sicily, to pass over with his army into Africa.

29. M. Cotta commanded in Sardinia; M. Cato in Sicily; and Africa had fallen by lot to Tubero. The inhabitants of Cagliari, hearing of Valerius' commission, of their own accord, before he had left Italy, drove Cotta out of their city; who, terrified by the unanimous opposition he met with from the province, fled into Africa. In Sicily, Cato applied himself with great diligence to the refitting of old ships, and building of new. He sent his lieutenant to raise forces in Lucania, and the country of the Brutians, and ordered the states of Sicily to furnish him with a certain num-

ber of horse and foot. When these preparations were almost completed, being informed of Curio's arrival, he called his chief officers together, and complained 'that he was betrayed and abandoned by Pompey, who, without any previous preparation, had involved the commonwealth in an unnecessary war; and on being questioned by himself and others in the senate, had assured them that he was abundantly able to sustain it.' Having thus declared his mind, he quitted the province, which by this means submitted without trouble to Curio, as Sardinia had before done to Valerius. Tubero arriving in Africa, found Attius Varus in possession of that province; who, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, as we have shown above, had fled into those parts, and, with the consent of the natives, taken on him the command. Here he had found means to levy two legions, by his knowlege of the people and country, where he had been governor some years before, after the expiration of his pretorship. Tubero coming before Utica with his fleet, was forbid the harbor and town; nor could he even obtain leave for his son to land, though he had a fit of sickness on him, but was obliged to weigh anchor and be gone.

30. These affairs despatched, Cæsar, that his troops might enjoy some repose, cantoned them in the nearest towns, and set out himself for Rome. There he assembled the senate, and after complaining of the injuries of his enemies, told them 'that he had never affected extraordinary honors, but waited patiently the time prescribed by the laws, to solicit for a second consulship, to which every Roman citizen had a right to aspire: that the people, with the concurrence of their tribunes, (in spite of the attempts of his enemies, and the vigorous opposition of Cato, who endeavored, according to custom, to spin out the time in speaking,)

had permitted him to stand candidate though absent, and that even in the consulship of Pompey; who, if he disapproved of the decree, why did he let it pass? But, if he allowed it, why now oppose the execution? He set before them his moderation, in voluntarily proposing that both parties should lay down their arms, by which he must have been himself divested of his government and command. He displayed the malice of his enemies, who sought to impose terms on him, to which they would not submit themselves; and chose rather to involve the state in a civil war, than part with their armies and provinces. He enlarged on the injury they had done him, in taking away two of his legions, and their cruelty and insolence, in violating the authority of the tribunes. He spoke of his many offers of peace, his frequent desire of an interview, and the continual refusals he had received. For all these reasons, he requested and conjured them to undertake the administration of the republic, jointly with him. But if they declined it through fear, he had no intention to force so great a burden on them, and would take the whole charge alone. That, in the mean time, it would be proper to send a deputation to Pompey, to treat of an accommodation: nor was he frightened at the difficulty Pompey had started some time before in the senate; that to send deputies was to acknowlege the superiority of him to whom they were sent, and a sign of timidity in the sender. That this was a little low way of thinking; and that, in the same manner as he had endeavored at a superiority in action, he would also strive to be superior in justice and equity.'

31. The senate liked the proposal of a deputation to Pompey, but the great difficulty was, to find deputies; every one, out of fear, refusing to charge himself with that commission: for Pompey, at his departure from

Rome, had declared in the senate, 'that he would es teem those who stayed behind as no less guilty tha those in Cæsar's camp.' Thus three days were spen in debates and excuses. The tribune L. Metellus ha likewise been suborned by Cæsar's enemies to travers this design, and hinder whatever he should propose which Cæsar coming to understand, and that he onl wasted his time to no purpose, he set out from Rome without effecting what he had intended, and arrived i Farther Gaul.

32. Here he was informed that Pompey had sen into Spain Vibullius Rufus, the same who a few day before had been made prisoner at Corfinium, and s at liberty by Cæsar: that Domitius was gone to tak possession of Marseilles, with seven galleys, which h had fitted out at Igilium and Cosanum, and manne with his slaves, freedmen, and laborers: that the de puties of the above-mentioned state, young men of th first quality, (whom Pompey, at his departure fro Rome, had exhorted not to suffer the memory of hi past services to their country to be blotted out by thos lately received from Cæsar,) had been sent before, t prepare the way for his reception. In consequence c their remonstrances, the inhabitants of Marseilles shu their gates against Cæsar, and summoned to their as sistance the Albici, a barbarous people, who had lon been under their protection, and inhabited the adjoin ing mountains. They brought provisions from th neighboring country and castles, appointed work-shop for the making of arms, refitted their navy, and re paired their walls and gates.

33. Cæsar, sending for fifteen of the principal me of the city, exhorted them not to be the first to begi the war, but to be swayed rather by the authority c all Italy, than the will of one particular person. H

forgot not such other considerations as seemed most likely to bring them to reason. The deputies returning into the town, brought back this answer from the senate: 'that they saw the Romans divided into two parties, and it did not belong to them to decide such a quarrel: that at the head of these parties were Pompey and Cæsar, both patrons of their city; the one having added to it the country of the Volcæ Arecomici and Helvians; the other, after the reduction of Gaul, considerably augmented its territories and revenues: that as they were therefore equally indebted to both, it became them not to aid the one against the other, but to remain neuter, and grant neither an admittance into their city or port.'

34. Whilst these things were in agitation, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with his fleet, and, being received into the town, was appointed governor, and charged with the whole administration of the war. By his order they sent out their fleet to cruise round the coasts; seized and brought in all the merchant vessels they could find, and made use of the nails, rigging, and timber, of such as were unfit for service, to repair the rest. They deposited in public granaries all the corn that was to be found in the city, and secured whatever else they thought might be serviceable to them in case of a siege. Cæsar, provoked at these preparations, brought three legions before the town, began to erect towers and galleries, and gave orders for building twelve galleys at Arles, which being finished, launched, and brought to Marseilles, within thirty days from the cutting of the wood they were composed of, he put them under the command of D. Brutus, and having directed the manner of the siege, left the care of it to C. Trebonius, his lieutenant.

35. During these orders and preparations, he sent

C. Fabius before him into Spain, with three legion that had wintered about Narbonne, charging him t secure with all diligence the passage of the Pyrenea mountains, which was at that time guarded by a part of Afranius' army. His other legions, whose quarter were more remote, had orders to follow as fast as the could. Fabius, according to his instructions, havin made great dispatch, forced the passes of the Pyrenees and by long marches came up with Afranius' army.

36. Pompey had then three lieutenants in Spain Afranius, Petreius, and Varro. The first of these wa at the head of three legions, and governed the Neare Spain. The other two had each two legions, and com manded, the one from the Castilian forest to th Anas; the other from the Anas, quite through Lusita nia, and the territories of the Vettones. These thre lieutenants, on the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whos Pompey had sent into Spain, as we have seen above consulted together, and agreed that Petreius shoul join Afranius with his two legions, and that Varr should stay and secure Farther Spain. These resolu tions being taken, Petreius levied horse and foot i Lusitania, and Afranius in Celtiberia, and the bar barous nations bordering on the ocean. When th levies were completed, Petreius speedily joined Afra nius, through the territories of the Vettones; and bot resolved to make Lerida the seat of the war, becaus the country lay convenient for their purpose.

37. We have already observed that Afranius ha three legions, and Petreius two. Besides these, ther were about eighty cohorts, some light, some heav armed, and five thousand horse, raised in both pro vinces. Cæsar had sent his legions before him int Spain, with six thousand auxiliary foot, and thre thousand horse, who had served under him in all hi

former wars, and he was furnished with the like number from Gaul, all chosen troops: for hearing that Pompey was coming with his whole force through Mauritania into Spain, he sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, inviting by name those of the most known and approved valor, and in particular a select body of mountaineers from Aquitain, where it borders on the Roman province. At the same time he borrowed money from the military tribunes and centurions, which he distributed among the soldiers. This policy was attended with two great advantages: it bound the officers to him by the obligation of interest, and the soldiers by the tie of gratitude.

38. Fabius, by letters and messengers, endeavored to sound the disposition of the neighboring states. He had laid two bridges over the Sicoris, four miles distant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, having consumed all the pasture on this side the river. Pompey's generals did the same, with much the like view, which occasioned frequent skirmishes between the horse. Two of Fabius' legions, which was the ordinary guard of the foragers, passing one day according to custom, and the cavalry and carriages following, the bridge broke down on a sudden, by the violence of the winds and floods, and separated them from the rest of the army. Afranius and Petreius perceiving it, by the fascines and hurdles that came down with the stream, detached immediately four legions, with all their cavalry, over the bridge that lay between the town and their camp, and marched to attack Fabius' legions. On this, L. Plancus, who commanded the escort, finding himself hard pressed, seizing a rising ground, and forming his men in two divisions, posted them back to back, that he might not be surrounded by the enemy's horse. By this disposition,

though inferior in number, he was enabled to susta the furious charge of their legions and cavalry. Duri the course of the battle, the ensigns of two legio were perceived at a distance, which Fabius had sent l the farther bridge to sustain his party, suspecti what might happen, and that Pompey's generals wou seize the opportunity offered them by fortune, to fall our men. Their arrival put an end to the engagemei and both parties returned to their respective camps.

39. Two days after, Cæsar arrived in the camp wi nine hundred horse, which he had kept for a bod guard. He began by re-establishing in the night t bridge which had been broken down, and was not y quite repaired. Next day he took a view of the cou try, and, leaving six cohorts to guard the bridge, t camp, and the baggage, marched with all his forces three lines to Lerida, and stopped near Afranius' cam where he remained some time under arms, and offer him battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out h troops, and formed them before his camp, half wa down the hill. Cæsar, finding that he declined engagement, resolved to encamp within four hundr paces of the foot of the mountain, and, to hinder h troops from being alarmed or interrupted in the works by sudden incursions from the enemy, order them not to throw up a rampart, which must ha appeared and betrayed them at a distance, but to cut ditch in front, fifteen feet broad. The first and seco lines continued in order of battle, as had been resolv from the beginning, and the third carried on the wo behind them unperceived. Thus the whole was cor pleted before Afranius had the least suspicion of h design to encamp there.

40. In the evening, Cæsar retreated with his legio behind the ditch, and passed the whole night und

arms. Next day he carried the intrenchment quite round his camp, and because materials for a rampart must have been fetched from a great distance, he contented himself for the present with a naked ditch, as the day before, allotting a legion to each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of the troops under arms, to cover those that worked. Afranius and Petreius, to alarm our men and disturb the works, advanced with their troops to the foot of the mountain, and threatened to give battle. But Cæsar, trusting to the three legions under arms, and the defence of his ditch, still persisted in his design. At last, after a short stay, and without daring to come forward into the plain, they retreated again to their camp. The third day Cæsar added a rampart to his camp, and brought into it the six cohorts, with the baggage which he had left in his former camp.

41. Between the city of Lerida and the hill where Petreius and Afranius were encamped was a plain of about three hundred paces, in the midst of which was a rising ground, which Cæsar wanted to take possession of; because, by that means, he could cut off the enemy's communication with the town and bridge, and render the magazines they had in the town useless. In this hope, he drew out three legions, and having formed them in order of battle, commanded the first ranks of one of them to run before, and gain the place. Afranius perceiving his design, despatched the cohorts that were on guard before the camp a nearer way to the same eminence. The contest was sharply maintained on both sides: but Afranius' party, who first got possession of the post, obliged our men to give ground, and being reinforced by fresh supplies, put them at last to rout, and forced them to fly for shelter to the legions.

42. The manner of fighting of Afranius' soldiers wi to come forward briskly against an enemy, and bold take possession of some post, neither taking care keep their ranks, nor holding it necessary to fight in close compact body. If they found themselves ha pushed, they thought it no dishonor to retire and qu their post, following in this the custom of the Lus tanians, and other barbarous nations, as it almost a ways happens that soldiers give into the manners the country where they have long been used to mal war. This manner of fighting, however, as it was ne and unexpected, disordered our men, who seeing th enemy come forward, without regard to their rank were apprehensive of being surrounded, and yet d not think themselves at liberty to break their ranks, abandon their ensigns, or quit their post, without son very urgent cause. The first ranks therefore being p into disorder, the legion in that wing gave ground, an retired to a neighboring hill.

43. Cæsar, contrary to his expectation, finding th consternation like to spread through the whole arm encouraged his men, and led the ninth legion to the assistance. He soon put a stop to the vigorous and in sulting pursuit of the enemy, obliged them to turn the backs, and pushed them to the very walls of Lerid But the soldiers of the ninth legion, elated with su cess, and eager to repair the loss we had sustained followed the runaways with so much heat, that the were drawn into a place of disadvantage, and foun themselves directly under the hill where the town stoo whence when they endeavored to retire, the enem again facing about, charged vigorously from the high ground. The hill was rough, and steep on each sid extending only so far in breadth as was sufficient fo drawing up three cohorts; but they could neither l

reinforced in flank, nor sustained by the cavalry. The descent from the town was indeed something easier, for about four hundred paces, which furnished our men with the means of extricating themselves from the danger into which their rashness had brought them. Here they bravely maintained the fight, though with great disadvantage to themselves, as well on account of the narrowness of the place, as because being posted at the foot of the hill, none of the enemy's darts fell in vain. Still, however, they supported themselves by their courage and patience, and were not disheartened by the many wounds they received. The enemy's forces increased every moment, fresh cohorts being sent from the camp through the town, who succeeded in the place of those that were fatigued. Cæsar was likewise obliged to detach small parties to maintain the battle, and bring off such as were wounded.

44. The fight had now lasted five hours without intermission, when our men, oppressed by the multitude of the enemy, and having spent all their darts, attacked the mountain sword in hand, and overthrowing such as opposed them, obliged the rest to betake themselves to flight. The pursuit was continued to the very walls of Lerida, and some out of fear took shelter in the town, which gave our men an opportunity of making good their retreat. At the same time the cavalry, though posted disadvantageously in a bottom, found means by their valor to gain the summit of the mountain, and riding between both armies, hindered the enemy from harassing our rear. Thus the engagement was attended with various turns of fortune. Cæsar lost about seventy men in the first encounter, among whom was Q. Fulginius, first centurion of the Hastati of the fourteenth legion, who had raised himself by his valor to that rank, through all the inferior orders. Upwards

of six hundred were wounded. On Afranius' side was slain T. Cæcilius, first centurion of a legion; also four centurions of inferior degree, and above two hundred private men.

45. Yet such were the circumstances of this day's action, that both sides laid claim to the victory; the Afranians, because though allowed to be inferior in number, they had long sustained our attack, kept possession of the eminence which occasioned the dispute, and obliged our men at first to give ground: Cæsar's troops, because they had maintained a fight of five hours, with a handful of men, and in a very disadvantageous post; because they had attacked the mountain sword in hand; because they had driven their adversaries from the higher ground, and compelled them to take shelter in the town. Meantime Afranius fortified the hillock which had been the subject of dispute, with a great number of works, and posted there a large body of troops.

46. Two days after, a very unfortunate accident happened: for so great a storm arose, that the water was never known to be higher in those parts; and the snow came down in such quantities from all the mountains round about, that the river overflowed its banks, and in one day broke down both the bridges Fabius had built over it. Cæsar's army was reduced to great extremities on this occasion: for his camp, as we have before observed, was between the Sicoris and Cinga, two rivers that were neither of them fordable, and necessarily shut him up within the space of no more than thirty miles. By this means, neither could the states that had declared for him supply him with provisions, nor the troops that had been sent beyond the rivers to forage, return, nor the large convoys he expected from Gaul and Italy get to his camp. Add

to all this, that it being near the time of harvest, corn was extremely scarce: and the more, as, before Cæsar's arrival, Afranius had carried great quantities of it to Lerida; and the rest had been consumed by Cæsar's troops. The cattle, which was the next resource in the present scarcity, had been removed to places of security, on the breaking out of the war. The parties sent out to forage and bring in corn were perpetually harassed by the Spanish infantry, who being well acquainted with the country, pursued them every where. The rivers themselves did not impede them, because they were accustomed to pass them on blown-up skins, which they always brought with them into the field. Afranius, on the contrary, abounded in all things. He had large magazines of corn already laid up, was continually receiving fresh supplies from the province, and had plenty of forage. The bridge of Lerida furnished all these conveniences without danger, and opened a free communication with the country beyond the river, from which Cæsar was wholly excluded.

47. The waters continued several days. Cæsar endeavored to re-establish his bridges, but could not get the better of the obstacles occasioned by the swelling of the river, and the enemy's forces stationed on the opposite bank. They found it the easier to prevent his design, as the river was deep and rapid, and they could discharge their darts all along the bank, on that particular spot where our men were at work: whereas it was extremely difficult on our side to struggle with the force of the stream, and at the same time guard ourselves against the assaults of the enemy.

48. Meanwhile Afranius was informed that a large convoy, which was on its way to join Cæsar, had been obliged to halt at the river side. It consisted of archers

from Rovergue, Gaulish horse, with many carts and much baggage, according to the custom of the Gauls; and about six thousand men of all sorts, with their domestics and slaves; but without discipline or commander, every one following his own choice, and all marching in perfect security, as if they had nothing more to apprehend than in former times. There were likewise many young gentlemen of quality, senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the deputies of the states of Gaul, and some of Cæsar's lieutenants; who were all stopped short by the river. Afranius set out in the night, with three legions, and all his cavalry; and sending the horse before, attacked them, when they least expected it. The Gaulish squadrons forming with great expedition, began the fight. While the contest was on equal terms, the Gauls, though few in number, bore up against the vast multitude of the enemy; but seeing the legions advance, and having lost some of their men, they retreated to the neighboring mountains. This delay saved the convoy; for during the skirmish the rest of the troops gained the higher ground. We lost that day about two hundred archers, a few troopers, and some servants and baggage.

49. All this served to enhance the price of provisions, a calamity inseparable from present scarcity, and the prospect of future want. Corn was already at fifty denarii a bushel; the soldiers began to lose their strength, and the evil increased every moment. Nay, so great was the change produced in a few days, and such the alteration of fortune, that while our men were in the utmost want of all kinds of necessaries, the enemy had plenty of every thing, and were accounted victorious. Cæsar left nothing untried to remove the present scarcity: he dismissed all the useless mouths;

and applied to the states that had declared for him, desiring them to send him cattle where they wanted corn.

60. These things were greatly exaggerated by Afranius, Petreius, and their friends, in the letters they sent on this occasion to Rome. Nor was fame backward in adding to the account: insomuch, that the war appeared to be almost at an end. These couriers and letters having reached Rome, there was a great concourse of people at Afranius' house, many congratulations passed, and multitudes of the nobility flocked out of Italy to Pompey; some to carry the first accounts of this grateful news; others, that they might not be so late as to subject them to the reproach of having waited for the event of things.

61. Affairs being in this extremity, and all the passes guarded by Afranius' parties, without a possibility of repairing the bridges, Cæsar ordered the soldiers to build some light boats, in imitation of those he had formerly seen in Britain, whose keel and ribs were of wood, and the rest of wicker, covered with leather. When he had got a sufficient number, he sent them by night in waggons, twenty-two miles off his camp. In these he embarked a good number of soldiers, and sent them over the river; took possession unexpectedly of a hill adjoining to the bank on the other side; threw up a fortification before the enemy thought of hindering him; posted a legion in this fortification; and then threw a bridge over the Sicoris in two days. By this means he recovered his foragers, secured the convoy, and opened a passage for future supplies. The same day he detached a great part of his cavalry over the river; who, falling unexpectedly on the enemy's foragers, dispersed up and down without a suspicion of danger, made a considerable capture of men and

horses; and observing some Spanish cohorts on the march to their assistance, skilfully divided themselves into two bodies: one to secure the booty; the other to receive and return the enemy's charge. One of their cohorts, which had rashly separated from the rest, and advanced too far before the main body, was surrounded and cut to pieces by our men, who returned over the same bridge to the camp, without loss, and enriched with a considerable booty.

52. Whilst these things passed at Lerida, the people of Marseilles, by the advice of L. Domitius, equipped seventeen galleys, eleven of which were covered. To these they added a multitude of smaller vessels, that they might strike a terror into our fleet by their very number; and manned them with archers, and the mountaineers we have already mentioned, whom they encouraged to perform their part by great rewards and promises. Domitius desired some of these ships, and filled them with the shepherds and laborers he had brought thither with him. Thus furnished and equipped, they sailed with great confidence, in quest of our fleet, which was commanded by Decimus Brutus, and rode at anchor at an island over against Marseilles. Brutus was much inferior to the enemy in number of ships; but Cæsar had manned them with his best soldiers, chosen out of all the legions, and headed by centurions of distinguished bravery, who had petitioned him for this service. These had provided themselves with hooks and grappling-irons, and a great number of darts, javelins, and offensive weapons of all sorts. Thus prepared, on notice of the enemy's arrival, they stood out to sea, and attacked their fleet. The conflict was sharp and vigorous; for the mountaineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and trained up in war, scarce yielded to the Romans

in bravery; and, having but just parted from Marseilles, still retained a lively sense of the promises so lately made them. The shepherds too, animated by the hopes of liberty, and fighting under the eye of their master, did wonders to merit his approbation. The townsmen themselves, confiding in the nimbleness of their ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded the shock of our vessels, and baffled all their attempts. As they had abundance of sea-room, they extended their line of battle, in order to surround our fleet, or attack our ships singly with a number of theirs, or in running along-side, sweep away a range of oars. If they were compelled to come to a closer engagement, setting aside the skill and address of their pilots, they relied wholly on the bravery of their mountaineers. Our men were but indifferently provided with rowers and pilots, who had been hastily taken out of some merchants' ships, and knew not so much as the names of the tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpishness of their vessels, which being built in haste, of unseasoned timber, were not so ready at tacking about. But when an opportunity offered of coming to close fight, they would boldly get between two of the enemy's ships, and grappling them with their hooks, charge them on each side, board them, and cut to pieces the mountaineers and shepherds that defended them. In this manner they sunk part of their vessels, took some with all the men on board, and drove the rest into the haven. In this engagement the enemy had nine galleys sunk or taken.

53. The report of this battle reaching Lerida, and Cæsar having finished his bridge over the Sicoris, affairs soon began to put on a new face. The enemy, dreading the courage of our horse, durst not disperse about the country as formerly; but either foraged in

the neighborhood of the camp, that they might the sooner make good their retreat, or, by a long circuit, endeavored to avoid our parties: and on receiving any check, or even descrying our cavalry at a distance, they would throw down their trusses, and fly. At last, they were reduced to omit foraging several days together, and resolved to pursue it only by night, contrary to the general custom of war.

54. In the mean time the Oscenses and Calagurritani jointly sent deputies to Cæsar, with an offer of their submission and services. The Tarraconenses, Jacitani, and Ausetani, and, not many days after, the Illurgavonenses, who inhabit along the banks of the Iberus, followed their example. He only required them to supply him with corn, to which they readily agreed; and having got together a great number of carriage horses, brought it to his camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses, hearing of the resolution taken by their state, deserted from the enemy, and came over to Cæsar's camp. The change was sudden and great; for, the bridge being finished, provisions secured, the rumor of Pompey's march through Mauritania extinguished, and five considerable states having declared in his favor, a great number of distant provinces renounced their engagements with Afranius, and entered into new ones with Cæsar.

55. These things having struck a terror into the enemy, that he might not be always obliged to send his cavalry so far about to forage, the bridge lying about seven miles from his camp, he bethought himself of draining the river, by turning some of its water into canals thirty feet deep, so as to make it fordable. The work being almost completed, Petreius and Afranius grew extremely apprehensive of being intirely cut off from their provisions and forage, because Cæsar

was very strong in cavalry. They therefore thought proper to quit a post that was no longer tenable, and to carry the war into Celtiberia. What contributed still farther to confirm them in this resolution was, that of the two contrary parties, concerned in the late war, those who had declared for Sertorius still trembled at the name of the conqueror, and dreaded his power, though absent; and those who had attached themselves to Pompey continued to love him for the many services he had done them: but Cæsar's name was hardly known among these barbarians. Here they expected considerable reinforcements of horse and foot; and doubted not, by taking the advantage of places, to be able to protract the war till winter. In order to execute this plan, they collected all the boats to be found on the Iberus, and ordered them to be brought to Octogesa, a city on that river, about twenty miles from their camp. Here they commanded a bridge of boats to be built; and, having sent two legions over the Sicoris, fortified their camp with a rampart of twelve feet.

56. Cæsar, having notice of this by his scouts, labored day and night at his drains with the utmost diligence; and had already so far diminished the water of the Sicoris, that the cavalry could, with some difficulty, pass over: but it took the infantry as high as the shoulders, who had therefore both the depth of the river and the rapidity of the stream to struggle with. Meanwhile it was known that the bridge over the Iberus was almost finished, and Cæsar's ford in great forwardness. This was a fresh motive to the enemy to quicken their march: wherefore, leaving two auxiliary cohorts for a garrison at Lerida, they crossed the Sicoris with all their forces, and joined the two legions they had sent over before. Cæsar had now no other

remedy left but to harass and fatigue them with his cavalry: for if he went with his whole army over his bridge, he lengthened his march prodigiously, and gave Afranius time enough to get to the Iberus. Accordingly the horse having forded the river, came up with Petreius and Afranius' rear, who had decamped about midnight, and making a motion to surround them, began to stop and retard their march.

57. At day-break we discovered from the hills near the camp that the enemy's rear was greatly harassed by our cavalry. Sometimes they obliged them to halt, and disordered their ranks: at other times, the enemy facing about, charged with all their cohorts at once, and forced our men to give ground; who, wheeling again as soon as they began to march, failed not to renew the attack. At this sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and down the camp, complained that the enemy would escape out of their hands, and the war necessarily be prolonged. They addressed themselves to the centurions and military tribunes, and desired them to beg of Cæsar not to spare them; that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the river as the horse had done. Cæsar, moved by their alacrity and intreaties, though he saw some danger in exposing his army to the rapidity of a deep river, judged it yet proper to attempt and make trial of the passage. Having therefore withdrawn from every company such as were weak of body, or of less courage than the rest, he left them in the camp, with a legion, and all the baggage. The rest of the army happily passed the river, by the assistance of a double line of cavalry, placed above and below them. Some of the infantry were carried away by the violence of the current; but they were picked up and saved by the horse below them; so that no one man was lost.

Having passed the river without loss, he drew up his army in order of battle, and began to pursue the enemy in three lines; and such was the ardor of the soldiers, that notwithstanding the army was obliged to make a circuit of six miles, notwithstanding the time necessarily lost in crossing the river, they got up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, who had set out at midnight.

58. When Afranius and Petreius perceived them at some distance, being with reason intimidated, they suspended their march, halted on an eminence, and formed in order of battle. Cæsar would not hazard an action with his troops, thus fatigued, and halted likewise in the plain. On this, the enemy resumed their march, and he the pursuit; which obliged them to encamp earlier than they designed. Hard by was a range of mountains, and about five miles farther the ways were difficult and narrow. The enemy retired among these mountains, to avoid the pursuit of the cavalry; and having placed parties in all the passes, to stop Cæsar's army, hoped, by this means, to continue their march to the Iberus, without fear or danger. This was their great affair, and what before all things they should have endeavored to effect; but, being fatigued by a long march, and their continual skirmishes with Cæsar's cavalry, they deferred it till next day. Cæsar likewise encamped on a hill that lay near him.

59. About midnight, the cavalry having surprised some of the enemy, who had adventured a little too far from their camp in quest of water, Cæsar was informed by them that Pompey's lieutenants were decamping without noise. Immediately he ordered the alarm to be sounded, and gave his army the signal to march. The enemy, finding they should be pursued,

kept still; being afraid of a nocturnal flight, wherein they would have had greatly the disadvantage, on account of their heavy baggage which they had with them, and the superiority of Cæsar's cavalry. Next day, Petreius went privately out with a party of horse to take a view of the country. Cæsar likewise detached a squadron for the same purpose, under the command of Decidius Saxa. Both made the like report in their several camps; that for five miles together, the country was level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that whoever should first get possession of the defiles might easily prevent the other army from approaching them.

60. On this, a council of war was held by Petreius and Afranius, to deliberate about the time of beginning their march. The greater number were for setting out by night, in hopes of reaching the defiles before Cæsar could have notice of their departure. Others argued against the possibility of decamping privately, by the alarm given in Cæsar's camp the night before, 'that the enemy's cavalry were continually patrolling in the night, and had beset all the ways and passes: that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, because, in a civil war, the soldiers were more apt to listen to their fears than the obligations of the military oath: that shame, and the presence of the centurions and tribunes, the great instruments of obedience and military duty, could have their proper effect only in the light, which rendered it of infinite importance to wait the approach of day; that in case of a disaster, yet the bulk of the army would escape, and be able to possess themselves of the post in question.' This opinion prevailed in the council, and they resolved to set out the next morning by break of day.

61. Cæsar having taken a view of the country, de-

camped as soon as it was light, taking a considerable circuit, and observing no particular route; for the direct way to the Iberus and Octogesa lay in the rear of the enemy's camp. He was therefore obliged to march through valleys, and over precipices and steep rocks, which the soldiers could not climb, but by disincumbering themselves of their arms, and returning them afterwards to one another. But not a man murmured at these difficulties, in hopes of seeing a speedy end of all their labors, if they could but gain the Iberus before the enemy, and intercept their provisions. As in this march we pursued at first an opposite course, and seemed to turn our backs on the enemy, Afranius' soldiers, who observed us from their camp, came forth with joyful looks, and insulted us on our supposed flight, imagining the want of provisions obliged us to return to Lerida. Their generals applauded themselves on their resolution of not decamping, and were confirmed in the notion of our retreat, as they saw we had neither horses nor carriages; whence they concluded the scarcity must be exceeding great. But when they saw us, after some time, turn to the right, and that our advanced guard had already gained the ground beyond their camp, there was not a man so tardy or indolent, as not to perceive the necessity of decamping and opposing our march. Immediately they ran to arms, and leaving a few cohorts to guard the camp, sallied in a body, pursuing their way directly to the Iberus.

62. All depended on dispatch, and getting the first possession of the defiles and mountains. Our troops were retarded by the difficulties of the way, and Afranius' by the continual attacks of Cæsar's cavalry: but such was the situation of the Afranians, that even supposing them to gain the hills first, they could only secure their own retreat, without a possibility of pre-

serving their baggage, and the cohorts left to guard the camp; because Cæsar's army getting between, cut them off from all communication with their own men. Cæsar arrived first at the place in question; and having found a plain beyond the rocks, formed his men in order of battle against the enemy. Afranius, who now saw our army in his front, at the same time that his rear was continually harassed by the cavalry, halted on an eminence, from whence he detached four Spanish cohorts, to take possession of the highest mountain thereabouts; ordering them to make all the dispatch they could to seize it, that he might get thither himself with the rest of his forces, and, changing his route, march them over the hills to Octogesa. The Spaniards wheeling obliquely to take possession of the place, were perceived by Cæsar's cavalry; who charged them furiously, broke them at the first onset, surrounded, and cut them in pieces in sight of both armies.

63. Cæsar had now an opportunity of giving the enemy an effectual blow; whose army, in the present consternation it was under, would, he was sensible, make but a faint resistance; more especially as it was surrounded on all sides by the cavalry, and would be obliged to fight on equal ground. He was pressed, on all hands, to give the signal. The lieutenants, centurions, and military tribunes, got round him, urging him not to delay the engagement, 'That the soldiers were all eager for a battle; whereas, on the contrary, the Afranians had given many marks of fear: that they had neither dared to support their own detachment, nor offered to descend from the hill, nor been able to withstand the very first charge of our cavalry: that they had brought their ensigns all into one place, where they crowded confusedly round them, without observing ranks or order: that if he was afraid to attack

them on the eminence, he would soon have an opportunity of more equal ground, as Afranius would be obliged to remove for want of water.'

64. Cæsar was in hopes of terminating the affair without bloodshed, or a battle; because he had intercepted the enemy's provisions. Why, therefore, even supposing the event to be prosperous, should he unnecessarily lose any of his men? Why should he expose to wounds, soldiers who had so well deserved of him? Why, in fine, should he tempt fortune? especially as it redounded no less to the honor of a good general, to gain the victory by his conduct, than by the force of his arms. He was also touched with compassion for Afranius' soldiers; who, after all, were fellow-citizens, and whom he must have slaughtered, when he could equally succeed without touching their lives. This resolution was not at all relished by the army; who, in their discontent, openly declared, that since Cæsar did not lay hold of so favorable an opportunity, nor let them fight when they had a mind, they would not fight when he had a mind. But nothing could shake him. Nay, he even retreated a little, to give Afranius and Petreius liberty to regain their camp, which they did. He then posted troops on the mountains, to guard the defiles, and came and encamped as near the enemy as possible.

65. The day after, Pompey's lieutenants, disturbed at finding their provisions cut off, and all the ways to the Iberus intercepted, consulted what was proper to be done. They had it still in their power to return to Lerida, or march to Tarraco. But while they were debating this matter, notice was brought them, that our cavalry had fallen on their parties sent out in quest of water. On this intelligence, they formed several posts of horse and foot, intermixed with legionary co-

horts, and began to throw up a rampart from the camp to the place where they watered, that the soldiers might pass and repass under cover, without fear, and without a guard. Afranius and Petreius divided this work between them, and went to give directions about it in person.

66. In their absence, their soldiers found frequent opportunities of conversing with our men, and sought out every one his fellow-citizen and acquaintance. They began by thanking them for having spared them the day before, owning they were indebted to them for their lives. Afterwards they asked them if they might trust to Cæsar's honor; testifying much grief at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations, with whom they were united by the strictest ties. At last they stipulated even for their generals, whom they would not seem to betray; and promised, if the lives of Petreius and Afranius were granted them, to change sides. At the same time they sent some of their principal officers to negotiate with Cæsar; and, these preliminaries to an accommodation being settled, the soldiers of both armies went into one another's tents, so that the two camps were now in a manner one. A great number of centurions and military tribunes came to pay their court to Cæsar, and beg his protection. The Spanish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend Afranius, and were detained in the camp as hostages, followed their example. Every man sought out his acquaintance and friends, who might recommend and procure him a favorable reception from Cæsar. Things were carried to such a length, that Afranius' son, a young gentleman, treated with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sulpicius, to desire he would give his word for his life, and that of his father. The joy was general; they mutually congratulated each other; the one, in

that they had escaped so imminent a danger; and the other, in that they had brought to a happy conclusion so important an enterprise, without striking a blow. Cæsar, in the judgment of all, was on the point of amply reaping the fruits of his wonted clemency, and every body applauded his late conduct.

67. Afranius having notice of what passed, quitted the work he was engaged in, and returned to the camp; prepared, as it would seem, to bear with an equal mind whatever should happen. But Petreius was not wanting to himself. He armed his slaves; and joining them to a pretorian cohort of target-bearers, and some Spanish horse, his dependants, whom he always kept about him to guard his person, he instantly flew to the rampart, broke off the conferences of the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put all of them he could find to the sword. The rest flocked together; where, alarmed at the danger to which they saw themselves exposed, they wrapped their cloaks round their left arms, drew their swords, and trusting to the nearness of their camp, defended themselves against the Spanish target-bearers and cavalry, till they had retreated to our advanced guard, who screened them from any farther assault.

68. After this, he went through the whole camp, begging his troops, with tears, to have pity on him, and Pompey their general; and that they would not deliver them both up to the cruel vengeance of their enemies. Every one on this flocks to the head-quarters. There Petreius proposes to the army to bind themselves by a new oath, not to abandon nor betray their commanders, nor to act separately, but all in concert, for the common good. He himself took this oath first, and then exacted it of Afranius, afterwards of the military tribunes and centurions, and lastly of all the com-

panies, man by man. At the same time an order issued, that all who had any of Cæsar's soldier their tents should signify it, that they might be pu death in the sight of the whole army. But the m rity detesting this bloody order, carefully hid th who were under their protection, and procured th means to escape in the night. However, the te they had been thrown into by their generals, the verity shown in punishing, and the new oath they been obliged to take, defeated for the present all h of a surrender, changed the soldiers' minds, and duced the war to its former state.

69. Cæsar ordered diligent search to be made a such of the enemy's soldiers as had come to his c during the time of conference, and carefully sent th back. Some military tribunes and centurions vol tarily chose to stay with him, whom he afterw treated with great distinction; promoting the ce rions to higher ranks, and honoring the Roman kni with the office of military tribunes.

70. The Afranian troops were destitute of for and could not water without much difficulty. The gionary soldiers had indeed some provisions, beca they had been ordered to bring two-and-twenty da corn with them from Lerida; but the Spanish infa and auxiliaries had none; for they neither had opp tunities of supplying themselves, nor were their bo inured to carry heavy burdens. Accordingly t every day deserted in shoals to Cæsar. In this ex mity, of the two expedients proposed, that of return to Lerida appeared the safest, as they had still s provisions in that city, and might there concert w farther measures to pursue. Tarraco was at a gre distance, and they would of course be exposed to m accidents by the way. This resolution being tak

they decamped. Cæsar sent the cavalry before to harass and retard them in their march; and followed himself with the rest of the army. The cavalry gave the enemy no respite, being continually engaged with their rear.

71. The manner of fighting was thus:—Some light-armed cohorts formed the rear-guard, which, in a plain, halted from time to time, and made head against our cavalry. When they fell in with an eminence, the very nature of the ground furnished them with the means of defending themselves, because those who were first could cover those behind. But when a valley or descent came in the way, the van could give no assistance to the rear, and our cavalry annoyed them with their darts from the higher ground, which put them in imminent danger. In this case the legions were obliged to halt, and endeavor to drive back the cavalry a good way, after which they ran down the valley precipitately, until they came to the opposite eminence: for their cavalry, of which they had a considerable number, was so terrified by their ill success in former skirmishes, that, far from being of any service, they were forced to place it in the centre to secure it; and if any of them chanced to straggle from the main body, they were immediately taken by Cæsar's horse.

72. During these continual skirmishes, in which the enemy were often obliged to halt, in order to disengage their rear, it is easy to perceive that their march could not be very expeditious. This was in fact the case; so that after advancing four miles, finding themselves greatly incommoded by the cavalry, they halted on an eminence, and drew a line before them, as it were to encamp, but did not unload their beasts of burden. When they saw that Cæsar had marked out his camp, pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to forage;

suddenly, towards noon, they resumed their march briskly, hoping to be rid of the cavalry which had so much incommoded them. But Cæsar set out immediately with his legions, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, and sent orders to his cavalry to return with all diligence. The cavalry returned accordingly, and, having overtaken the enemy before the close of day, attacked their rear so vigorously, that they were almost routed, a great number of soldiers, and even some centurions, being slain. Cæsar's whole army came up, and threatened them with an immediate attack.

73. As they could then neither choose a proper place for a camp, nor continue their march, they were forced to halt where they were, far from any water, and on very disadvantageous ground. Cæsar did not offer to attack them, for the reasons mentioned before: he would not even permit any tents to be pitched that day, that he might be the readier to pursue with all his forces, should they attempt to escape either by night or by day. The Afranians, perceiving the disadvantage of their situation, employed the whole night in throwing up intrenchments, and disposed their camp directly fronting ours. The same they did the following day, from sunrise till the evening. But the farther they extended their camp, and produced their lines, in order to better their position, the farther they went from water, and, to avoid one inconvenience, fell into another. The first night nobody went out of the camp for water, and the next day the whole army was obliged to do it in order of battle, so that they could not forage that day. Cæsar wanted to humble them by these misfortunes, and reduce them by want and necessity rather than force. He began however to draw lines round their camp, the better to check their

sudden sallies and eruptions, to which he foresaw they would be obliged to have recourse at last. Want, and the desire of marching with less difficulty, soon constrained them to kill all the beasts of burden.

74. Two days were spent in forming and executing these resolutions; on the third, Cæsar had considerably advanced his works. Afranius and Petreius, sensible of the consequences, drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. Cæsar presently called in his workmen, assembled his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to receive them; for he was aware of the hurt his reputation might sustain, if, contrary to the opinion of the troops, and the earnest expectations of all, he should still seem to decline an engagement. However, for the reasons already mentioned, he resolved to keep only on the defensive; and the rather, because the distance between the two camps was so small, that should he even put his adversaries to rout, he could not flatter himself with the hopes of a complete victory. In fact, from camp to camp was not above two thousand feet; the armies were posted on each side of this space, which was left void for the mutual charge and assault of the soldiers. On supposition therefore of a battle, the nearness of their camp furnished an easy retreat to the vanquished. For this reason he resolved to wait the enemy's charge, and not enter the first into action.

75. Afranius' troops were ranged in two lines, consisting of five legions, and the cohorts wont to be stationed in the wings, formed a body of reserve. Cæsar's army was on three lines; in the first of which were posted four cohorts, detached out of each of the five legions; in the second, three; and in the third, the like number; all from their respective legions: the archers and slingers were disposed in the midst, and

the cavalry on the two wings. The armies being drawn up in this manner, each general kept firm to his resolution; Cæsar, not to engage, unless forced to it; and Afranius, to prevent the progress of our works. In this posture they continued till sunset, when both armies returned to their several camps. The next day Cæsar prepared to finish his lines; and Pompey's lieutenants, as their last resource, endeavored to find a fordable place in the Sicoris: but Cæsar, penetrating their design, sent his light-armed Germans, with part of his cavalry, over the river, and posted many good bodies of troops along the banks, at a small distance from one another.

76. At last, having no hope left, and being in want of every thing, wood, water, forage, corn, they demanded an interview; and that it might be, if possible, in some place out of the sight of the soldiers. Cæsar denied the last part of their request, but offered to grant them a public interview; whereon Afranius, having given his son for a hostage, went to the place appointed by Cæsar, where, in the presence of both armies, he addressed him to this effect: 'That it was no just matter of blame, either in him or his soldiers, to have preserved their fidelity to their general, Pompey; but that they had now sufficiently acquitted themselves of their duty, and suffered enough in his cause, by the want of all kind of necessaries: that, like wild beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of the most common enjoyments, having their bodies oppressed by want, and their minds overwhelmed with ignominy; that they therefore acknowleged themselves vanquished, and besought and conjured him not to make a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the lives of his unhappy countrymen.' This speech was delivered with all possible marks of humility and submission.

77. Cæsar replied, 'that he, of all mankind, had least reason to complain, or implore compassion: that all the rest had fully done their duty; himself, in forbearing to attack him, with all the advantages of time and place, that the way to an accommodation might be the more open; his army, in returning untouched the men that were in their power, after injuries received, and the massacre of their comrades: in fine, even his own troops, in endeavoring to conclude a peace, whereon they thought their safety depended. Thus all orders had shown an inclination to treat, while Afranius and Petreius alone opposed an accommodation, refusing both interview and truce, and barbarously murdering those whom the faith of a conference had enticed to their camp: that it had therefore happened to them as frequently happens to men of obstinacy and arrogance, and they were forced to have recourse to those conditions, and earnestly solicit the very same terms, which not long before they had despised. However, he would not take advantage of their present submission, or the favorable circumstances in which he found himself, to demand any thing tending to the increase of his own power, but only that they would disband those troops which they had now for so many years kept on foot against him. For with what other view had six legions been sent into Spain; a seventh levied there; so many powerful navies equipped; so many able and experienced officers sent over? These mighty preparations could not be meant against Spain, or to supply the wants of the province; which, having enjoyed a long run of peace, had no occasion for such extraordinary forces. Their real aim was to pave the way to his destruction; to effect which, a new species of power had been introduced into the commonwealth, and the same man appointed to command in Italy, at the gates

of Rome, and hold for so many years, though absent, the government of the two most potent provinces of the republic. For this reason the magistrates were stripped of their prerogatives, and not suffered to take possession of their provinces, at the expiration of the pretorship or consulship, as had always been the custom; but particular governors were sent, by the choice and management of a faction. For this reason even the excuse of old age was disallowed; and those who had merited a discharge by their past services, were compelled to take arms again, to complete the number of their troops. In fine, for this reason, he alone had been denied that justice, which was never refused to any general before him; that after having successfully served the commonwealth, he should be allowed to return home, and disband his own army, with some marks of honor, or at least without ignominy. All which, nevertheless, he had hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with patience; nor was it now his design to take from them their soldiers, and enlist them, as it would be easy for him to do, but to prevent their employing them against him. Therefore, as he had already intimated, they must resolve to quit Spain, and disband their forces, in which case he would injure no man. This was his final resolution, and the only condition of peace they were to expect.'

78. These conditions were agreeable to Afranius' soldiers, who, instead of being punished, as they feared, were in some sort rewarded by the discharge procured them. They plainly showed their satisfaction: for, while the place and time of their dismission were debating, they signified by their gestures and cries from the rampart, where they stood, that they desired to be disbanded immediately; because no sufficient security could be given for the performance of what was put off

till another time. After some discussion of that article by Cæsar and Afranius, it was regulated, that those who had houses or possessions in Spain should be discharged on the spot; and the rest near the Var, a river between Gaul and Italy. Cæsar, on his side, declared that he would hurt nobody, nor force any one to take on in his service.

79. Cæsar undertook to find them in corn until they got to the Var. He even promised to restore to them all they had lost in the war that could be known again; himself indemnifying his own soldiers, who hereby lost part of their booty. By this conduct he acquired their confidence to such a degree, that he was arbiter of all the disputes they had, either among themselves, or with their commanders. The soldiers being ready to mutiny about their pay, because Petreius and Afranius affirmed it was not yet due, the matter was referred to Cæsar, who determined it to the satisfaction of both parties. About a third of the army was disbanded during the two days they continued here, after which the rest set out for the Var in this order. Two of Cæsar's legions marched at the head, the others in the rear, and the vanquished troops in the middle. Q. Fufius Calenus, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, presided over the march. In this manner they continued their route to the Var, where the remainder of the troops were disbanded.

BOOK II.

1. WHILE these things passed in Spain, Trebonius, Cæsar's lieutenant, who had been left to carry on the siege of Marseilles, raised terraces for two different attacks, and approached with his towers and galleries. One of the attacks was on the side of the port; the other, towards the mouth of the Rhone, which empties itself into the sea bordering on Spain and Gaul: for Marseilles is washed by the sea on three sides, and can be approached by land only on the fourth; of which that part where the citadel stands, being very strong by nature, because of a deep valley that runs before it, requires a long and difficult siege. For the completing of these works, Trebonius drew together, from all parts of the province, a great number of workmen and beasts of carriage; ordered wood and osiers to be brought; and having prepared all things necessary, raised a terrace eighty feet high.

2. But so well was the town provided with all requisites of war, and so great was the multitude of machines to annoy the besiegers, that no mantles were sufficient to withstand their violence: for they had wooden bars, twelve feet in length, armed at the point with iron, which were shot with such force from their balistæ, that they pierced four rows of hurdles, and entered a considerable way into the ground. To resist the violence of these batteries, the besiegers made use of galleries, whose roofs consisted of pieces of wood of about a foot in thickness, strongly compacted together. Under this cover the materials necessary for raising the terrace were conveyed: and a tortoise, sixty feet long, composed of strong beams, and armed with every

thing necessary to defend it against fire and stones, went before to level the ground. But in spite of all endeavors, the greatness of the works, the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of machines made use of by the besieged, greatly retarded the approaches. Besides, the mountaineers made frequent sallies, and set fire to the towers and mount: which, though our men easily sustained, driving them back with great loss into the town, yet failed not very much to incommode the works.

3. In the mean time L. Nasidius, sent by Pompey to the assistance of Domitius and the Marseillians, with a fleet of sixteen ships, some of which were strengthened with beaks of brass, passed the straits of Sicily unknown to Curio, landed at Messana, and raised so great a terror in the place, that, being abandoned by the senate and principal inhabitants, he found means to carry off one of their galleys; and joining it to his own fleet, steered directly for Marseilles; having despatched a frigate before, to apprise Domitius and the inhabitants of his coming, and press them to hazard a second engagement with Brutus, when they should be reinforced by his fleet.

4. The Marseillians, after their defeat, had drawn as many old ships out of the docks as they had lost in the engagement, and repaired and rigged them with wondrous expedition. They were likewise well provided with rowers and pilots; and had prepared a number of fishing-barks, which they filled with archers and engines, and strengthened with roofs to shelter the rowers from the enemy's darts. The fleet being equipped in this manner, the Marseillians, animated by the prayers and tears of their old men, matrons, and virgins, to exert themselves in defence of their country in so pressing a conjuncture, embarked with no less confi-

dence and assurance than they had done before their late defeat: for such is the weakness of the human mind, that things dark, hidden, and unknown, always produce in us a greater degree of confidence or terror; as happened in the present case; for the arrival of Nasidius had filled all men with an uncommon share of hope and eagerness. The wind springing up fair, they set sail, and rendezvoused at Tauroenta, a castle belonging to the town, where Nasidius lay with his fleet. Here they put their ships in order, armed themselves with courage for a second encounter, and entering readily into all the measures proposed by Nasidius, left to him the command of the left wing, and stationed themselves on the right.

5. Brutus sailed to meet them, with his fleet considerably increased; for besides the ships which Cæsar had caused to be built at Aries, he had also joined to it six more, taken from the Marseillians, which he had refitted and rigged since the late action. Wherefore exhorting his men to despise an enemy, who had not been able to resist them when intire and unvanquished, he advanced against them full of resolution and confidence. It was easy to discern from Trebonius' camp, and the eminences around it, what passed in the town. All the youth that were left, the old men, the women, children, and even the guards on the walls, extending their hands to heaven, or repairing to the temples, and prostrating themselves at the altars, besought the gods to grant them victory. Nor was there a man among them who did not believe that their safety depended wholly on the issue of that day's action; for the choice of their youth, and the most considerable men of their city, were all on board the fleet: insomuch, that in case of any disaster, they had no resource left: but should they obtain the victory, they were in hopes of preserving

their city, either by their own forces, or the reinforcements they expected from without.

6. Accordingly, in the engagement, they behaved with the most determined courage. The remembrance of what their wives and children had represented to them at their departure served to exalt their bravery; in a full persuasion that this was the last opportunity they should have of exerting themselves in defence of their country; and that if they fell in the engagement, their fellow-citizens could not long survive them, as their fate must be the same on the taking of the town. Our ships being at some distance from each other, both gave the enemy's pilots an opportunity of showing their address in working their vessels, and flying to the assistance of their friends, when they were laid hold on by our grappling-hooks. And indeed, when it came to a close fight, they seconded the mountaineers with wonderful resolution, and, in bravery, seemed to yield but little to our men. At the same time, a great quantity of darts poured incessantly from their smaller frigates, wounded a great many of our rowers, and such of the soldiers as were without shelter. Two of their galleys fell on that of Brutus, which was easily distinguished by its flag: but though they attacked him on both sides, he extricated himself with such agility and address, as in a short time to get a little before, which made them run foul of each other so violently, that they were both considerably shattered; one in particular had its beak broken, and was in a manner totally crushed; which being observed by those of our fleet that lay nearest, they suddenly fell on and sunk them, before they could recover out of their disorder.

7. In this encounter, the ships under Nasidius were of no manner of service to the Marseillians, but

quickly retired out of the fight: for as they were neither animated by the sight of their country, nor the intreaties of their relations, they were not very forward to expose their lives to hazard, but escaped without hurt from the combat. The Marseillians had five ships sunk, and four taken. One escaped to the coast of Hither Spain, with those of Nasidius. Of the rest that remained, one was immediately despatched to Marseilles, to carry thither the news of the defeat. As soon as it drew near the town, all the inhabitants flocked out to know what had passed; and, being informed of it, appeared no less dejected than if the city had been taken by storm. However, they still continued their preparations for the defence of the place with as much diligence as ever.

8. The legionaries, who had the charge of the works on the right, perceived, that a tower of brick, built at a little distance from the walls, would be of great service to shelter them from the frequent sallies of the enemy. At first they made it very low and small, to guard against sudden incursions. Hither they retired in case of danger: here they defended themselves against the most obstinate attacks of the enemy; nay, even assaulted them in their turn, repulsed, and pursued them. This tower was of a square form, thirty feet every way, allowing for the thickness of the walls, which might be about five feet. Afterwards, (being instructed by experience, which is the best of teachers,) they plainly perceived, that the higher it was carried, the more serviceable it would prove. The manner of effecting it was thus: when the work was raised to the height of one story, they laid a floor over it, the extremities of whose beams were concealed in the thickness of the wall, that they might not, by appearing on the outside, be liable to be set on fire. Thence they

continued the wall directly upwards, as far as their galleries and mantles would allow. Here they laid two beams cross-wise, whose extremities almost reached the angles of the wall, for supporting the floor, which was to serve as a roof to the whole. Over these beams they laid the joists of the roof, and boarded them with planks. The roof was so contrived as to project a little beyond the wall, in order to suspend from it what might be necessary to shelter the workmen, while employed in completing the story. This floor was paved with tiles and clay, to render it proof against fire, and had besides a covering of strong mattresses, to break the force of stones and darts. At the same time they suspended from the beams of the roof, that projected beyond the wall, curtains made of strong cables, wove to the depth of four feet, and which went round the three sides of the tower that were exposed to the engines of the enemy; having experienced on former occasions that this kind of cover was impenetrable to any dart or engine whatever. When this part of the tower was finished, roofed, and sheltered from the enemy's blows, they removed their mantles to another, and by means of engines elevated the roof intire from the first story, as far as the curtains would allow. There, secure from all insult, they labored at the wall, elevating the roof a second time, and thereby enabling themselves both to continue the work, and lay the interjacent floors. In this manner they proceeded from story to story, mounting them one on another, till, without danger or wounds, they had completed the number of six, leaving loop-holes in convenient places for the engines to play through.

9. When, by means of this tower, they thought they had sufficiently provided for the security of the works around it, they resolved to build a gallery sixty feet

long, of wood two feet in thickness, to extend from the brick tower to the tower of the enemy, and the very walls of the town. The form of the gallery was this: first, two beams of equal length were laid on the ground, at the distance of four feet from one another; and in these were fixed little pillars five feet high, joined at the top by beams designed to support the roof of the gallery. Over these were laid rafters, two feet square, fastened strongly with nails and plates of iron. The upper part of the roof was composed of square laths, four inches thick, which were placed at a small distance one from another, to bear the tiles that were to be laid on them. Thus was the whole finished with a sloping roof, which, being partly composed of tiles and mortar, was proof against fire, and had besides a covering of hides, to hinder the mortar from being washed away by spouts of water. Over all we threw strong mattresses, to screen the hides from fire and stones. This work was finished close by the brick tower, under cover of four mantles, and immediately carried forward on rollers, in the manner ships are launched, till it unexpectedly reached the very tower of the enemy.

10. The Marseillians, astonished at so threatening and unlooked-for a machine, pushed forward with levers the largest stones they could find, and tumbled them from the top of the wall on the gallery. But the strength of the wood resisted the violence of the blows, so that they fell to the ground without doing any hurt. Observing this, they changed their design, and poured down on us burning barrels of pitch and tallow. But these likewise rolled along the roof without damage, and, falling on the ground, were afterwards thrust away with forks and long poles. Meanwhile our soldiers, under protection of the gallery, were endeavor-

ing with their levers to undermine the enemy's tower. The gallery itself was defended by the tower of brick, whence our engines played without intermission; insomuch, that the enemy, driven from their tower and walls, were at last obliged to abandon their defence. By degrees the tower being undermined, part of it fell down, and the rest was so shaken that it could not stand long.

11. On this the enemy, alarmed at so unexpected a misfortune, discouraged by the downfall of the tower, awed by such a testimony of the wrath of the gods, and dreading the plunder and devastation of their city, came forth in the habit of suppliants, and with outstretched hands besought the compassion of the army and generals. At this new and unexpected sight, all acts of hostility ceased, and the soldiers, laying aside their ardor for the fight, were eager to hear and get acquainted with the proposals of the enemy, who, arriving in presence of the army and generals, threw themselves at their feet, requesting them to suspend all farther operations till Cæsar's arrival. They told them, 'that as the works were now completed, and the tower destroyed, they were sensible the city could no longer hold out, and therefore meant not to defend it: that in the mean time no prejudice could arise to the besiegers from this respite; because, if they refused to submit on Cæsar's coming, he would have it in his power to treat them as he pleased.' They added, 'that if the whole tower should be brought down, it would be impossible to hinder the soldiers from yielding to the desire of plunder, by breaking into and pillaging the town.' This, and much more of the same nature (for the Marseillians are a learned people) they urged in a very moving and pathetic strain.

12. The generals, moved by these remonstrances,

drew off the soldiers from the works, discontinued the attack, and contented themselves with posting guards in convenient places. Compassion occasioned a kind of truce till Cæsar's arrival; so that on neither side were any acts of hostility committed, but every thing was quiet and secure, as if the siege had been at an end: for Cæsar had earnestly recommended it to Trebonius by letter, to prevent, if possible, the city's being taken by storm, lest the soldiers, irritated by their revolt, and the resistance they had found, should put all the youth to the sword, as they threatened to do. Nay, they were even then hardly restrained from breaking into the town, and loudly murmured against Trebonius for delaying a conquest which they looked on as certain.

13. But the Marseillians, a nation without faith, aimed at nothing farther in all this, than to find a time and opportunity to deceive us, and put in practice the treacherous purpose they had formed. For after some days, our men suspecting no danger, but relying on the good faith of the enemy, while some were retired to their tents, others laid down to rest in the trenches, overpowered by the long fatigue they had undergone, and all the arms laid up and removed out of sight; suddenly they sallied from the town, and the wind being high, and favorable to their design, set fire to the works. The flame in a moment spread itself on all sides; insomuch, that the battery, the mantles, the tortoise, the tower, the machines, and the gallery were intirely destroyed, before it was possible to discover whence the disaster arose. The suddenness of the accident made our men immediately run to their arms, where every one took what came first to hand. Some sallied out on the enemy, but were checked by the arrows and darts poured on them from the town; inso-

much, that the Marseillians, sheltered by their walls, burnt without any difficulty the tower of brick and the gallery. Thus the labor of many months was destroyed in an instant, by the treachery of an enemy and the violence of the wind. Next day they made the same attempt, favored by the same wind, and with yet greater assurance, against the tower and terrace of the other attack. They approached them boldly, and threw plenty of fire on them; but our men, grown wise by their late misfortune, had made all necessary preparations for their defence; so that, after losing many men, they were obliged to retreat into the city without effecting their purpose.

14. Trebonius immediately resolved to repair his loss, in which he found himself warmly seconded by the zeal of the soldiers. They saw the works which had cost so much labor and toil destroyed by the perfidy of a people who made no scruple of violating the most sacred engagements; they saw that their credulity had been abused, and that they were become the jest of their enemies, which grieved and provoked them at the same time. But it was still difficult to determine whence they might be supplied with wood, to repair all these works. There was none in the neighborhood of Marseilles, the trees having been all cut down for a great way round. They resolved therefore to raise a terrace of a new kind, and such as history no where mentions before that time. They raised two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and distant from one another nearly the breadth of the former mount. Over these they laid a floor, and to render it firm, besides its being supported on either side, placed pillars underneath between the walls, to bear it up where it was weakest, or had a greater stress of weight to support. There were moreover cross-beams, which rested on

niches in the wall; and to render the several floors proof against fire, hurdles were laid over them, which were afterwards covered with clay. The soldiers thus sheltered over head by the roof, on the right and left by walls, and before by a breast-work, brought the necessary materials without danger, and, by the eagerness with which they labored, soon completed the whole, leaving ouvertures in convenient places, to sally out on occasion.

15. The enemy seeing we had repaired, in so short a time, what they imagined must have cost us the labor of many days; that there was now no hope left, either of deceiving us, or sallying out on us with success; that all the approaches to the city, by land, might in like manner be shut up by a wall and towers, so as to render it impossible for them to appear on their works, our walls overtopping and commanding theirs, that they could neither discharge their javelins, nor make any use of their engines, in which their principal hope lay; and that they were now reduced to the necessity of fighting us on equal terms, though conscious of their great inferiority in point of valor; they were forced to have recourse again to the same conditions of truce they had so ill observed before.

16. M. Varro, in Farther Spain, having early notice of what passed in Italy, and beginning to distrust the success of Pompey's affairs, spoke in a very friendly manner of Cæsar. He said, 'that he was indeed under particular obligations to Pompey, who had made him his lieutenant-general, but at the same time was no less indebted to Cæsar: that he was not ignorant of the duty of a lieutenant, employed by his general in an office of trust; but that he likewise knew his own strength, and the attachment of the whole province to Cæsar.' After this manner he talked in all companies,

nor declared expressly for either side. But when he afterwards understood that Cæsar was detained by the siege of Marseilles; that the armies of Petreius and Afranius had joined, and daily grew stronger by the arrival of new succors; that there was room to hope for every thing; that the hither province had unanimously declared in their favor; that Cæsar himself was reduced to great straits at Lerida, of all which Afranius wrote largely, magnifying his own advantages, he began to alter with fortune. He raised troops over the whole province; added thirty auxiliary cohorts to the two legions he had already under his command; formed great magazines of corn to supply Marseilles, and the armies under Afranius and Petreius; ordered the Gaditani to furnish him with ten ships of war; caused a considerable number to be built at Hispalis; sent all the money and ornaments he found in the temple of Hercules to Cales; left there a garrison of six cohorts, under the command of Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, the friend of Domitius, who had sent him thither to look after an inheritance of his; conveyed all the arms, public and private, to Gallonius' house; spoke every where disadvantageously of Cæsar; declared several times from his tribunal that Cæsar had been worsted, and that many of his soldiers had gone over to Afranius, as he was well assured by undoubted testimonies: by all which, having struck a terror into the Roman citizens of that province, he obliged them to promise him one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand weight of silver, and one hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat. The states well affected to Cæsar he loaded with heavy contributions; confiscated the effects of such as had spoken against the commonwealth; quartered soldiers on them; harassed them with arbitrary judgments; and, in fine,

obliged the whole province to take an oath of fidelity to himself and Pompey. Hearing of what had passed in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. His design was, to shut himself up with his two legions in Cales, where all the provisions and shipping lay, because he very well understood that the whole province was in Cæsar's interest; for he judged it would be easy in that island, with the ships and provisions he had, to draw out the war into length.

17. Cæsar, though called on by many and necessary affairs to return to Italy, resolved, however, not to leave Spain till he had intirely quelled the war in that province; for he knew that Hither Spain had many obligations to Pompey, and that most of the inhabitants were strongly in his interest. Having therefore detached two legions into Farther Spain, under the command of Q. Cassius, tribune of the people, he himself advanced, by great journeys, at the head of six hundred horse. He sent orders before to the magistrates, and the principal men of every state, to meet him by a certain day at Cordova. All obeyed; every state sent its deputies; nor was there a single Roman citizen of any consideration who did not repair thither on this occasion. The very senate of Cordova, of their own proper motion, shut their gates against Varro, stationed guards and sentinels along the walls, and detained two cohorts, called Calonicæ, which chanced to march that way, that they might serve to protect the town. At the same time those of Carmona, the most considerable state in the province, drove out of their city three cohorts, which Varro had left to garrison the citadel, and shut their gates against them.

18. This determined Varro to make all possible dispatch, that he might reach Cales as soon as possible, lest his march should be intercepted; so great and

apparent was the affection of the province to Cæsar. When he was advanced a little way, he received letters from Cales, which informed him, 'that as soon as Cæsar's edict was known, the principal men of Cales, with the tribunes of the cohorts he had left in garrison, had conspired to drive Gallonius from the city, and preserve the town and island for Cæsar; that this project being formed, they had warned Gallonius to retire of his own accord, while he yet might with safety; threatening, if he did not, to come to some immediate resolution against him: that Gallonius, terrified by so general a revolt, had accordingly left Cales.' On this intelligence, one of the two legions, known by the name of Vernacula, took up their ensigns in Varro's presence, quitted the camp, and marched directly to Hispalis, where they sat down in the market-place and cloisters, without committing the least act of violence, which so wrought on the Roman citizens residing in the town that every one was desirous of accommodating them in their houses. Varro, astonished at these proceedings, turned back with design to reach Italica, but was informed that the gates were shut. At last, finding himself surrounded on all sides, and the ways every where beset, he wrote to Cæsar that he was ready to resign the legion under his command to whomsoever he should order to receive it. Cæsar sent Sextus Cæsar to take the command; and Varro, having resigned the legion accordingly, came to him at Cordova. After giving him an account of the state of the province, he faithfully resigned all the public money he had in his hands, and informed him of the quantity of corn and shipping he had prepared.

19. Cæsar, assembling the states at Cordova, returned thanks severally to all who had declared in his favor; to the Roman citizens, for having made them-

selves masters of the town in his name; to the Spaniards, for driving out Pompey's garrison; to the people of Cales, for having frustrated the designs of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the military tribunes and centurions sent thither to guard the place, for having confirmed them in their resolutions by their example. He remitted the tribute imposed by Varro on the Roman citizens; restored their estates to those who had been deprived of them for speaking their thoughts freely; distributed rewards to a great many, both in public and private, and gave all room to hope for like favors in the issue. After a stay of two days at Cordova, he went to Cales, where he restored to the temple of Hercules all the treasures and ornaments which had been carried off and lodged in private houses. He committed the government of the province to Q. Cassius, assigned him four legions for that purpose; and, embarking for Tarraco on board the fleet which Varro had obliged the Gaditani to furnish, arrived there in a few days. There he found deputies from almost all the states of the province, and having, in like manner as at Cordova, both publicly and privately rewarded some states, he left Tarraco, came by land to Narbonne, and thence to Marseilles. There he was informed of the law touching the dictatorship, and that M. Lepidus the pretor had named him to that office.

20. The Marseillians, overwhelmed with a profusion of calamities, reduced to the utmost distress by famine, worsted in two different engagements by sea, weakened by continual sallies, assaulted by a heavy pestilence, occasioned by the length of the siege and their constant change of diet; (for they were obliged to feed on old meal and musty barley, which had been long treasured up in their magazines against an acci-

dent of this kind;) their tower being overthrown, a great part of their walls undermined, and no prospect of relief from armies or the provinces, which were now all reduced under Cæsar's power, they resolved to surrender in good earnest. But some days before, Domitius, who was apprised of their intentions, having prepared three ships, (two of which he assigned to his followers, and embarked in person on board the third,) took occasion, during a storm, to make his escape. Some of Brutus' galleys, which he had ordered to keep constantly cruising before the port, chancing to get sight of him, prepared to give chase. That in which Domitius was, escaped under favor of the tempest; but the two others, alarmed at seeing our galleys so near them, re-entered the port. Cæsar spared the town, more in regard to its antiquity and reputation, than any real merit it could plead. He obliged the citizens however to deliver up their arms, machines, and ships of war, whether in the port or arsenal; to surrender all the money in their treasury; and to receive a garrison of two legions. Then, sending the rest of the army into Italy, he himself set out for Rome.

21. About the same time, C. Curio sailed from Sicily into Africa, with two of the four legions which had been put under his command by Cæsar, and five hundred horse, having conceived the highest contempt of the troops headed by P. Attius Varus. After two days' and three nights' sailing, he landed at a place called Aquilaria. This place is about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and has a very convenient harbor for ships in the summer time, sheltered on each side by a promontory. L. Cæsar, the son, waited for him at Clupea, with ten galleys, which P. Attius had taken in the war against the pirates, and repaired at Utica for the service of the present war. But, terrified at

the number of ships Curio brought with him, he stood in for the coast; where, running his galley on shore, he left her, and went by land to Adrumetum. C. Confidius Longus commanded in that town, with one legion; and here also the rest of the fleet repaired after Cæsar's flight. M. Rufus the questor pursuing them with twelve galleys, which Curio had brought with him from Africa, to guard the transports; when he saw Cæsar's own galley on the strand, he towed her off, and returned with the fleet to Curio.

22. Curio ordered him to sail directly for Utica, and followed himself with the land army. After a march of two days he arrived at the river Bagradas, where he left C. Caninius Rebilus with the legions, and advanced before with the cavalry, to take a view of the Cornelian camp, which was judged to be a situation extremely advantageous. It is a high rock, jutting out into the sea, steep and rough on both sides, but with an easier descent where it fronts Utica. It lies little more than a mile from Utica in a direct line; but as there is a fountain about half way, which runs towards the sea, and, overflowing the plain, forms a morass, to avoid this, in marching to Utica, it is necessary to take a compass of six miles. When he had taken a view of this post, he went next and examined Varus' camp, which was under the walls of the town, towards the gate named the Gate of War. The situation of it was extremely advantageous; for on the one side it was covered by the city of Utica itself, and on the other by a kind of theatre, which stood without the walls, the works round which took up so much room, that they rendered the approach to the camp extremely difficult. At the same time he saw all the ways crowded with people, who, out of fear of being pillaged, were carrying their most valuable effects into the city. He

detached the cavalry against them to disperse them, and likewise have an opportunity of making some booty: on which Varus ordered six hundred Numidian horse to advance to their assistance, which he farther strengthened with four hundred foot, sent by Juba, a few days before, to reinforce the garrison of Utica. This king inherited from his father an affection for Pompey, and, besides, personally hated Curio; who, during his tribuneship, had published a law to deprive him of his kingdom. The Numidian cavalry soon came to blows with ours; but were not able to stand their first charge, retreating to their camp, with the loss of a hundred and twenty men. Meantime, on the arrival of Curio's fleet, he ordered proclamation to be made among the merchant ships, which were at Utica, to the number of two hundred, that he would treat them as enemies, if they did not immediately repair to the Cornelian camp. On this proclamation they instantly weighed anchor, and, leaving Utica, sailed whither they were ordered; by which means the army was plentifully supplied with every thing they stood in need of.

23. These things despatched, Curio repaired to his camp at Bagrada, where, with the joint acclamations of the whole army, he was saluted by the name of Imperator. Next day he led his army towards Utica, and encamped not far from the town. But before he had finished his intrenchments, he was informed by some parties of horse, who were on the scout, that a powerful body of horse and foot had been sent by the king to Utica: at the same time a great cloud of dust began to appear, and soon after the enemy's van was in view. Curio, astonished at a motion so unexpected, sent the cavalry before to sustain their first charge, and keep them in play: he, meanwhile, drawing off

the legions from the works, with all possible expedition, formed them in order of battle. The horse engaged, according to orders; and with such success, that before the legions could be duly drawn up, the whole reinforcement sent by the king, who marched without order or apprehension of danger, falling into confusion, at last betook themselves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling nimbly along the shore, escaped, with little loss, into the town; but great numbers of the infantry were cut to pieces.

24. Next night, two centurions of the nation of the Marsi, with twenty-two private soldiers, deserted from Curio, and went over to Attius Varus. These, either believing the thing themselves, or desirous to carry grateful tidings to Varus, (for we easily believe what we wish, and readily hope that others will fall into our way of thinking,) assured him that the whole army was extremely averse to Curio, and would infallibly revolt, if he would but advance, and come to a conference with them. Accordingly Varus drew out his legions next day. Curio did the same: and the two armies stood facing one another in order of battle, with a small valley between them.

25. Sextus Quintilius Varus, who, as we have related above, had been made prisoner at Corfinium, was now in the enemy's army; for Cæsar having granted him his liberty, he had retired into Africa. Curio had brought over with him from Sicily the very same legions who had revolted some time before to Cæsar at the siege of Corfinium; so that, excepting a few centurions who had been changed, the officers and companies were the same as had formerly served with this very Quintilius. He made use of this handle to debauch the army of Curio; 'and began with putting the soldiers in mind of their former oath to Domitius, and

to himself, that general's questor: he exhorted them not to carry arms against the old companions of their fortune, who had shared with them in all the hazards of that siege; nor fight in defence of that party, who treated them ignominiously, and as deserters.' To these considerations he added offers of a liberal recompense, if they would follow his fortune and that of Attius. But his speech made no impression on Curio's troops, so that both armies retired to their respective camps.

26. But an uncommon panic soon spread itself over Curio's camp, which the various discourses of the soldiers served only to increase; for every one had his opinion, and added the suggestions of his own fear to that which he heard from others. These reports spreading from one to many, and receiving additions in every new relation, there appeared to be several authors of the same notions:—'That in a civil war it was lawful for every soldier to choose what side he pleased: that the same legion, who a little before had fought on the side of the enemy, might, without scruple, return again to the same cause, since Cæsar's conferring favors on his enemies, ought not to render them unmindful of prior and greater obligations: that even the municipal towns were divided in their affection, and sided, some with one party, some with another.' These discourses proceeded not from the Marsi and Peligni alone, but ran like a torrent through the whole camp. However, some of the soldiers blamed their companions for this so great freedom of talk; and others, who affected to appear more diligent than the rest, enlarged in their accounts of it to the officers.

27. For these reasons, Curio, summoning a council of war, began to deliberate about the proper remedies for this evil. Some were for attacking, at all hazards,

the camp of Varus, in order to find employment for the soldiers, whose idleness they considered as the cause of all the present alarms. Besides, it was better, they said, to trust to valor, and try the fortune of a battle, than see themselves abandoned by their men, and delivered up to the barbarity of the enemy. Others were for retiring, during the night, to the Cornelian camp, where they would have more time to cure the infatuation of the soldiers; and whence, in case of a disaster, they could with more safety and ease make good their retreat into Sicily, by means of the great number of ships they were there provided with. Curio relished neither of these motions: the one, he thought, argued cowardice; the other, a rash boldness: to retreat would have all the appearance of a shameful flight; to attack, they must resolve to fight in a place of disadvantage. 'With what hope,' said he, 'can we attack a camp fortified by nature and art? And what advantage can we draw from an attempt, whence we shall be obliged to retire with loss? Does not success always secure to a general the affection of his troops, whereas ill fortune is evermore followed with contempt? And what would a decampment imply but an ignominious flight, an absolute despair of all things, and an unavoidable alienation of the whole army? That we ought not to let the modest think we distrust them, nor the insolent that we fear them; because the knowlege of our fear only augments the presumption of the one, and an apprehension of being suspected abates the zeal of the other. But if what is reported of the discontent of the army be true, which I am yet unwilling to believe, at least to the degree some pretend, we ought, for that reason, rather to hide and dissemble our fears, than by an unreasonable discovery of them to add strength to the evil: that, as in some

cases, it was necessary to conceal the wounds of the body, that the enemy might not conceive hope from our misfortunes; so also ought we to hide the indisposition of an army: that by retreating in the night, as some proposed, they would only furnish a fairer occasion to the ill-affected to execute their purpose; for fear and shame are powerful restraints by day, but night intirely divests them of their force: that he was neither so rash as to attack a camp without hopes of success, nor so blinded by fear as to be at a loss what measures to pursue: that he thought it his duty to examine things to the bottom; and as he had called them together to deliberate on the present state of affairs, doubted not, with their assistance, to take such measures as would be attended with success.'

28. He then dismissed the council; and assembling the soldiers, put them in mind of what advantage their steadiness and zeal had been to Cæsar at Corfinium, and how serviceable towards the conquest of the greatest part of Italy. 'It was you,' said he, 'that gave the example, and all the municipal towns soon followed: their submission to Cæsar was your work; and therefore it is not without reason that he is so particularly attached to you, and that Pompey hates you sincerely. It was you that obliged him to quit Italy, without being forced to it by the loss of a battle. Cæsar, who ranks me in the number of his dearest friends, has committed my safety to your care, with Sicily and Africa, without which it would be impossible to defend either Rome or Italy. You are now in the presence of those who exhort you to abandon us; and, indeed, what could be more desirable to them, than at the same time to ensnare us, and fix on you the stain of an infinite crime? What worse opinion could an enraged enemy testify of you, than to suppose you capable of

betraying those who own themselves indebted to you for all; and of throwing yourselves into the power of a party, who consider you as the authors of all their misfortunes? Are you strangers to Cæsar's exploits in Spain? Two armies defeated! Two generals overcome! Two provinces brought under subjection! And all this in the space of forty days after Cæsar came within sight of the enemy. Is it likely that those, who, with forces unbroken, could not stand their ground, will be able to resist, now they are vanquished? And will you, who followed Cæsar before fortune declared in his favor, now return to the vanquished, when fortune has already decided the quarrel, and you are on the point of obtaining the reward of your services? They charge you with having abandoned and betrayed them, contrary to the faith of oaths. But is it indeed true, that you abandoned Domitius? Or did he not rather meanly abandon you, at a time when you were ready to suffer every thing for his sake? Did he not, unknown to you, resolve to seek his safety in flight? And were you not, after being thus basely betrayed by him, indebted to Cæsar's goodness for your preservation? How could your oath bind you to one, who, after throwing away the ensigns of his authority, and divesting himself of his office, surrendered himself a private man and a captive into the power of another? The new engagement you were then brought under alone subsists at present, and ought quite to obliterate that, which the surrender of your general, and his loss of liberty, have made void. But though I doubt not of your being satisfied with Cæsar, you may perhaps have taken offence at me. And, indeed, I have no thought of mentioning any services I may have done you; which, as yet, come far short of my intentions, and your expectations: but you are not ignorant, that

the rewards of military service come not till after the conclusion of the war; and I believe you little doubt what the issue of this will be. Nor need I, on this occasion, decline taking notice of the diligence I have used, the progress already made, and the good fortune that has hitherto attended me. Are you dissatisfied that I have landed my army safe in Africa, without the loss of a single ship? That I dispersed the enemy's fleet at the first onset? That within the space of two days I have twice defeated their cavalry? That I forced two hundred of their merchantmen to quit the port of Utica and join me? And that I have reduced them to a situation where it is impossible for them to receive any supplies either by land or sea? Can you think of abandoning a cause conducted by such leaders, and attended with such success, to follow the fortune of those who so ignominiously delivered up Corfinium, relinquished Italy, surrendered Spain, and have already sustained considerable losses in the African war? I never pretended to more than being a follower of Cæsar: it was you that honored me with the title of Imperator; which I am this moment ready to resign, if you think me unworthy of the favor. Restore me my former name, that it may not be said I was honored, to be covered afterwards with the greater ignominy.'

29. These remonstrances made such an impression on the soldiers, that they frequently interrupted him while he was speaking, and appeared deeply touched at his suspecting their fidelity. As he retired, they all gathered round him, exhorting him not to be discouraged, or scruple to hazard a battle, and make trial of their fidelity and bravery. This behavior of the troops wrought so great a change in the minds of the officers, that Curio, with the joint concurrence of them all,

resolved to give battle the first opportunity that offered. Accordingly, drawing out his men next day, in the same place he had done for some time past, he ranged them in order of battle. Attius Varus did the same; that if an opportunity offered, either of corrupting the soldiers or fighting to advantage, he might be in readiness to lay hold of it.

30. Between the two armies lay a valley, as we have observed above, not indeed considerable for its breadth; but steep and difficult of ascent. Both sides waited till the other should pass it, that they might engage to more advantage. Curio, observing that all the horse on Varus' right wing, together with the light-armed foot, had ventured down into this valley, detached his cavalry against them, with two cohorts of Marrucinians; whose first shock the enemy were not able to sustain, but returned full speed to their own men, leaving the light-armed foot behind, who were surrounded and cut to pieces in sight of Varus' army; which, fronting that way, was witness to the flight of the one, and slaughter of the other. On this, Rebilus, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily, on account of his consummate knowlege in the art of war;—'Why,' said he, 'do you delay seizing the favorable moment? You see the enemy struck with terror.' Curio made no answer, only desired his soldiers to remember what they had promised the day before; and marching the first, commanded them to follow him. The valley was so steep and difficult, that the first ranks could not ascend, but with the assistance of those that came after. But the Attinian army was so dispirited with fear, and the flight and slaughter of their troops, that they never thought of making resistance, fancying themselves already surrounded by our cavalry; so that before we could ar-

rive within reach of dart, the whole army of Varus fled, and retreated to their camp.

31. In this flight, one Fabius Pelignus, a centurion of the lowest rank in Curio's army, as he was pursuing the fugitives, called with a loud voice to Varus, as if he had been one of his own men, who wanted to admonish him of something. Varus, hearing himself named several times, turned and stood still, demanding who he was, and what he wanted. Fabius aimed a blow at his breast with his sword, and would certainly have killed him, had not Varus warded it off with his shield. Fabius himself was soon after surrounded and slain. Meanwhile, the multitude of fugitives so closed up the gates of the camp, and pressed on one another in such a manner, that more were crowded to death, than fell either in the battle or pursuit. Nay, the camp itself was very near being taken; because great numbers, instead of stopping there to defend it, made directly for the town. But both the nature of the ground, and the fortifications themselves, prevented the assault; and the rather, as Curio's soldiers, being armed only for battle, had brought with them none of the necessary tools to force a camp. Curio brought back his army without the loss of a man, Fabius excepted. Of the enemy about six hundred were killed, and a thousand wounded. After Curio had drawn off his men, all the wounded quitted the camp, and retired into the city, as did a great many others, who, overcome by fear, sheltered themselves there also under the same pretence. Varus observing this, and that a universal dread had seized the army, left only a trumpet in the camp, with a few tents for show, and about midnight silently entered the town with all his forces.

32. Next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and

draw a line of circumvallation round it. There was in the town a multitude of men unfit for the fatigues of war through a long enjoyment of peace. The inhabitants themselves were strongly attached to Cæsar, for ancient favors received from him. The senate was composed of people greatly differing in their tempers, and the losses already sustained spread terror through all ranks. A surrender was publicly talked of, and all concurred in soliciting Varus not to ruin them by his obstinacy and perverseness. While these things were in agitation, messengers sent by king Juba arrived, who informed them of the approach of his army, and exhorted them to defend the city; which contributed not a little to confirm their wavering minds.

33. Curio received the same news, but for some time would not believe it, so greatly did he confide in his good fortune. Besides, Cæsar's success in Spain was already known in Africa; whence he concluded it improbable that Juba would attempt any thing against him. But when he was for certain informed of his being within twenty-five miles of Utica with his whole army, he retired from before the town to the Cornelian camp, laid in great quantities of corn and wood, began to fortify himself, and sent directly to Sicily for the cavalry, and the two legions he had left there. The camp itself was very advantageous for protracting the war, being strong both by nature and art, near the sea, and abounding in water and salt, great quantities of which had been carried thither from the neighboring salt-pits. Neither ran he any hazard of being straitened for wood and corn, as the country abounded in trees and grain. He resolved therefore, with the consent of the whole army, to wait here the arrival of the rest of the troops, and make preparation for continuing the war.

34. This resolution being taken, and meeting with general approbation, some of the townsmen, who had deserted to Curio, informed him, that the war, in which Juba was engaged with the Leptitani, having obliged him to return into his own kingdom, he had only sent his lieutenant Sabura, with a small body of forces, to the assistance of the Uticans. On this intelligence, to which he too hastily gave credit, he changed his design, and resolved to give battle. The fire of youth, his courage, good success, and self-confidence, contributed greatly to confirm him in this resolution. Urged by these considerations, about the beginning of the night, he sent all his cavalry towards the enemy's camp, which was on the river Bagradas, and where Sabura, of whom we have spoken before, commanded in chief; but the king followed with all his forces, and was not above six miles behind him. The cavalry which Curio had detached, marched all night, and coming unexpectedly on the enemy, attacked them before they were ready to receive the charge; for the Numidians, according to the custom of that barbarous country, were encamped without order or rule. Falling on them, therefore, in this confusion, and oppressed with sleep, they slew great numbers, and obliged the rest to fly in the utmost consternation; after which they returned to Curio, with the prisoners they had taken.

35. Curio had set out with all his forces about the fourth watch of the night, leaving only five cohorts to guard his camp. After a march of six miles he was met by his cavalry, who informed him of all that had passed. He asked the prisoners, who commanded at Bagradas? They answered, Sabura. On this, without making any farther inquiries, for fear of being detained too long, he turned to the troops next to him, and said, 'Do

you not see, fellow-soldiers, that the report of the prisoners corresponds exactly with the intelligence given by the deserters?. Juba is not with the army. It must consist of but a few troops, since they were not able to withstand the charge of a small body of horse. Haste, therefore, in the pursuit of glory, booty, and victory.' What the cavalry had done was indeed considerable, because they were but few in number in comparison with the Numidians; but as vanity always makes us believe our merit to be greater than it is, they themselves boasted immoderately of the action, and endeavored to enhance the value of it. They made a mighty parade of the booty. The prisoners too, as well infantry as cavalry, marched in procession before them: and, indeed, the whole army imagined, that to delay the battle, was no other than to delay the victory; so that the ardor of the troops perfectly seconded Curio's hopes. He therefore hastened his march, ordering the horse to follow, that he might as soon as possible come up with the frighted enemy. But as they were fatigued with their late march, they found themselves unable to keep pace with the army; but stopped, some in one place, some in another; which, however, retarded not Curio's hopes.

36. Juba, having notice from Sabura of the action in the night, detached to his assistance two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, of his ordinary guard, with that part of the infantry in which he put the greatest confidence. Himself followed leisurely with the rest of the troops, and about forty elephants, suspecting that Curio, who had sent the cavalry before, could not be far off with his army. Sabura drew up his horse and foot, ordering them to give ground on the enemy's attack, and, as through fear, counterfeit a flight. Meanwhile he told them, that he would give the signal

of battle when he saw proper, and direct their motions as the case might require.

37. Curio, flattered with new hopes, and imagining, by the enemy's motions, that they were preparing for flight, made his troops come down from the mountain into the plain; and advancing still farther, though his army was already very much fatigued, having marched upwards of sixteen miles, halted at last to give the men breath. That moment Sabura sounded the charge, led on his men in order of battle, and went from rank to rank to animate the troops; but he suffered only the cavalry to come to blows, keeping the infantry at a distance within sight. Curio was not wanting on his side, but exhorted his men to place all their hopes in their valor: and indeed neither the infantry, though fatigued with their march, nor the cavalry, though few in number and spent with toil, showed any want of valor, or backwardness to fight; though the last, in particular, did not exceed two hundred, the rest having stopped by the way. These, wherever they attacked the enemy, obliged them to give ground; but they could neither pursue far, nor drive their horses on with impetuosity. On the other hand, the Numidian cavalry began to surround our men, and charge them in the rear. When the cohorts advanced against them, they fell back, and by the quickness of their retreat eluded the charge; but immediately returning, they got behind our men, and cut them off from the rest of the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for them to maintain their ranks, or advance to battle. The enemy's forces increased continually by the reinforcements sent from the king; ours, on the contrary, were disabled by fatigue. Neither could our wounded men retire, or be sent to any place of safety, the whole army being invested by the enemy's horse. These, de-

spairing of safety, as is usual for men in the last moments of life, either lamented their own fate, or recommended their relations to their fellow-soldiers, if any should be so fortunate as to escape that danger. The whole army was filled with consternation and grief.

38. Curio, perceiving the general alarm, and that neither his exhortations nor prayers were regarded, ordered the troops to retire with the standards to the nearest mountains, as the only resource in the present exigence: but the cavalry detached by Sabura had already seized them. All hope being now lost, some were slain endeavoring to fly; others threw themselves on the ground, partly in despair, partly unable to make any efforts for their own safety. At this moment, Cn. Domitius, who commanded the horse, addressing Curio, intreated him to regain his camp with the few cavalry that remained, promising not to abandon him. 'Can I,' says Curio, 'look Cæsar in the face, after having lost an army he had committed to my charge?' So saying, he continued fighting till he was slain. Very few of the cavalry escaped, those only excepted who had stopped to refresh their horses; for perceiving at a distance the rout of the whole army, they returned to their camp. All the infantry were slain to a man.

39. When this disaster was known, M. Rufus the questor, whom Curio had left to guard the camp, intreated his men not to lose courage. They begged and requested him to reconduct them into Sicily; which he promised, and ordered the masters of the transports to have their ships in readiness at night along the shore. But fear had so universally seized the minds of the soldiers, that some cried out Juba was arrived with his troops; some that Varus ap-

proached with the legions, the dust of whose march they pretended to discern; and others, that the enemy's fleet would be on them in an instant; though there was not the least ground for these reports. The consternation thus becoming general, each man thought only of his own safety. Those who were already embarked, sailed immediately, and their flight drew after it that of the transports; so that only a very few small frigates obeyed the summons, and came to the general rendezvous. The disorder was so great on the shore, every one striving who should first embark, that many boats sunk under the crowd, and others were afraid to come near the land.

40. Thus only a few soldiers and aged men, who either through interest or compassion were received on board, or had strength enough to swim to the transports, got safe to Sicily: the rest, deputing their centurions to Varus by night, surrendered to him. Juba, coming up next day, claimed them as his property, put the greater number to the sword, and sent a few of the most considerable, whom he had selected for that purpose, into Numidia. Varus complained of this violation of his faith; but durst not make any resistance. The king made his entrance into the city on horseback, followed by a great number of senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius, and Licinius Damasippus. Here he stayed a few days, to give what orders he thought necessary; and then returned, with all his forces, into his own kingdom.

BOOK III.

1. CÆSAR, as dictator, holding the comitia, Julius Cæsar and P. Servilius were chosen consuls; for this was the year in which he could be elected to that magistracy, consistent with the laws. This affair being despatched, as Cæsar saw public credit at a stand over all Italy, because nobody paid their debts; he ordered that arbiters should be chosen, who should make an estimate of the possessions of all debtors, and should convey them in payment to their creditors, at the price they bore before the war. This regulation he thought best calculated to restore public credit, and prevent the apprehension of a general abolition of debts, which is but too common in consequence of wars and civil dissensions. At the same time, in consequence of an address to the people, he re-established the pretors and tribunes, who had been deprived on a charge of bribery, at a time when Pompey awed the city by his legions. These decisions were so little conformable to law, that sentence was often pronounced by a party of judges different from those who attended the pleadings. As these had made him an offer of their service in the beginning of the war, he accounted the obligation the same as if he had actually accepted of their friendship; but thought it better their restoration should seem to flow from the people, than appear a mere act of bounty in him; that he might neither be charged with ingratitude to his followers, nor accused of invading the prerogatives of the people.

2. All this business, with the celebration of the Latin festivals, and the holding of the comitia for elections, took him up only eleven days, at the end of which he

abdicated the dictatorship, and immediately set out from Rome, in order to reach Brundusium, where he had ordered twelve legions, with all the cavalry, to rendezvous. But he had scarce ships to carry over twenty thousand legionary soldiers, and six hundred horse, which alone hindered him from putting a speedy end to the war. Besides, the legions were considerably weakened by their many losses in the Gallic war, and the long and painful march from Spain; and an unhealthful autumn in Apulia, and about Brundusium, with the change of so fine a climate as that of Gaul and Spain, had brought a general sickness among the troops.

3. Pompey, having had a whole year to complete his preparations, undisturbed by wars, and free from the interruption of an enemy, had collected a mighty fleet from Asia, the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt, and had given orders for the building of ships in all parts. He had exacted great sums from the people of Asia and Syria; from the kings, tetrarchs, and dynasties of those parts; from the free states of Achaia; and from the corporations of the provinces subject to his command. He had raised nine legions of Roman citizens; five he had brought with him from Italy; one had been sent him from Sicily, consisting wholly of veterans, and called Gemella, because composed of two; another from Crete and Macedonia, of veteran soldiers likewise, who, having been disbanded by former generals, had settled in those parts; and two more from Asia, levied by the care of Lentulus. Besides all these, he had great numbers from Thessaly, Bœotia, Achaia, and Epirus; whom, together with Antony's soldiers, he distributed among the legions by way of recruits. He expected also two legions that Metellus Scipio was to bring out of Syria.

He had three thousand archers, drawn together from Crete, Lacedæmon, Pontus, Syria, and other provinces; six cohorts of slingers; and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted to seven thousand; six hundred of which came from Galatia, under Dejotarus; five hundred from Cappadocia, under Ariobarzanes; and the like number had been sent him out of Thrace, by Cotus, with his son Sadalis at their head. Two hundred were from Macedonia, commanded by Rascipolis, an officer of great distinction: five hundred from Alexandria, consisting of Gauls and Germans, left there by A. Gabinius, to serve as a guard to king Ptolemy; and now brought over by young Pompey in his fleet, together with eight hundred of his own domestics. Tarcundarius Castor and Donilaus furnished three hundred Gallogrecians: the first of these came himself in person; the latter sent his son. Two hundred, most of them archers, were sent from Syria, by Comagenus of Antioch, who lay under the greatest obligations to Pompey. There were likewise a great number of Dardanians and Bessians, partly volunteers, partly mercenaries; with others from Macedonia, Thessaly, and the adjoining states and provinces; who all together made up the number mentioned above. To subsist this mighty army, he had taken care to amass vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries; resolving to quarter his troops, during the winter, at Dyrrhachium, Apollonia, and the other maritime towns, to prevent Cæsar's passing the sea; for which purpose, he ordered his fleet to cruise perpetually about the coasts. Young Pompey commanded the Egyptian squadron; D. Lelius and C. Triarius the Asiatic; C. Cassius the Syrian; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the Rhodian; Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius the Liburnian and Achaian: but the

chief authority was vested in M. Bibulus, who was admiral of the whole, and gave his orders accordingly.

4. Cæsar, on his arrival at Brundusium, harangued his troops, and told them, 'that as they were now on the point of seeing an end of all their toils and dangers, they ought not to scruple at leaving their servants and baggage behind them in Italy, that they might embark with less confusion, and in greater numbers; putting all their hopes in victory, and the generosity of their general.' The whole army testified their approbation of what was proposed, and called out that they were ready to submit to his orders. Accordingly, having put seven legions on board, as we have before observed, he set sail the fourth of January, and arrived next day at the Ceraunian mountains; where, having found, among the rocks and shelves with which that coast abounds, a tolerable road; and not daring to go to any port, as he apprehended they were all in the enemy's possession; he landed his troops at a place called Pharsalus, whither he brought his fleet, without the loss of a single ship.

5. Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships; and Bibulus had a hundred and ten at Corcyra. But the first durst not hazard an engagement, though Cæsar was escorted by no more than twelve galleys, only four of which had decks; and Bibulus had not time to reassemble his sailors and soldiers, who were dispersed in full security; for no news of Cæsar's approach had reached those parts, till his fleet was seen from the continent.

6. Cæsar, having landed his troops, sent the fleet back the same night to Brundusium, to bring over his other legions and cavalry. Fufius Kalenus, lieutenant-general, had the charge of this expedition, with orders

to use the utmost despatch. But setting sail too late, he lost the benefit of the wind, which offered fair all night, and fell in with the enemy. For Bibulus hearing at Corcyra of Cæsar's arrival, forthwith put to sea, in hopes of intercepting some of the transports; and meeting the fleet as it returned empty, took about thirty ships, which he immediately burned, with all that were on board; partly to satisfy his own vengeance for the disappointment he had received; partly to deter the rest of the troops from attempting the passage. He then stationed his fleet along the coast, from Salona to Oricum, guarded all places with extraordinary care, and even lay himself aboard, notwithstanding the rigor of the winter; declining no danger nor fatigue, and solely intent on intercepting Cæsar's supplies.

7. After the departure of the Liburnian galleys, M. Octavius, with the squadron under his command, sailed from Illyricum, and came before Salona. Having spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations in those parts, he drew Issa to revolt from Cæsar: but finding that the council of Salona was neither to be moved by promises nor threats, he resolved to invest the town. Salona is built on a hill, and advantageously situated for defence; but as the fortifications were very inconsiderable, the Roman citizens residing there immediately surrounded the place with wooden towers; and finding themselves too few to resist the attacks of the enemy, who soon overwhelmed them with wounds, betook themselves to their last refuge, by granting liberty to all slaves capable of bearing arms, and cutting off the women's hair, to make cords for their engines. Octavius, perceiving their obstinacy, formed five different camps round the town, that they might at once suffer all the inconveniences of a siege,

and be exposed to frequent attacks. The Salonians, determined to endure any thing, found themselves most pressed for want of corn; and therefore sent deputies to Cæsar to solicit a supply, patiently submitting to all the other hardships they labored under. When the siege had now continued a considerable time, and the Octavians began to be off their guard, the Salonians, finding the opportunity favorable, about noon, when the enemy were dispersed, disposed their wives and children on the walls, that every thing might have its wonted appearance; and sallying in a body with their enfranchised slaves, attacked the nearest quarters of Octavius. Having soon forced these, they advanced to the next; thence to a third, a fourth, and so on through the rest; till having driven the enemy from every post, and made great slaughter of their men, they at length compelled them, and Octavius their leader, to betake themselves to their ships. Such was the issue of the siege. As winter now approached, and the loss had been very considerable; Octavius, despairing to reduce the place, retired to Dyrrhachium, and joined Pompey.

8. We have seen that L. Vibullius Rufus, Pompey's chief engineer, had fallen twice into Cæsar's hands, and been as often set at liberty; the first time at Corfinium, the next in Spain. Having been therefore twice indebted to him for his life, and being also much in Pompey's esteem, Cæsar thought him a proper person to negotiate between them. His instructions were, 'That it was now time for both to desist from their obstinacy, and lay down their arms, without exposing themselves any more to the precarious events of fortune. That the losses they had already sustained ought to serve as lessons and cautions, and fill them with just apprehensions with regard to the future. That Pompey had

been forced to abandon Italy, had lost Sicily and Sardinia, the two Spains, with about a hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens, who had perished in these countries. That himself too had been a considerable sufferer by the death of Curio, the destruction of the African army, and the surrender of his forces at Corcyra. That it was therefore incumbent on them to show some regard to the sinking state of the commonwealth, having sufficiently experienced by their own misfortunes, how prevalent fortune was in war. That the present moment was the most favorable in this respect; because, not having yet tried one another's strength, and considering them as equals, there would be more likelihood of agreeing on terms: whereas, if one of them once got the superiority, he would exact every thing from the other, and give up nothing. That as hitherto they had been unable to settle the conditions of peace, they ought to refer them to the decision of the senate and people of Rome; and, in the mean time, to obtain a free and unbiassed judgment, both swear to disband their armies in three days' time. That when they were once divested of their national and auxiliary forces, in which their whole confidence lay, they would find themselves under a necessity of submitting to the decree of the senate and people. In fine, that to give Pompey a proof of his readiness to perform these proposals, he would give immediate orders for the discharge of all his forces, both in garrison and in the field.'

9. Vibullius, having received these instructions, thought it necessary to give Pompey speedy notice of Cæsar's arrival, that he might be provided against that event, before he laid open the commission he was charged with. Accordingly, journeying day and night, *and frequently* changing horses, for the greater expedi-

tion, he at length got to Pompey, and informed him that Cæsar was approaching with all his forces. Pompey was, at that time, in Candavia, from whence he was marching through Macedonia, to his winter quarters at Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. Concerned at this unexpected news, he hastened his march to Apollonia, to prevent Cæsar's making himself master of the sea-coasts. Meanwhile Cæsar, having landed his forces, marched the same day to Oricum. On his arrival there, L. Torquatus, who commanded in the town for Pompey, with a garrison of Parthinians, ordered the gates to be shut, and the Greeks to repair to their arms, and man the walls: but they refusing to fight against the authority of the people of Rome, and the inhabitants, of their own accord, endeavoring to admit Cæsar, Torquatus, despairing of relief, opened the gates, and surrendered both himself and the town to Cæsar, who readily granted him his life.

10. Cæsar, having made himself master of Oricum, marched directly to Apollonia. On the report of his arrival, L. Staberius, who commanded in the place, ordered water to be carried into the castle, fortified it with great care, and demanded hostages of the townsmen. They refused to comply, declaring they would not shut their gates against the consul of the Roman people, nor presume to act in contradiction to the judgment of the senate, and of all Italy. Staberius, finding it in vain to resist, privately left the place; on which, the Apollonians sent deputies to Cæsar, and received him into the town. The Bullidenses, Amantiani, with the rest of the neighboring countries, and all Epirus, followed their example; acquainting Cæsar, by their ambassadors, that they were ready to execute his commands.

11. Meanwhile Pompey, having notice of what passed

at Oricum and Apollonia, and being apprehensive for Dyrrhachium, marched day and night to reach the place. At the same time it was reported that Cæsar was not far off; which meeting with the more credit, because of their hasty march, put the whole army into such consternation, that many abandoning their colors in Epirus and the neighboring states, and others throwing down their arms, every thing had the appearance of a precipitate flight. But on Pompey's halting near Dyrrhachium, and ordering a camp to be formed, as the army had not even then recovered its fright; Labienus advanced before the rest, and swore never to abandon his general, but to share in whatever lot Fortune should assign him. The other lieutenants did the same, as likewise the military tribunes and centurions, whose example was followed by the whole army. Cæsar, finding that he was prevented in his design on Dyrrhachium, pursued his march more leisurely; and encamped on the river Apsus, in the territories of the Apollonians, that he might protect the possessions of a state, which had so warmly declared in his favor. Here he resolved to pass the winter in tents, and wait the arrival of the rest of his legions out of Italy. Pompey did the like; and having encamped on the other side of the Apsus, assembled there all his legions and auxiliaries.

12. Kalenus, having embarked the legions and cavalry at Brundusium, according to the instructions he had received, put to sea with his whole fleet; but had not sailed very far, till he was met by letters from Cæsar, informing him that all the Grecian coasts were guarded by the enemy's fleet. On this, he recalled his ships, and returned again into the harbor. Only one continued its route, which carried no soldiers, nor was subject to the orders of Kalenus, but belonged to a

private commander. This vessel arriving before Oricum, fell into the hands of Bibulus; who, not sparing the very children, put all on board to death, both freemen and slaves. So much did the safety of the whole army depend on a single moment.

13. Bibulus, as we have related above, lay at Oricum, with his fleet; and as he deprived Cæsar of all supplies by sea, so was he, in like manner, greatly incommoded by Cæsar on land; who, having disposed parties along the coast, hindered him from getting water or wood, or coming near the shore. This was attended with many inconveniences, and threw him into great straits; insomuch, that he was obliged to fetch all his other necessaries, as well as wood and water, from the island of Corcyra; and once, when foul weather prevented his receiving refreshments from thence, the soldiers were necessitated, for want of water, to collect the dew, which, in the night, fell on the hides that covered their ships. Yet he bore all these difficulties with surprising firmness, and continued resolute in his design of not unguarding the coast. But at last, being reduced to the above-mentioned extremity, and Libo having joined him, they called from on board to M. Acilius and Statius Murcus, two of Cæsar's lieutenants, one of whom guarded the walls of Oricum, and the other the sea coasts, that they wanted to confer with Cæsar about affairs of the greatest consequence, if they could but have an opportunity. To gain the more credit, they let fall some expressions that seemed to promise accommodation; and in the meanwhile demanded and obtained a truce: for Murcus and Acilius, believing their proposals to be serious, knew how extremely grateful they would be to Cæsar, and doubted not but Vibullius had succeeded in his negotiation.

14. Cæsar was then at Buthrotum, a town over against Corcyra; whither he was gone, with one legion, to reduce some of the more distant states, and supply himself with corn, which then began to be scarce. Here, receiving letters from Acilius and Murcus, with an account of Libo and Bibulus' demands, he left the legion, and returned to Oricum. On his arrival, he invited them to a conference. Libo appeared, and made an apology for Bibulus: 'that being naturally hasty, and bearing a personal grudge to Cæsar, contracted during the time of his edileship and questorship, he had, for that reason, declined the interview, to prevent any obstructions from his presence to the success of so desirable and advantageous a design: that Pompey was, and ever had been, inclined to lay down his arms, and terminate their differences by an accommodation, but as yet had not sent him sufficient powers to treat; which, however, he doubted not soon to receive, as the council had intrusted him with the whole administration of the war: that if he would therefore make known his demands, they would send them to Pompey, who would soon come to a resolution on their representations. In the mean time, the truce might continue, and both parties abstain from acts of hostility, till an answer could be obtained.' He added something about the justice of their cause, and their forces, both natural and auxiliary; to which Cæsar neither at that time returned any answer, nor do we now think it of importance enough to be transmitted to posterity. Cæsar's demands were, 'that he might have leave to send ambassadors to Pompey; and that they would either stipulate for their return, or undertake themselves to convey them in safety: that with regard to the truce, such were the present circumstances of the war, that their fleet kept back his

supplies and transports, and his forces deprived them of water and access to the shore. If they expected any abatement on his side, they must likewise abate in guarding the coast; but if they still persisted in their former vigilance, neither would he yield in what depended on him: that, notwithstanding, the accommodation might go forward, without any obstruction from this mutual denial.' Libo declined receiving Cæsar's ambassadors, or undertaking for their safe return, and chose to refer the whole matter to Pompey; yet insisted on the truce. Cæsar, perceiving that the only aim of the enemy was to extricate themselves out of their present straits and danger, and that it was in vain to entertain any hopes of peace, turned all his thoughts to the vigorous prosecution of the war.

15. Bibulus, having kept at sea for many days, and contracted a dangerous illness by the cold and perpetual fatigue, as he could neither have proper assistance on board, nor would be prevailed on to quit his post, he at last sunk under the weight of his distemper. After his death, nobody succeeded in the command of the whole fleet; but each squadron was governed, independently of the rest, by its particular commander.

16. When the surprise occasioned by Cæsar's sudden arrival was over, Vibullius, in presence of Libo, L. Lucceius, and Theophanes, who were among Pompey's most intimate counsellors, resolved to deliver the commission he had received from Cæsar. But scarce had he begun to speak, when Pompey interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed no farther. 'What,' said he, 'is my life or country to me, if I shall seem to be beholden to Cæsar for them? And will it be believed that I am not indebted to him for them, if he, by an accommodation, restores me to Italy?' Cæsar was informed of this speech, after the conclusion of the war;

by those who were present when it was delivered: he still continued, however, by other methods, to try to bring about an accommodation.

17. As the two camps were only separated by the river Apsus, the soldiers had frequent discourse among themselves; and it was settled, by mutual consent, that no act of hostility should pass during the conferences. Cæsar, taking advantage of this opportunity, sent P. Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to forward to the utmost an accommodation; and to demand, frequently, with a loud voice, 'whether it might not be permitted to citizens to send deputies to their fellow-citizens about peace: that this had never been denied even to fugitives and robbers, and could much less be opposed when the only design was to prevent the effusion of civil blood.' This and much more he said, with a submissive air, as became one employed to treat for his own and the common safety. He was heard with great silence by both parties, and received this answer from the enemy: 'That A. Varro had declared he would next day appear at an interview, whither the deputies of both parties might come in perfect security, and mutually make known their demands.' The hour of meeting was likewise settled; which being come, multitudes on both sides flocked to the place; the greatest expectations were formed; and the minds of all seemed intent on peace. T. Labienus, advancing from the crowd, began in a low voice to confer with Vatinius, as if to settle the articles of the treaty. But their discourse was soon interrupted by a multitude of darts that came pouring in on all sides. Vatinius escaped the danger, by means of the soldiers, who protected him with their shields; but Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtus, centurions, and some private men, were wounded. Labienus then lifted up

his voice, and cried, 'Leave off prating of an accommodation; for you must not expect peace till you bring us Cæsar's head.'

18. About the same time, M. Cœlius Rufus, pretor at Rome for foreign affairs, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on his entrance into his office, ordered his tribunal to be fixed near that of the city pretor, C. Trebonius, and promised to receive the complaints of such as should appeal to him, in regard to the estimation and payments made in consequence of Cæsar's late regulation. But such was the equity of the decree, and the humanity of Trebonius, who, in so nice and critical an affair, thought it necessary to conduct himself with the utmost clemency and moderation, that no pretence of appeal could be found: for to plead poverty, personal losses, the hardness of the times, and the difficulty of bringing their effects to sale, is usual enough even with reasonable minds; but to own themselves indebted, and yet aim at keeping their possessions intire, would have argued a total want both of honesty and shame. Accordingly, not a man was found who had made any such demand. Cœlius' whole severity, therefore, was pointed against those to whom the inheritance of the debtor was adjudged; and having once embarked in the affair, that he might not seem to have engaged himself to no purpose in an unjustifiable cause, he published a law, by which he allowed the debtors six years for the discharge of their debts, which they were to clear at equal payments, without interest.

19. But the consul Servilius, and the rest of the magistrates, opposing the law, when he found it had not the effect he expected, he thought proper to drop that design; and, with the view of inflaming the people, proposed two new laws: the one, to exempt all

the tenants in Rome from paying rents; the other, for a general abolition of debts. This bait took with the multitude; and Cœlius, at their head, came and attacked Trebonius on his tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded some about him. The consul Servilius reported these things to the senate, who interdicted to Cœlius the functions of his office. In consequence of this decree, the consul refused him admittance into the senate, and drove him out of his tribunal, when he was going to harangue the people. Overwhelmed with shame and resentment, he openly threatened to carry his complaints to Cæsar; but privately gave notice to Milo, who had been banished for the murder of Clodius, to come into Italy, and join him with the remains of the gladiators, which he bought formerly to entertain the people with, in the shows he gave them. With this view he sent him before to Turinum, to solicit the shepherds to take arms, and went himself to Casilinum; where, hearing that his arms and ensigns had been seized at Capua, his partisans at Naples, and their design of betraying the city discovered; finding all his projects defeated, the gates of Capua shut against him, and the danger increasing every moment, because the citizens had taken arms, and began to consider him as a public enemy; he desisted from the project he had formed, and thought proper to change his route.

20. In the mean time, Milo, having despatched letters to all the colonies and free towns, intimating that what he did was in virtue of Pompey's authority, who had sent him orders by Bibulus, endeavored to draw over the debtors to his party; but not succeeding in his design, he contented himself with setting some slaves at liberty, and with them marched to besiege Cosa, in the territory of Turinum. Q. Pædius, the

pretor, with a garrison of one legion, commanded in the town; and here Milo was slain by a stone from a machine on the walls. Cœlius, giving out that he was gone to Cæsar, came to Thurium; where, endeavoring to debauch the inhabitants, and corrupt, by promises of money, the Spanish and Gaulish horse, whom Cæsar had sent thither to garrison the place, they slew him. Thus these dangerous beginnings, that by reason of the multiplicity of affairs wherewith the magistrates were distracted, and the ticklish situation of the times, threatened great revolutions, and alarmed all Italy, were brought to a safe and speedy issue.

21. Libo leaving Oricum, with the fleet under his command, consisting of fifty sail, came to Brundusium, and possessed himself of an island directly facing the harbor; judging it of more consequence to secure a post, by which our transports must necessarily pass, than guard all the coasts and havens on the other side. As his arrival was unexpected, he surprised and burned some transports, and carried off a vessel loaded with corn. The consternation was great among our men, insomuch, that having landed some foot, with a party of archers, in the night, he defeated our guard of cavalry, and had so far the advantage, by the commodiousness of his post, that he wrote Pompey word, he might draw the rest of the navy on shore, and order them to be careened; for he alone, with his squadron, would undertake to cut off Cæsar's supplies.

22. Antony was then at Brundusium, who, confiding in the valor of the troops, ordered some boats belonging to the fleet to be armed with hurdles and galleries; and having filled them with chosen troops, disposed them in several places along the shore. At the same time, he sent two three-benched galleys, which he had caused to be built at Brundusium, to the mouth of the

harbor, as if with design to exercise the rowers. Libo, perceiving them advance boldly, and hoping he might be able to intercept them, detached five quadriremes for that purpose. At their approach, our men rowed towards the harbor, whither the enemy, eager of the pursuit, inconsiderately followed them; for now Antony's armed boats, on a signal given, came pouring on them from all parts, and on the very first onset took a quadrireme, with all the soldiers and sailors on board, and forced the rest to an ignominious flight. To add to this disgrace, the cavalry, which Antony had posted all along the coast, hindered the enemy from watering; which reduced them to such straits, that Libo was forced to quit the blockade of Brundusium, and retire with his fleet.

23. Several months had now passed; the winter was almost over; meantime, neither the ships nor the legions were yet arrived, which Cæsar expected from Brundusium. He could not help thinking that some opportunities had been lost, as it was certain the wind had many times offered fair, and there was a necessity of trusting to it at last. The longer the delay in sending over the troops, the more vigilant and alert were the enemy in guarding the coast, and the greater their confidence to hinder the passage; nay, Pompey, in his letters, frequently reproached them, that as they had not prevented the first embarkation, they ought at least to take care that no more of the troops got over; and the season itself was becoming less favorable, by the approach of milder weather, when the enemy's fleet would be able to act and extend itself. For these reasons, Cæsar wrote sharply to his lieutenants at Brundusium, charging them not to omit the first opportunity of sailing, as soon as the wind offered fair, and to steer for the coast of Apollonia, which they

could approach with less danger, as it was not so strictly guarded by the enemy, who were afraid of venturing on a coast so ill provided with havens.

24. The lieutenants, roused and emboldened by these letters, and encouraged by the exhortations of the troops themselves, who professed they were ready to face any danger for Cæsar's sake, embarked under the direction of M. Antony and Fufius Kalenus; and setting sail with the wind at south, passed Apollonia and Dyrrhachium next day. Being descried from the continent, C. Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian squadron at Dyrrhachium, put out to sea; and the wind slackening on our fleet, it was near falling into the hands of the enemy; but a fresh gale springing up at south, saved us from that danger. Coponius however desisted not from the pursuit, hoping, by the labor and perseverance of the mariners, to surmount the violence of the tempest; and though we had passed Dyrrhachium with a very hard gale, still continued to follow us. Our men, apprehensive of an attack, should the wind again chance to slacken, seized an advantage fortune threw in their way, and put into the port of Nymphæum, about three miles beyond Lissus. This port is sheltered from the south-west wind, but lies open to the south; but they preferred the hazard they might be exposed to by the tempest, to that of fighting. At that instant, by an unusual piece of good fortune, the wind, which for two days had blown from the south, changed to the south-west. This was a sudden and favorable turn: for the fleet, so lately in danger from the enemy, was sheltered in a safe, commodious port; and that which threatened ours with destruction, was in its turn exposed to the utmost peril. By this unexpected change, the storm, which protected our fleet, beat so furiously on the Rhodian galleys, that

they were all, to the number of sixteen, broke to pieces against the shore. Most of the soldiers and mariners perished among the rocks; the rest were taken up by our men, and sent, by Cæsar's orders, to their several homes.

25. Two of our transports, unable to keep up with the rest, were overtaken by the night; and not knowing where the fleet had put in, cast anchor over against Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded in the place, sent out some boats and small vessels to attack them: at the same time he urged them to a surrender, promising quarter to such as would submit. One of these vessels carried two hundred and twenty new-raised soldiers; the other less than two hundred veterans. On this occasion appeared, how great a defence against danger results from firmness of mind. The new levies, frighted at the number of their adversaries, and fatigued with sea-sickness, surrendered on promise of their lives; but when they were brought to Otacilius, regardless of the oath he had taken, he ordered them all to be cruelly slain in his presence. The veterans, on the contrary, though they had both the storm and a leaky vessel to struggle with, abated nothing of their wonted bravery; but having spun out the time till night under pretence of treating, obliged the pilot to run the vessel ashore, where finding an advantageous post, they continued the remainder of the night. At day-break, Otacilius detached against them about four hundred horse, who guarded that part of the coast, and pursued them sword in hand; but they defended themselves with great bravery; and having slain some of the enemy, rejoined, without loss, the rest of the troops.

26. On this, the Roman citizens inhabiting Lissus, to whom Cæsar had before made a grant of the town,

after fortifying it with great care, opened their gates to Antony, and furnished him with every thing he stood in need of. Octacilius, dreading the consequences of this revolution, quitted the place, and fled to Pompey. Antony having landed his troops, which consisted of three veteran legions, one new raised, and eight hundred horse, sent most of the transports back again to Brundusium, to bring over the rest of the foot and cavalry; retaining nevertheless some ships of Gaulish structure, that if Pompey, imagining Italy destitute of troops, should attempt to run thither, as was commonly rumored, Cæsar might be able to follow him. At the same time he gave Cæsar speedy notice of the number of forces he had brought over with him, and the place where he had landed.

27. This intelligence reached Cæsar and Pompey much about the same time; for both had seen the fleet pass Apollonia and Dyrrhachium, and had in consequence directed their march that way; but neither knew, for some days, into what harbor it had put. On the first news of Antony's landing, the two generals took different resolutions; Cæsar to join him as soon as possible; Pompey to oppose his march, and if possible, draw him into an ambuscade. Both quitted their camps on the Apsus about the same time; Pompey, privately, during the night; Cæsar, publicly, by day. But Cæsar, who had the river to cross, was obliged to fetch a compass, that he might come at a ford. Pompey, on the other hand, having nothing to obstruct his march, advanced by great journeys against Antony; and understanding that he was not far off, posted his troops on an advantageous ground, ordering them to keep within their camp, and light no fires, that his approach might not be perceived. But Antony being informed of it by the Greeks, would not stir out

of his lines, and sending immediate notice to Cæsar, was joined by him next day. On advice of Cæsar's arrival, Pompey, that he might not be shut up between two armies, quitted the place, and coming with all his forces to Asparagium, a town belonging to the Dyrrhachians, encamped there on an advantageous ground.

28. About the same time Scipio, notwithstanding some checks he had received near Mount Amanus, assumed the title of emperor; after which he exacted great sums of money from the neighboring states and princes; obliged the farmers of the revenue to pay the two years' taxes, which lay in their hands, and advance a third by way of loan, and sent orders to the whole province for levying cavalry. Having got a sufficient number together, he quitted the Parthians, his nearest enemies, who not long before had slain M. Crassus, and held Bibulus invested, and marched out of Syria with his legions and cavalry. When he arrived in Asia Minor, he found the whole country filled with terror on account of the Parthian war; and the soldiers themselves declared that they were ready to march against an enemy, but would never bear arms against a consul, and their fellow-citizens. To stifle these discontents, he made considerable presents to the troops, quartered them in Pergamus and other rich towns, and gave up the whole country to their discretion. Meanwhile the money demanded of the province was levied with great rigor, and various pretences were devised to serve as a ground to new exactions. Slaves and freemen were subject to a capitation tax. Imposts were laid on pillars and doors of houses. Corn, soldiers, mariners, arms, engines, carriages—in a word, every thing that had a name, furnished a sufficient handle for extorting money. Go-

vernors were appointed not only over towns, but over villages and castles; and he that acted with the greatest rigor and cruelty was accounted the worthiest man, and best citizen. The province swarmed with lictors, overseers, and collectors, who, besides the sums imposed by public authority, exacted money likewise on their own account, coloring their iniquitous demands with a pretence that they had been expelled their country and native homes, and were in extreme want of every thing. Add to all these calamities, immoderate usury, an evil almost inseparable from war; for as great sums are then exacted, beyond what a country is able to furnish, they are obliged to apply for a delay, which at any price is still accounted a favor. Thus the debts of the province increased considerably during these two years. Nor were the Roman citizens the only sufferers on this occasion; for certain sums were demanded of every state and corporation, as a loan on the senate's decree; and the farmers of the revenue were ordered to advance the next year's tribute, in like manner as when they first entered on office. Besides all this, Scipio gave orders for seizing the treasures of the temple of Diana at Ephesus, with all the statues of that goddess. But when he came to the temple, attended by many persons of senatorian rank, he received letters from Pompey, desiring him to lay aside all other concerns, and make what haste he could to join him, because Cæsar had passed into Greece with his whole army. In consequence of this order, he sent back the senators who had been summoned to attend him at Ephesus, made preparations for passing into Macedonia, and began his march a few days after. Thus the Ephesian treasures escaped being plundered.

29. Cæsar having joined Antony's army, and re-

called the legion he had left at Oricum to guard the sea-coast, judged it necessary to advance farther into the country, and possess himself of the more distant provinces. At the same time deputies arrived from Thessaly and Ætolia, with assurances of submission from all the states in those parts, provided he would send troops to defend them. Accordingly he despatched L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, called the twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse, into Thessaly; and C. Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and some cavalry, into Ætolia; charging them in a particular manner, as those provinces lay the nearest to his camp, that they would take care to furnish him with corn. He likewise ordered Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, and five hundred horse, to march into Macedonia: for Menedemus, the principal man of that country, having come ambassador to Cæsar, had assured him of the affection of the province.

30. Calvisius was well received by the Ætolians, and having driven the enemy's garrisons from Calydon and Naupactum, possessed himself of the whole country. Cassius arriving in Thessaly with his legion, found the state divided into two factions. Egesaretus, a man in years, and of established credit, favored Pompey; Petreius, a young nobleman of the first rank, exerted his whole interest in behalf of Cæsar.

31. About the same time Domitius arrived in Macedonia; and while deputies were attending him from all parts, news came that Scipio approached with his legions, which spread a great alarm through the country; as fame, for the most part, magnifies the first appearances of things. Scipio, without stopping any where in Macedonia, advanced by great marches towards Domitius; but being come within twenty miles

of him, suddenly changed his route, and turned off to Thessaly, in quest of Cassius Longinus. This was done so expeditiously, that he had actually arrived with his troops when Cassius received the first notice of his march; for to make the more dispatch he had left M. Favonius at the river Haliacmon, which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts to guard the baggage of the legions, and ordered him to erect a fort there. At the same time, king Cotus' cavalry, which had been accustomed to make inroads into Thessaly, came pouring on Cassius' camp; who, knowing that Scipio was on his march, and believing the cavalry to be his, retired in a fright to the mountains that begirt Thessaly, and thence directed his course towards Ambracia. Scipio preparing to follow him, received letters from M. Favonius, that Domitius was coming up with his legions, nor would it be possible for him to maintain the post he was in, without his assistance. Scipio, on this intelligence, changed his resolution, gave over the pursuit, of Cassius, and advanced to the relief of Favonius. As he marched day and night without intermission, he arrived so opportunely, that the dust of Domitius' army, and his advanced parties, were descried at the same time. Thus Domitius' care preserved Cassius, and Scipio's diligence Favonius.

32. Scipio continuing two days in his camp on the Haliacmon, which ran between him and the army of Domitius, put his troops in motion on the third, and by day-break forded the river. Early next morning he drew up his troops in order of battle at the head of his camp. Domitius was not averse to an engagement; but as between the two camps there was a plain of six miles, he thought that the fittest place for a field of battle, and drew up his men at some distance from

Scipio's camp. Scipio would not stir from his post; yet hardly could Domitius restrain his men from advancing to attack him, though a rivulet with steep banks, that ran in the front of the enemy's camp, opposed their passage. Scipio observing the keenness and alacrity of our troops, and fearing that next day he should either be forced to fight against his will, or ignominiously keep within his camp; after great expectations raised, by too hastily crossing the river, he saw all his projects defeated; and decamping in great silence during the night, returned to his former station, beyond the Haliacmon, and posted himself on a rising ground near the river. A few days after, he formed an ambuscade of cavalry, by night, in a place where our men were wont to forage; and when Q. Varus, who commanded the horse under Domitius, came next day, according to custom, suddenly the enemy rose from their lurking holes: but our men bravely sustained the attack, soon recovered their ranks, and in their turn vigorously charged the enemy. About four-score fell on this occasion; the rest betook themselves to flight; and our men returned to their camp, with the loss of only two of their number.

33. After this rencounter, Domitius hoping to draw Scipio to a battle, feigned to decamp for want of provisions; and having made the usual signal for retreating, after a march of three miles, drew up his cavalry and legions in a convenient plain, shrouded from the enemy's view. Scipio, preparing to follow, sent the horse and light-armed infantry before to explore his route, and examine the situation of the country. When they were advanced a little way, and their first squadrons had come within reach of our ambush, beginning to suspect something from the neighing of the horses, they wheeled about, in order to retreat;

which the troops that followed observing, suddenly halted. Our men, finding that the ambush was discovered, and knowing it would be in vain to wait for the rest of the army, fell on the two squadrons that were most advanced. M. Opimius, general of the horse to Domitius, was amongst these, but some how found means to escape. All the rest were either slain or made prisoners.

34. Cæsar having drawn off his garrisons from the sea-coast, as we have related above, left three cohorts at Oricum to defend the town, and committed to their charge the galleys he had brought out of Italy. Acilius, one of his lieutenants, had the command of these troops; who, for the greater security, caused the ships to be drawn up into the harbor behind the town, and made them fast to the shore. He likewise sunk a transport in the mouth of the haven, behind which another rode at anchor, on whose deck a tower was erected, facing the entrance of the port, and filled with troops, to be ready in case of surprise. Young Pompey, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having notice of this, came to Oricum; weighed up the vessel that had been sunk in the mouth of the harbor, and, after an obstinate resistance, took the other, which had been placed there by Acilius to guard the haven. He then brought forward his fleet, on which he had raised towers, to fight with the greater advantage; and having surrounded the town on all sides, attacked it by land with scaling ladders, and by sea from the towers, sending fresh men continually in the place of those that were fatigued, and thereby obliging us to yield, through weariness and wounds. At the same time he seized an eminence, on the other side of the town, which seemed a kind of natural mole, and almost formed a peninsula over against Oricum; and by means of this neck of land,

carried four small galleys, on rollers, into the inner part of the haven. Thus the galleys that were made fast to the land, and destitute of troops, being attacked on all sides, four were carried off, and the rest burned. This affair despatched, he left D. Lælius, whom he had taken from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to prevent the importation of provisions from Biblis and Amantia; and sailing for Lissus, attacked and burned the thirty transports which Antony had left in that haven. He endeavored likewise to take the town; but the Roman citizens of that district, aided by the garrison Cæsar had left, defended it so well, that at the end of three days, he retired without effecting his purpose, having lost some men in the attempt.

35. Cæsar being informed that Pompey was at Asparagium, marched thither with his army; and having taken the capital of the Parthinians by the way, where Pompey had a garrison, arrived the third day in Macedonia, and encamped at a small distance from the enemy. The next day he drew out all his forces, formed them before his camp, and offered Pompey battle. Finding that he kept within his lines, he led back his troops, and began to think of pursuing other measures. Accordingly, on the morrow by a long circuit, and through very narrow and difficult ways, he marched, with all his forces, to Dyrrhachium; hoping either to oblige Pompey to follow him thither, or cut off his communication with the town, where he had laid up all his provisions, and magazines of war; which happened accordingly: for Pompey, at first, not penetrating his design, because he counterfeited a route different from what he really intended, imagined he had been obliged to decamp for want of provisions: but being afterwards informed of the truth, by his scouts, he quitted his camp next day, in hopes to prevent him

by taking a nearer way. Cæsar, suspecting what might happen, exhorted his soldiers to bear the fatigue patiently; and allowing them to repose during only a small part of the night, arrived next morning at Dyrrhachium, where he immediately formed a camp, just as Pompey's van began to appear at a distance.

36. Pompey, thus excluded from Dyrrhachium, and unable to execute his first design, came to a resolution of encamping on an eminence, called Petra, where was a tolerable harbor, sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered part of his fleet to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought him from Asia and the other provinces subject to his command. Cæsar, apprehending the war would run into length, and despairing of the supplies from Italy, because the coasts were so strictly guarded by Pompey's fleet, and his own galleys, built, the winter before, in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were not yet arrived, despatched L. Canuleius, one of his lieutenants, to Epirus for corn. And because that country lay at a great distance from his camp, he built granaries in several places, and wrote to the neighboring states to carry their corn thither. He likewise ordered search to be made for what corn could be found in Lissus, the country of the Parthinians, and the other principalities in those parts. This amounted to very little; partly occasioned by the soil, which is rough and mountainous, and obliges the inhabitants often to import grain; partly because Pompey, foreseeing Cæsar's wants, had, some days before, ravaged the country of the Parthinians, plundered their houses, and, by means of his cavalry, carried off all their corn.

37. For these reasons, Cæsar formed a project, which the very nature of the country suggested. All round Pompey's camp, at a small distance, were high and

steep hills. Cæsar took possession of those hills, and built forts on them; resolving, as the nature of the ground would allow, to draw lines of communication from one fort to another, and inclose Pompey within his works. His views herein were; first, to facilitate the passage of his convoys, which the enemy's cavalry, which was very strong and fine, would no longer cut off; next, to distress this very cavalry, for want of forage; and lastly, to lessen the great reputation and high idea entertained of Pompey, when it should be reported all over the world that he had suffered himself to be blockaded, and, as it were, imprisoned by Cæsar's works, and durst not hazard a battle to set himself at liberty.

38. Pompey would neither leave the sea and Dyrrhachium, where he had all his magazines and engines of war, and whence he was supplied with provisions by means of his fleet; nor could he prevent the progress of Cæsar's works, without fighting, which, at that time, he was determined against. He could do nothing therefore but extend himself, by taking as many hills, and as large a circuit of country as possible, to give his adversary the more trouble, and divide his forces. This he did, by raising twenty-four forts, which took in a circumference of fifteen miles, wherein were arable and pasture lands, to feed his horses and beasts of burden. And as our men had carried their circumvallation quite round, by drawing lines of communication from fort to fort, to prevent the sallies of the enemy, and guard against the attacks in their rear; in like manner, Pompey's men had surrounded themselves with lines, to hinder us from breaking in on them, and charging them behind. They even perfected their works first, because they had more hands, and a less circuit to inclose. When Cæsar endeavored to gain any place, Pompey,

though determined not to oppose him with all his forces, nor hazard a general action, failed not however to detach parties of archers and slingers, who wounded great numbers of our men, and occasioned such a dread of their arrows, that almost all the soldiers furnished themselves with coats of mail, or thick leather, to guard against that danger.

39. Both parties disputed every post with great obstinacy: Cæsar, that he might inclose Pompey within as narrow a space as possible; and Pompey, that he might have liberty to extend himself; which occasioned many sharp skirmishes. In one of these, Cæsar's ninth legion having possessed themselves of an eminence, which they began to fortify, Pompey seized the opposite mount, with a resolution to hinder their works. As the access on one side was very easy, he sent first some archers and slingers, and afterwards a strong detachment of light-armed foot, plying us, at the same time, with his military engines; which obliged our men to desist, as they found it impossible at once to sustain the enemy's charge, and go forward with their works. Cæsar, perceiving that his men were wounded from all sides, resolved to quit the place and retire. But as the descent, by which he must retreat, was pretty steep, the Pompeians charged him briskly in drawing off, imagining he gave way through fear. Pompey went so far as to say 'that he consented to be accounted a general of no merit, if Cæsar's men got off without considerable loss.' Cæsar, concerned about the retreat of his men, ordered hurdles to be fixed on the ridge of the hill fronting the enemy: behind which he dug a moderate ditch, and rendered the place as inaccessible as he could, on all sides. When this was done, he began to file off the legionary soldiers, supporting them by some light-armed troops, posted on their flanks,

who, with arrows and stones, might repulse the enemy. Pompey's troops failed not to pursue them, with great outcries and fierce menaces, overturned the hurdles, and used them as bridges to get over the ditch. Which Cæsar observing, and fearing some disaster might ensue, should he seem to be driven from a post which he quitted voluntarily; when his forces were got half down the hill, encouraging them by Antony, who had the command of that legion, he gave the signal to face about, and fall on the enemy. Immediately the soldiers of the ninth legion, forming themselves into close order, launched their darts; and advancing briskly up the hill against the enemy, forced them to give ground, and at last betake themselves to flight: which was not a little incommoded by the hurdles, palisades, and ditch, Cæsar had thrown up to stop their pursuit. But our men, who sought only to secure their retreat, having killed several of the enemy, and lost only five of their own number, retired without the least disturbance, and inclosing some other hills within their lines, completed the circumvallation.

40. This method of making war was new and extraordinary; as well in regard to the number of forts, the extent of the circumvallation, the greatness of the works, and the manner of attack and defence, as on other accounts: for whoever undertakes to invest another, is, for the most part, moved thereto, either by some previous defeat he has sustained, the knowlege of his weakness, to take advantage of his distresses, to profit by a superiority of forces; or, in fine, to cut off his provisions, which is the most ordinary cause of these attempts. But Cæsar, with an inferior force, besieged Pompey, whose troops were intire, in good order, and abounded in all things: for ships arrived every day, from all parts, with provisions; nor could the wind blow from

any quarter that was not favorable to some of them; whereas Cæsar's army, having consumed all the corn round about, was reduced to the last necessities. Nevertheless the soldiers bore all with singular patience; remembering, that though reduced to the like extremity the year before, in Spain, they had yet, by their assiduity and perseverance, put an end to a very formidable war. They called to mind too their sufferings at Alesia, and their still greater distresses before Avaricum, by which, however, they triumphed over mighty nations. When barley or pulse was given them instead of corn, they took it cheerfully, and thought themselves regaled when they got any cattle, which Epirus furnished them with in great abundance. They discovered in the country a root, called chara, which they pounded and kneaded with milk, so as to make a sort of bread of it. This furnished a plentiful supply; and when their adversaries reproached them with their want, by way of answer to their insults, they threw their loaves at them.

41. By this time the corn began to ripen, and the hopes of a speedy supply supported the soldiers under their present wants. Nay, they were often heard to say one to another that they would sooner live on the bark of trees, than let Pompey escape: for they were informed from time to time, by deserters, that their horses were almost starved, and the rest of their cattle actually dead; that the troops themselves were very sickly; partly occasioned by the narrow space in which they were inclosed, the number and noisome smell of dead carcasses, and the daily fatigue to which they were unaccustomed, partly by their extreme want of water. For Cæsar had either turned the course of all the rivers and brooks that ran into the sea, or dammed up their currents. And as the country was

mountainous, intermixed with deep valleys, by driving piles into the earth, and covering them with mould, he stopped up the course of the waters. This obliged the enemy to search for low and marshy places, and to dig wells, which added to their daily labor. The wells, too, when discovered, lay at a considerable distance from some parts of the army, and were soon dried up by the heat. Cæsar's army, on the contrary, was very healthy, abounded in water, and had plenty of all kinds of provisions, corn excepted, which they hoped to be soon supplied with, as the season was now pretty far advanced, and harvest approached.

42. In this new method of making war, new stratagems were every day put in practice by both generals. Pompey's soldiers, observing by the fires the place where our cohorts were on guard, stole thither privately by night, and pouring on them a flight of arrows, retired instantly to their camp, which obliged our men to have fires in one place, and keep guard in another.

43. Meanwhile P. Sylla, whom Cæsar, at his departure, had left to command the camp, being informed of what passed, came to the assistance of the cohort with two legions. His arrival soon put the Pompeians to flight, who could not stand the very sight and shock of his troops; but seeing their first ranks broken, took to their heels, and quitted the place. Sylla checked the ardor of his men, whom he would not suffer to continue the pursuit too far; and it was the general belief, that had he pursued the enemy warmly, that day might have put an end to the war. His conduct, however, cannot be justly censured; for the difference is great between a lieutenant and a general: the one is tied up to act according to instructions; the other, free from restraint, is at li-

berty to lay hold of all advantages. Sylla, who was left by Cæsar to take care of the camp, was satisfied with having disengaged his own men, and had no intention to hazard a general action, which might have been attended with ill consequences, and would have looked like arrogating the part of a general. The Pompeians found it no easy matter to make good their retreat; for having advanced from a very disadvantageous post to the summit of the hill, they had reason to fear our men would charge them in descending; and the rather, as it was very near sunset, for they had protracted the affair almost till night, in hopes of accomplishing their design. Thus Pompey, compelled by necessity, immediately took possession of an eminence, at such a distance from our fort, as to be secure from darts and military engines. Here he encamped, threw up an intrenchment, and drew his forces together to defend the place.

44. At the same time we were engaged in two other places; for Pompey attacked several castles together, to divide our forces, and hinder the forts from mutually succoring one another. In one of these, Volcatius Tullus, with three cohorts, sustained the charge of a whole legion, and forced them to retire. In the other, the Germans, sallying out of their intrenchments, slew several of the enemy, and returned again without loss.

45. Thus there happened no less than six actions in one day; three near Dyrrhachium, and three about the lines. In computing the number of the slain, it appeared that Pompey lost about two thousand men, with several volunteers and centurions, among whom was Valerius Flaccus, the son of Lucius, who had formerly been prætor of Asia. We gained six standards, with the loss of no more than twenty men in all

the attacks; but in the fort, not a soldier escaped being wounded; and four centurions belonging to one cohort lost their eyes. As a proof of the danger they had been exposed to, and the efforts they had sustained, they brought and counted to Cæsar about thirty thousand arrows that had been shot into the fort, and showed him the centurion Scæva's buckler, which was pierced in two hundred and thirty places. Cæsar, as a reward for his services both to himself and the republic, presented him with two hundred thousand *asses*, and advanced him directly from the eighth rank of captains to the first; it appearing that the preservation of the fort was chiefly owing to his valor. He also distributed military rewards among the other officers and soldiers of that cohort, and assigned them double pay, and a double allowance of corn.

46. Pompey labored all night at his fortifications, raised redoubts the following days, and having carried his works fifteen feet high, covered that part of his camp with mantelets. Five days after, taking advantage of a very dark night, he walled up the gates of his camp, rendered all the avenues impracticable; and drawing out his troops in great silence about midnight, returned to his former works.

47. Ætolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis, having been reduced by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have related above, Cæsar thought it expedient to pursue his conquests, and attempt to gain Achaia. Accordingly he despatched Fufius Kalenus thither, ordering Sabinus and Cassius to join him, with the cohorts under their command. Rutilius Lupus, Pompey's lieutenant in Achaia, hearing of their approach, resolved to fortify the isthmus, and thereby hinder Fufius from entering the province. Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenus, voluntarily submitted to

Kalenus; some states he obtained by force, and, sending deputies to the rest, endeavored to make them declare for Cæsar. These negociations found sufficient employment for Fufius.

48. Cæsar, meanwhile, drew up his army every day, offering Pompey battle on equal ground; and, to provoke him to accept it, advanced so near his camp, that his van was within engine-shot of the rampart. Pompey, to preserve his reputation, drew out his legions too, but posted them in such a manner, that his third line touched the rampart, and the whole army lay under cover of the weapons discharged from thence.

49. Whilst these things passed in Achaia and at Dyrrhachium, and it was now known that Scipio had arrived in Macedonia, Cæsar, still adhering to his former views of peace, despatched Clodius to him, an intimate friend of both, whom he had taken into his service on Scipio's recommendation. At his departure, he charged him with letters and instructions to this effect: 'That he had tried all ways to bring about a peace; but believed he had hitherto miscarried, through the fault of those to whom his proposals were addressed, because they dreaded presenting them to Pompey at an improper time: that he knew Scipio's authority to be such, as not only privileged him to advise freely, but even to enforce his counsels, and compel the obstinate to hearken to reason: that he was possessed of an independent command, and had an army at his disposal to give weight to his interposition: that in employing it for so desirable an end, he would gain the indisputable praise of having restored quiet to Italy, peace to the provinces, and saved the empire.' Clodius reported this commission to Scipio, and at first met with a favorable

reception, but was afterwards denied audience: for Favonius having sharply reprimanded Scipio, as we learned after the conclusion of the war, the negotiation was discontinued, and Clodius returned to Cæsar without success.

50. Cæsar, the more effectually to shut up Pompey's horse at Dyrrhachium, and hinder them from foraging, blocked up the two narrow passes, of which we have spoken, with strong works, and raised forts to defend them. Pompey finding his cavalry rendered by this means unserviceable, conveyed them some days after by sea to his camp again. Forage was so scarce, that they were forced to have recourse to the leaves of trees, and the roots of green reeds, bruised; for the corn sown within their lines was all consumed; nor had they had any supplies but what came a long way about by sea, from Corcyra and Acarnania; and even this was so inconsiderable, that to increase the quantity, they were forced to mix it with barley, and by these contrivances support their horses. At last, all expedients being exhausted, and the horses dying daily, Pompey thought it time to attempt to force the barricade, and set himself at liberty.

51. Among the cavalry in Cæsar's camp were two brothers, Allobrogians by birth, named Roscillus and Ægus, the sons of Adbucillus, who had long held the chief sway in his own state; men of singular bravery, and who had been of signal service to Cæsar in all his Gallic wars: for these reasons he had raised them to the highest offices in their own country, got them chosen into the senate before they were of age, given them lands in Gaul taken from the enemy, besides pecuniary rewards to a great value, insomuch that from very moderate beginnings they had risen to vast wealth. These men were not only highly honored by Cæsar on

account of their bravery, but in great esteem with thewhole army. But presuming on Cæsar's friendship, and foolishly elated with their prosperity, they used the troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, and secreted all the plunder to their own use. The Gaulish cavalry, offended at these proceedings, went in a body to Cæsar, and openly complained of the two brothers; adding among other accusations, that, by giving in false musters, they received pay for more men than they had. Cæsar not thinking it a proper time for animadversion, and regarding them greatly on account of their valor, declined all public notice of the affair, and contented himself with reprimanding them in private, admonishing them to expect every thing from his friendship, and to measure their future hopes by the experience of what he had already done for them. This rebuke, however, disgusted them greatly, and very much lessened their credit with the whole army, which they easily perceived, as well from the raillery they were often forced to bear, as in consequence of the secret reproaches and sense of their own minds. Thus prompted by shame, and perhaps imagining they were not cleared, but reserved to a more favorable opportunity, they resolved tod esert, to try their fortunes elsewhere, and search for new friendships. Having imparted their design to a few of their clients, whom they judged fit instruments for so black a treason, they first attempted to murder C. Volusenus, general of the cavalry, (as was afterwards known, when the war was over,) that by so signal a piece of service they might the more effectually recommend themselves to Pompey's favor. But finding that design attended with great hazard, and that no favorable opportunity offered for putting it in execution, they borrowed all the money they could, under pre-

tence of reimbursing the troops, and making restitution; and having bought up a great number of horses, went over to Pompey, with those whom they had made acquainted with their design. As they were persons of noble birth, liberally educated, came with a great train of horses and servants, had been highly honored by Cæsar, and were universally esteemed on account of their valor, Pompey carried them ostentatiously over all the camp, triumphing in this new and unusual acquisition; for till then, neither horse nor foot soldier had deserted from Cæsar to Pompey; whereas scarce a day passed without some desertion from Pompey's army, especially among the new levies in Epirus, Ætolia, and those countries that had declared for Cæsar. The brothers being well acquainted with the condition of Cæsar's camp, what was wanting to complete the fortifications, where the foible of the lines lay, the particular times, distance of places, strength and vigilance of the guards, with the temper and character of the officers who commanded in every post, made an exact report of all to Pompey.

52. On this intelligence, having already formed the design of forcing Cæsar's lines, he ordered the soldiers to make coverings of osier for their helmets, and provide themselves with fascines. This done, he embarked by night, in boats and small barks, a great number of light-armed troops and archers, with the fascines for filling up Cæsar's trenches; and having drawn together sixty cohorts from the greater camp and forts, led them about midnight towards that part of the enemy's lines nearest the sea, a good distance from the main camp. Thither likewise he despatched the barks, on board of which were the light-armed troops and fascines, together with all the galleys that lay at Dyrrhachium, giving each their particular in-

structions. Lentulus Marcellinus the quæstor, with the ninth legion had charge of this part of the fortifications; and as his health was but infirm, Cæsar had joined Fulvius Posthumus with him in the command.

53. This place was guarded by a ditch, fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards the enemy, ten feet high, and of equal thickness. Behind this, at the distance of six hundred feet, was another rampart, somewhat lower than the former, and fronting the contrary way. Cæsar, apprehending an attack from the sea, had raised this double rampart, some days before, that he might be able to defend himself against the enemy, should they charge him on both sides at once. But the extent of the circumvallation, and the continued labor of so many days, in inclosing a space of eighteen miles, had not allowed us time to finish the work. Accordingly, the line of communication, which ran along the sea-side, and was to have joined these two ramparts, was not yet completed. This Pompey was informed of by the Allobrogian brothers, which proved of fatal consequence to us: for while some cohorts of the ninth legion were on guard, near the sea, suddenly the Pompeians arrived about day-beak, and surprised them by their unexpected appearance. At the same time the troops that came by sea, launched their darts against the outward rampart, and began to fill up the ditch with fascines; while the legionary soldiers, planting their scaling-ladders against the inner works, and plying those that defended them with darts and engines, spread a general terror over that part of the camp, which was still increased by the multitude of archers that came pouring on them, from all sides. The osiers they had bound round their helmets, contributed greatly to defend them from the stones thrown down from the rampart, which were the only weapons

we had. At last, all things going against us, and our resistance becoming every moment more languid, the enemy discovered the defect before spoken of in our lines; and landing their men between the two ramparts, where the line of communication towards the sea remained unfinished, they attacked our soldiers in the rear, and obliged them to abandon both sides of the works.

54. Marcellinus hearing of this disorder, detached some cohorts to sustain the flying troops: but as the rout was become general, they could neither persuade them to rally, nor were able themselves to withstand the enemy's charge. The like happened to a second detachment; insomuch that the several supplies sent, by catching the general terror, served only to add to the confusion and danger; for the multitude of runaways rendered the retreat the more difficult. In this action, the eagle-bearer of the ninth legion finding himself dangerously wounded, and that his strength began to fail, called to some troopers who passed by, and said, 'I have preserved to the last moment of my life, with the greatest care, this eagle, with which I have been entrusted; and, now I am dying, I return it to Cæsar, with the same fidelity. Carry it to him, I beseech you; nor suffer Cæsar's arms to experience, in losing it, an ignominy, with which they have been hitherto unacquainted.' Thus the eagle was preserved; but all the centurions of the first cohort were slain, except the first captain of the Principes.

55. And now the Pompeians, having made great slaughter of our men, approached the quarters of Marcellinus, to the no small terror of the rest of the cohorts; when Marc Antony, who commanded in the nearest redoubts, on notice of what passed, was seen descending from the higher ground, at the head of

twelve cohorts. His arrival put a stop to the enemy's progress, and by enabling our men to recover from their extreme terror, restored them to their wonted courage. Soon after Cæsar arrived in person with some troops, being apprised of the attack by the smoke of the forts, the usual signal on these occasions; and perceiving the loss he had sustained, and that Pompey had forced the lines, being able to forage, and having an easy communication with the sea; he quitted his former project, which had proved unsuccessful, and encamped as near Pompey as he could.

56. When the intrenchments were finished, Cæsar had notice from his scouts, that a certain number of the enemy's cohorts, which to them appeared a complete legion, were retired behind a wood, and seemed to be on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two armies was this: some days before, when Cæsar's ninth legion was sent to oppose a body of Pompey's troops, they thought proper to intrench themselves on an opposite hill, and form a camp there. This camp bordered on a wood, and was not above four hundred paces from the sea: but afterwards, for certain reasons, Cæsar removed a little beyond that post; and Pompey, a few days after, took possession of it. But as his design was to place several legions there; leaving the inner rampart standing, he surrounded it with greater works. Thus the smaller camp, inclosed within one of larger circumference, served by way of castle or citadel. He likewise carried an intrenchment from the left angle of the camp to the river, through a space of about four hundred paces, which enabled him to water freely and without danger. But he too, soon after, changed his mind, for reasons which it is not needful to repeat here; and abandoned the place, which thereby was

left several days without troops, though the fortifications remained intire. Hither the scouts reported they saw the standard of a legion carried; which was likewise confirmed by those who were stationed in the higher forts. The place was about five hundred paces distant from Pompey's new camp. Cæsar, desirous to repair the loss he had sustained, and hoping he might be able to surprise this legion, left two cohorts in his intrenchments, to prevent any suspicion of his design; and with thirty-three more, amongst which number was the ninth legion, which had lost many centurions and soldiers, marched by a different route, as privately as he could, against the legion which Pompey had lodged in the lesser camp. Neither was he deceived in his first conjecture: for he arrived before Pompey could have notice of his design; and though the intrenchments were strong, yet charging the enemy briskly with his left wing, where he himself commanded in person, he quickly drove them from the rampart. But as the gates were secured by a barricade, they still maintained the fight here for some time, our men endeavoring to break in, and the enemy to defend the camp. T. Pulcia, who betrayed the army of C. Antony, as we have related above, gave signal proofs of his valor on this occasion. But our men at last prevailed; and, having cut down the barricade, broke first into the greater camp, and afterwards into the fort within it, whither the legion had retired, some of whom were slain, endeavoring to defend themselves.

57. But fortune, whose influence is very great, as in other things, so particularly in war, often effects mighty changes from the most trifling causes; as happened on this occasion: for the cohorts of Cæsar's right wing being unacquainted with the situation of

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the camp, and mistaking the rampart which led to the river for one of its sides, marched on that way in quest of a gate; but perceiving at length their error, and that nobody defended the intrenchment, they immediately mounted the rampart, and were followed by the whole cavalry. This delay saved the enemy: for Pompey, having notice of what passed, brought up the fifth legion to sustain his party; so that at one and the same instant his cavalry approached ours, and his troops were seen advancing in order of battle, by those who had taken possession of the camp; which quickly changed the face of affairs: for Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy succors, sallied by the Decuman port, and briskly charged our cohorts. On the other hand, Cæsar's cavalry, who had entered by a narrow breach in the rampart, foreseeing that a retreat would be extremely difficult, began betimes to think of flying. The right wing, which had no communication with the left, observing the consternation of the cavalry, and fearing they should be overpowered within the camp, retired the same way they had entered. Many, to avoid being engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves from the rampart, which was ten feet high, into the ditch; where the first ranks being trodden to death, their bodies afforded a safe passage to those that followed. The left wing, who from the rampart whence they had driven the enemy, saw Pompey advancing against them and their own men flying, fearing to be entangled in the defiles, as they had the enemy on them, both within and without the camp, retreated the same way they came. Nothing was to be seen but consternation, flying, and disorder: insomuch that all Cæsar's efforts to rally his troops were fruitless. If he seized any by the arm, they struggled till they got away. If he laid hold of the

colors, they left them in his hands. Not a man could be prevailed on to face about.

58. In this calamity, what saved the army from intire destruction was, that Pompey, apprehending an ambuscade, (probably because the success was beyond his hopes, as a little before he had seen his men worsted and put to flight) durst not, for some time, approach the intrenchments; and his cavalry were retarded in the pursuit by Cæsar's troops, who were possessed of all the gates and defiles. Be that as it may, a small matter proved of very great consequence to both parties: for the intrenchment between the camp and the river stopped the course of Cæsar's victory, when he had already forced Pompey's lines; and the same, by retarding the pursuit of the enemy, saved his army from destruction.

59. In these two actions Cæsar lost nine hundred and sixty private men, thirty officers, and several knights of note, as Flavius Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; C. Felginus, of Placentia; A. Gravius, of Puteoli; and M. Sacrativir, of Capua. But the greatest part of these died without wounds, being trodden to death in the ditch, about the works, and on the banks of the river, occasioned by the flight and terror of their own men. He lost also thirty-two colors. Pompey was saluted emperor on this occasion; a title which he bore ever after, and suffered himself to be accosted by: but neither in the letters which he wrote, nor in his consular ensigns, did he think proper to assume the laurel. The prisoners were delivered up to Labienus at his own request; and this deserter, brutal and cruel as usual, diverted himself with insulting them in their calamity; and asked them, sarcastically, if it was usual for veterans to run away; after which, he caused them all to be put to death.

60. This success gave such confidence and spirit to the Pompeian party, that they now no longer took any concern about the conduct of the war, but began to consider themselves as already victorious. They never reflected on the inconsiderable number of our troops, the disadvantage of the ground, the narrow passes we were engaged in, by their having first possession of the camp, the double danger, both within and without the fortifications, and the separation of the two wings of the army, which hindered them from mutually succoring one another. They forgot that the advantage they had gained was not the effect of a brisk and vigorous attack; and that our men had suffered more by crowding on one another in the narrow passes than by the sword of the enemy. In fine, they never called to mind the uncertain chance of war, and on what minute causes good or bad success often depends; how a groundless suspicion, a panic terror, or a religious scruple, have frequently been productive of the most fatal events; when, either by the misconduct of a general, or the terror of a tribune, some false persuasion has been suffered to take root in an army. But, as if the victory had been purely the effect of their valor, and no change of fortune was to be apprehended, they every where proclaimed, and made public, the success of this day.

61. Cæsar, seeing all his former projects disconcerted, resolved to submit to fortune, and intirely change the manner of the war. He therefore called in all his forces from the forts, gave up the design of inclosing Pompey, and having assembled his army, addressed them as follows: 'That they ought not to be discouraged, or give way to consternation, on what had lately happened, but oppose their many successful engagements to one slight and inconsiderable check: That

the field, and return without loss to the main body of their army.

63. Having completed the intended march of that day, and brought his army over the Genusus, he took up his quarters in his old camp at Asparagium, suffering none of the soldiers to stroll without the rampart, and charging the cavalry, who had been sent out under pretence of foraging, to return immediately to the Decuman port. Pompey, likewise, having completed that day's march, encamped at his old post at Asparagium; where the troops having nothing to do, because the works were still intire, some made long excursions in quest of wood and forage; others, who had come almost without any baggage, by reason the march was undertaken on a sudden, enticed by the nearness of their former camp, laid down their arms in their tents, quitted the intrenchments, and went to fetch what they had left behind them. This rendering them unable to pursue, as Cæsar had foreseen, about noon he gave the signal for decamping, led forth his troops, and doubling that day's march, gained eight miles on Pompey, who could not follow him by reason his troops were dispersed.

64. Next day Cæsar decamped again at three in the morning; having sent away his baggage over night, that, if he should find himself under a necessity of fighting, he might have his army clear of all incumbrance. The same he did the following days; by which means, though he had very difficult ways to pass, and some great rivers to cross, he suffered no loss during the whole march: for Pompey, after the first day's hindrance, endeavoring in vain by long and forced marches to overtake Cæsar, gave over the pursuit on the fourth, and began to think of taking other measures.

then possessed, and putting all to the hazard of a battle. But Cæsar did not think it prudent to expose to an action troops that had been just worsted, and in whom might remain too deep impressions of their late fright. He was for allowing them time to recover themselves; and, having quitted his works, thought it needful to provide for the security of his convoys.

62. Accordingly, after proper care taken of the sick and wounded, and as soon as night approached, he sent all the baggage privately towards Apollonia, under a guard of one legion, with orders not to halt till they had reached the place. This affair despatched, he made two legions remain in the camp, and marching out all the rest, about three in the morning, at several gates, ordered them to follow the same route the baggage had taken. Soon after, that his departure might not have the appearance of a flight, and yet be known to the enemy as late as possible, he ordered the usual signal to be given, and setting out with the rest of his forces, lost sight of the camp in a moment. Pompey, hearing of his retreat, prepared to follow him without delay; and hoping to surprise the army in its march, whilst incumbered with baggage, and not yet removed from its consternation, drew out all his troops, and sent his cavalry before to retard our rear; which, however, he could not overtake, because Cæsar, marching without baggage, had got a great way before him. But when we came to the river Genusus, we found the banks so steep and difficult, that before all the men could get over, Pompey's cavalry came up, and fell on our hindmost battalions. Cæsar sent his horse to oppose them, intermixed with some light-armed troops; who charged with such vigor and success, as to put them all to rout, leave a considerable number dead on

mitius, who for several days had been encamped near Scipio, quitted that station for the convenience of provisions, and was on his march to Heraclea Sentica, a city of the Candavians; so that chance seemed to throw him directly in Pompey's way, which Cæsar had not then the least knowlege of. Pompey too having sent letters through all the states and provinces, relating to the action at Dyrrhachium, with representations that far exceeded the truth; a rumor began to prevail, that Cæsar had been defeated with the loss of almost all his forces, and was forced to fly before Pompey. These reports raised him many enemies on his march, and induced some states to throw off their allegiance; whence it happened, that the couriers mutually sent by Cæsar and Domitius were all intercepted. But the Allobrogians in the train of Ægus and Roscillus, who, as we have seen before, had deserted from Cæsar to Pompey, meeting some of Domitius's scouts, either out of ancient custom, because they had served together in the Gallic wars, or from a motive of vain-glory, informed them of all that had passed; of Pompey's victory, and Cæsar's retreat. Advice being given of this to Calvinus, who was not above four hours' march from the enemy, he avoided the danger by a timely retreat, and joined Cæsar near Æginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly.

67. After the junction of the two armies, Cæsar arrived at Gomphi, the first town of Thessaly, as you come from Epirus. A few months before, the inhabitants had of their own accord sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to make an offer of what their country afforded, and petition for a garrison. But the report of the action at Dyrrhachium, with many groundless additions, had by this time reached their ears. And therefore Androsthenes, pretor of Thessaly, choosing rather

to be the companion of Pompey's good fortune, than associate with Cæsar in adversity, ordered all the people, whether slaves or free, to assemble in the town; and having shut the gates against Cæsar, sent letters to Scipio and Pompey to come to his assistance, intimating 'that the town was strong enough to hold out if they used dispatch, but by no means in condition to sustain a long siege.' Scipio, on advice of the departure of the armies from Dyrrhachium, had come to Larissa with his legions; and Pompey was yet far enough distant from Thessaly. Cæsar having fortified his camp, ordered mantelets, hurdles, and scaling-ladders to be prepared for a sudden attack; and then exhorting his men, represented 'of how great consequence it was to render themselves masters of an opulent city, abounding in all things needful for the supply of their wants, and by the terror of whose punishment other states would be awed into submission; and this, he told them, must be done quickly, before any succors could arrive.' Accordingly, seizing the opportunity offered by the uncommon ardor of the troops, he attacked the town the same day about three in the afternoon; and having made himself master of it before sunset, gave it up to be plundered. From Gomphi Cæsar marched directly to Metropolis, and arrived before they were acquainted with the misfortune of their neighbors.

68. The Metropolitans at first following the example of Gomphi, to which they were moved by the same reports, shut their gates and manned the walls. But no sooner came they to understand the fate of their neighbor city, by some prisoners whom Cæsar had produced for that end, than immediately they admitted him into the town. He suffered no hostilities to be committed, nor any harm to be done them: and so

powerful was the example, from the different treatment of these two cities, that not a single state in Thessaly refused to submit to Cæsar, and receive his orders, except Larissa, which was awed by the numerous army of Metellus Scipio. As the country was good, and covered with corn, which was near ripe, Cæsar took up his quarters there, judging it a proper place to wait for Pompey in, and render the theatre of the war.

69. A few days after Pompey arrived in Thessaly, and joining Metellus Scipio, harangued both armies. He first thanked his own for their late services, and then turning to Scipio's troops, exhorted them to put in for their share of the booty, which the victory already obtained gave them the fairest prospect of. Both armies being received into one camp, he shared all the honors of command with Scipio, ordered a pavilion to be erected for him, and the trumpets to sound before it. This increase of Pompey's forces, by the conjunction of two mighty armies, raised the confidence of his followers, and their assurance of victory to such a degree, that all delays were considered as a hindrance of their return to Italy; insomuch, that if Pompey on any occasion acted with slowness and circumspection, they failed not to cry out 'that he industriously protracted an affair, for the dispatch of which one day was sufficient, in the view of gratifying his ambition for command, and having consular and pretorian senators amongst the number of his servants.' Already they began to dispute about rewards and dignities, and fixed on the persons who were annually to succeed to the consulship. Others sued for the houses and estates of those who had followed Cæsar's party. A warm debate arose in council in relation to L. Hirrus, whom Pompey had sent against the Parthians, whether, in the next election of pretors, he should be allowed to

stand candidate for that office in his absence; his friends imploring Pompey to make good the promise he had made him at his departure, and not suffer him to be deceived by depending on the general's honor; while such as aspired to this office complained publicly that a promise should be made to any one candidate, when all were embarked in the same cause, and shared the like dangers. Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, were openly quarrelling about the high priesthood, which Cæsar was in possession of. They even descended to personal abuse, and pleaded their several pretensions; Lentulus urging the respect due to his age; Domitius, his dignity, and the interest he had in the city; and Scipio, his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus impeached L. Afranius before Pompey, charging him with having occasioned the loss of the army in Spain: and L. Domitius moved in council, that after the victory, all the senators in Pompey's army and camps should be appointed judges, and impowered to proceed against those who had stayed in Italy, or who had appeared cool, or shown any indifference to the cause; and that three billets should be given to these judges, one for acquittance, another for condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary fine. In a word, nothing was thought on but honors, or profit, or vengeance; nor did they consider by what methods they were to conquer, but what advantage they should make of victory.

70. Cæsar having provided for the subsistence of his troops, who were now no longer fatigued, and had sufficiently recovered from the consternation the different actions at Dyrrhachium had thrown them into, thought it high time to make trial how Pompey stood affected to an engagement. Accordingly he drew out his men, and formed them in order of battle; at first

near his own camp, and somewhat distant from the enemy: but perceiving this had no effect on Pompey, who still maintained his post on the eminences, he each day drew nearer, and by that conduct animated and gave fresh courage to his soldiers. His cavalry being much inferior to the enemy's in number, he followed the method already mentioned, of singling out the strongest and nimblest of his foot soldiers, and accustoming them to fight intermixed with the horse; in which way of combat they were become very expert by daily practice. This disposition, joined to constant exercise, so emboldened his cavalry, that though but a thousand in number, they would on occasion sustain the charge of Pompey's seven thousand, even in an open plain, and appear not greatly dismayed at their multitude: nay, they actually got the better in a skirmish that happened between them, and killed Ægus the Allobrogian, one of the two brothers who deserted to Pompey, with several others of his party.

71. Pompey, whose camp was on an eminence, drew up his army at the foot of the mountain, expecting, as may be presumed, that Cæsar would attack him in that advantageous situation. But Cæsar despairing to draw Pompey to battle on equal terms, thought it would be his best course to decamp, and be always on the march; in hopes, that by frequent shifting his ground, he might the better be supplied with provisions; and that as the enemy would not fail following him, in the frequent marches he should make, he might perhaps find an opportunity of attacking them, and forcing them to fight: at least he was sure of harassing Pompey's army, little accustomed to these continued fatigues. Accordingly the order for marching was given, and the tents struck; when Cæsar perceived that Pompey's army, which had quitted their intrenchments, had advanced farther to-

wards the plain than usual, so that he might engage them at a less disadvantage: whereon, addressing himself to his soldiers, who were just ready to march out of their trenches, 'Let us no longer think,' said he, 'of marching; now is the time for fighting, so long wished for; let us therefore arm ourselves with courage, and not miss so favorable an opportunity.' This said, he immediately drew out his forces.

72. Pompey likewise, as was afterwards known, had resolved to offer battle, in compliance with the repeated importunities of his friends. He even said in a council of war, held some days before, that Cæsar's army would be defeated before the infantry came to engage. And when some expressed their surprise at this speech, 'I know,' said he, 'that what I promise appears almost incredible; but hear the reasons on which I ground my confidence, that you may advance to battle with the greater assurance. I have persuaded the cavalry, and obtained their promise for the performance, that as soon as the armies are formed, they shall fall on Cæsar's right wing, which they will easily be able to outflank and surround. This must infallibly occasion the immediate rout of that wing, and consequently of the rest of Cæsar's troops, without danger or loss on our side. Nor will the execution be attended with any difficulty, as we are so much superior to them in horse. Be ready therefore for battle; and since the so-much desired opportunity of fighting is come, take care not to fall short of the good opinion the world entertains of your valor and experience.' Labienus spoke next, highly applauding this scheme of Pompey, and expressing the greatest contempt of Cæsar's army: 'Think not,' says he, 'addressing himself to Pompey, that these are the legions which conquered Gaul and Germany. I was present in all those battles,

and can, of my own knowlege, affirm, that but a very small part of that army now remains: great numbers have been killed, as must of necessity happen, in such a variety of conflicts: many perished during the autumnal pestilence in Apulia: many are returned to their own habitations, and not a few were left behind to guard Italy. Have you not heard that the cohorts in garrison, at Brundusium, are made up of invalids? The forces which you now behold are composed of new levies, raised in Lombardy, and the colonies beyond the Po: for the veterans, in whom consisted the main strength of the army, perished all in the two defeats at Dyrrhachium.' Having finished this speech, he took an oath, which he proffered to all that were present, never to return to camp otherwise than victorious. Pompey commended his zeal, took the oath himself, and the rest followed his example, without hesitation. After these engagements, taken publicly in council, they all departed, full of joy and expectation; considering themselves as already victorious, and relying intirely on the ability of their general; who, in an affair of that importance, they were confident would promise nothing without an assurance of success.

73. When Cæsar approached Pompey's camp, he found his army drawn up in this manner: in the left wing were the two legions delivered by Cæsar, at the beginning of the quarrel, in consequence of a decree of the senate; one of which was called the first, the other the third legion; and here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio was in the centre, with the legions he had brought out of Syria. The Cilician legion, joined to the Spanish cohorts, brought over by Afranius, formed the right wing. These Pompey esteemed his best troops, distributing the less expert between the

wings and the main body. He had in all a hundred and ten cohorts, amounting to five-and-forty thousand; besides two cohorts of volunteers, who had served under him in former wars; and who, out of affection to their old general, though their legal time was expired, flocked to his standard on this occasion, and were dispersed among the whole army. His other seven cohorts were left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. As the Enipeus, a river with very steep banks, covered his right wing, he placed all his horse, slingers, and archers in the left.

74. Cæsar observing his ancient custom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and the ninth in the left wing. As this last had been considerably weakened by the several actions at Dyrrhachium, he joined the eighth to it in such manner, that they formed as it were but one legion, and had orders mutually to relieve each other. His whole army amounted to fourscore cohorts, making in all twenty-two thousand men; besides two cohorts left to guard the camp. Domitius Calvinus was in the centre, Marc Antony on the left, and P. Sylla on the right. Cæsar took his post opposite to Pompey, at the head of the tenth legion. And as he had observed the disposition of the enemy contrived to outflank his right wing, to obviate that inconvenience, he made a draught of six cohorts from his rear line, formed them into a separate body, and opposed them to Pompey's horse; instructing them in the part they were to act; and admonishing them, that the success of that day would depend chiefly on their courage. At the same time, he charged the whole army, and in particular the third line, not to advance to battle without orders; which, when he saw it proper, he would give, by making the usual signal.

75. When he was exhorting them to battle, as mili-

tary custom required, and reminding them of the many favors they had, on all occasions, received at his hands, he chiefly took care to observe, 'that they had themselves been witnesses of his earnest endeavors after peace; that he had employed Vatinius to solicit a conference with Labienus, and sent A. Clodius to treat with Scipio; that he had pressed Libo, in the warmest manner, at Oricum, to grant him a safe conduct for his ambassadors: in a word, that he had left nothing unattempted to avoid wasting the blood of his soldiers, and to spare the commonwealth the loss of one of her armies.' After this speech, observing his soldiers ardent for the fight, he ordered the trumpets to sound a charge. Among the volunteers in Cæsar's army was one Crastinus, a man of distinguished courage, who, the year before, had been first centurion of the tenth legion. This brave officer, as soon as the signal was given, calling to those next him, 'Follow me,' said he, 'you that were formerly under my command, and acquit yourselves of the duty you owe to your general. This one battle more will crown the work, by restoring him to his proper dignity, and us to the enjoyment of our freedom.' At the same time, turning to Cæsar, 'General,' said he, 'this day you shall be satisfied with my behavior, and whether I live or die, I will take care to deserve your commendations.' So saying, he marched up to the enemy, and began the attack at the head of a hundred and twenty volunteers.

76. Between the two armies there was an interval sufficient for the onset: but Pompey had given his troops orders to keep their ground, that Cæsar's army might have all that way to come. This he is said to have done by the advice of C. Triarius, that the enemy's ranks might be broken, and themselves put out of breath, by having so far to run; of which disorder

he hoped to make an advantage. He was besides of opinion that our javelins would have less effect, by the troops continuing in their post, than if they sprung forward at the very time they were launched; and as the soldiers would have twice as far to run as usual, they must be weary and breathless by the time they came up with the first line. But herein Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient reason; because there is a certain alacrity and ardor of mind, naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed by the desire of fighting; and which an able general, far from endeavoring to repress, will, by all the methods he can devise, foment and cherish. Nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on every side, and the whole army raise a shout, in order to animate the courage of their own men, and strike terror into the enemy. Cæsar's soldiers intirely defeated Pompey's hopes by their good discipline and experience; for perceiving the enemy did not stir, they halted, of their own accord, in the midst of their career; and having taken a moment's breath, put themselves a second time in motion, marched up in good order, flung their javelins, and then betook themselves to their swords. Nor did Pompey's men act with less presence of mind; for they sustained our attack, kept their ranks, bore the discharge of our darts; and having launched their own, immediately had recourse to their swords. At this instant, Pompey's horse, accompanied by the archers and slingers, attacked Cæsar's; and having compelled them to give ground, began to extend themselves to the left, in order to flank the infantry. Whereon Cæsar gave the appointed signal to the six cohorts, who fell on the enemy's horse with such fury, that they not only drove them from the field of battle, but even compelled them to seek refuge

in the highest mountains. The archers and slingers, deprived of their protection, were soon after cut to pieces. Meanwhile the six cohorts, not content with this success, wheeled round on the enemy's left wing, and began to charge it in the rear: whereon Cæsar, perceiving the victory so far advanced, to complete it, brought up his third line, which till then had not engaged. Pompey's infantry being thus doubly attacked, in front by fresh troops, and in rear by the victorious cohorts, could no longer resist, but fled to their camp. Nor was Cæsar mistaken in his conjecture when, in exhorting his men, he declared that victory would depend chiefly on the six cohorts which formed the body of reserve, and were stationed to oppose the enemy's horse; for by them were their cavalry defeated, their archers and slingers cut to pieces, and their left wing surrounded and forced to fly.

77. Pompey seeing his cavalry routed, and that part of the army on which he chiefly depended put into disorder, despaired of being able to restore the battle, and quitted the field. Repairing immediately to his camp, he said aloud to the centurions who guarded the pretorian gate, so as all the soldiers might hear him, 'take care of the camp, and defend it vigorously in case of an attack. I go to visit the other gates, and give orders for their defence.' This said, he retired to his tent, despairing of success, yet waiting the event. Cæsar having forced the Pompeians to seek refuge in their camp, and not willing to allow them time to recover from their consternation, exhorted his troops to make the best of their present victory, and vigorously attack the enemy's intrenchments. Though the battle had lasted till noon, the weather being extremely hot, yet prepared to encounter all difficulties, they cheerfully complied with his orders. The camp was bravely

defended, for some time, by the cohorts left to guard it; and particularly by a great number of Thracians, and other barbarians, who made a very stout resistance: for as to such troops as had there sought refuge from the field of battle, they were in too great a consternation to think of any thing more than a safe retreat. It was not however possible for the troops posted on the rampart long to stand the multitude of darts continually poured on them; which, in the end, obliged them to retire covered with wounds, and under the conduct of their tribunes and centurions, seek shelter in the mountains adjoining to the camp.

78. On entering Pompey's camp we found tables ready covered, side-boards loaded with plate, and tents adorned with branches of myrtle; that of L. Lentulus, with some others, was shaded with ivy. Every thing gave proofs of the highest luxury, and an assured expectation of victory; whence it was easy to see that they little dreamed of the issue of that day, since, intent only on voluptuous refinements, they pretended, with troops immersed in luxury, to oppose Cæsar's army, accustomed to fatigue, and inured to the want of necessaries.

79. Pompey finding our men had forced his intrenchments, mounted his horse, quitted his armor for a habit more suitable to his ill fortune, and withdrawing by the Decuman port, rode full speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there; but continuing his flight, day and night without intermission, he arrived at the sea-side, with thirty horse, and went on board a little bark; often complaining, 'that he had been so far deceived in his opinion of his followers, as to see those very men, from whom he expected victory, the first to fly, and, in a manner, betray him into the hands of his enemies.'

80. Cæsar having mastered the enemy's camp, re-

quested his soldiers not to leave the victory imperfect, by busying themselves about the plunder. Finding them ready to obey, he began a line of circumvallation round the mountain. The Pompeians quickly abandoned a post, which, for want of water, was not tenable, and endeavored to reach the city of Larissa: whereon Cæsar, dividing his army, left one part in Pompey's camp, sent back another to his own camp, and having, with four legions taken a nearer road than that by which the enemy passed, he found means to intercept them, and, after six miles' march, drew up in order of battle. But the Pompeians once more found protection from a mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. Though Cæsar's troops were greatly fatigued, by fighting the whole day, before night he had flung up some works, sufficient to prevent the enemy from having any communication with the rivulet. As by this step they were cut off from all hopes of relief, or of escaping, they sent deputies to treat about a surrender. Affairs continued in this situation all that night, of which some few senators, who had accompanied them, took the advantage to make their escape. At break of day they all, by Cæsar's order, came down into the plain, and delivered up their arms; humbly imploring his goodness, and suing for mercy. Cæsar spoke to them with great mildness, and to alleviate their apprehensions, cited various instances of his clemency, which he had, on so many occasions, made evident. In fact, he gave them their lives, and forbade his soldiers to offer them any violence, or to take any thing from them. He then sent for the legions, which had passed the night in camp, to relieve those that had accompanied him in the pursuit; and being determined to follow Pompey, began his march, and arrived the same day at Larissa.

81. This battle cost Cæsar no more than two hun-

dred soldiers: but he lost thirty centurions, men of singular courage. Among these latter was Crastinus, whose gallantry and intrepidity, in marching up to battle, has been taken notice of. This brave officer, fighting, regardless of danger, received a wound in the mouth from a sword. Nor was he deceived in promising himself Cæsar's approbation, who was thoroughly sensible of his merit, and greatly applauded his behavior in this action. On Pompey's side there fell about fifteen thousand: but upwards of four-and-twenty thousand were taken prisoners: for the cohorts that guarded the forts surrendered to Sylla; though many escaped into the adjacent countries. One hundred and eighty colors were taken, and nine eagles. L. Domitius, flying towards the mountains, and growing faint through the fatigue, was overtaken and killed by some horsemen.

82. About this time D. Lælius arrived with his fleet at Brundusium, and possessed himself of the island over against the harbor, as Libo had done before. Vatinius, who commanded in the place, having equipped several boats, endeavored to entice some of Lælius' ships within the haven, and took a five-benched galley, with two smaller vessels, that had ventured too far into the port; then disposing his cavalry along the shore, he prevented the enemy from getting fresh water. But Lælius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for sailing, brought water in transports from Corcyra and Dyrrhachium; still keeping to his purpose, from which neither the disgrace of losing his ships, nor the want of necessaries could divert him, till he received intelligence of the battle of Pharsalia.

83. Much about the same time Cassius arrived in Sicily, with the Syrian, Phœnician, and Cilician fleets. And as Cæsar's fleet was divided into two parts, in one

of which P. Sulpicius the pretor commanded at Vibo, in the straits; in the other M. Pomponius at Messana: Cassius had arrived at Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his coming: and finding him unprepared, without guards, order, or discipline, he took the opportunity of a favorable wind, and sent several fire-ships against him, which consumed his whole fleet, thirty-five in number, twenty of which were decked. The terror occasioned by this blow was so great, that though there was an intire legion in garrison at Messana, they durst scarce look the enemy in the face; and would doubtless have delivered up the town, had not the news of Cæsar's victory reached them, by means of the cavalry stationed along the coast. Cassius then sailed for Sulpicius' fleet at Vibo, which finding at anchor near the shore, by reason the consternation had become general over the whole island, he put the same stratagem in practice as before: for taking the advantage of a favorable wind, he made forty fire-ships advance against them, and the flame catching hold on both sides, quickly reduced five galleys to ashes. The conflagration continuing to spread, roused the indignation of some veteran soldiers, who had been left to guard the ships. Accordingly they went on board, weighed anchor, and attacking the enemy, took two quinqueremes, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he escaped in a boat. Two three-benched galleys were sunk; and soon after he was informed of the defeat at Pharsalia, by some of Pompey's own followers; for hitherto he had regarded it as a false report, spread about by Cæsar's lieutenants and friends. On this intelligence he quitted Sicily, and retired with his fleet.

84. Cæsar laying all other thoughts aside, determined to pursue Pompey, whithersoever he should re-

tire, to prevent his drawing together fresh forces, and renewing the war. He marched every day as far as the body of cavalry he had with him could hold out, and was followed, by shorter marches, by a single legion. Pompey had issued a proclamation at Amphipolis, enjoining all the youth of the province, whether Greeks or Romans, to join him in arms. But whether this was with intent to conceal his real design of retreating much farther, or to try to maintain his ground in Macedonia, if nobody pursued him, is hard to determine. Here he lay one night at anchor, sending to what friends he had in the town, and raising all the money he possibly could. But being informed of Cæsar's approach, he departed with all expedition, and came in a few days to Mitylene. Here he was detained two days by the badness of the weather; and having increased his fleet with a few galleys, sailed to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There he was informed that the Antiochians, and Roman citizens trading thither, had with joint consent seized the castle, and sent deputies to such of his followers as had taken refuge in the neighboring states, not to come near Antioch at their peril. The same had happened at Rhodes to L. Lentulus the consul of the foregoing year, to P. Lentulus, a consular senator, and to some other persons of distinction; who following Pompey in his flight, and arriving at that island, were refused admittance into the town and harbor, and received an order to withdraw immediately, which they were necessitated to comply with; for the fame of Cæsar's approach had now reached the neighboring states.

85. On this intelligence Pompey laid aside his design of going into Syria, seized all the money he found in the public bank, borrowed as much more as he could of his friends, sent great quantities of brass on

board for military uses; and having raised two thousand soldiers, amongst the public officers, merchants, and his own servants, sailed for Pelusium. Here, by accident, was king Ptolemy, a minor, warring with a great army against his sister Cleopatra; whom, some months before, by the assistance of his friends, he had expelled the kingdom, and was then encamped not far distant from her. Pompey sent to demand his protection, and a safe retreat into Alexandria, in consideration of the friendship that had subsisted between him and his father. The messengers, after discharging their commission, began to converse freely with the king's troops, exhorting them to assist Pompey, and not despise him in his adverse fortune. Among these troops were many of Pompey's old soldiers, whom Gabinius having draughted out of the Syrian army, had carried to Alexandria, and, on the conclusion of the war, left there with the young king's father. The king's ministers, who had the care of the government during his minority, being informed of this, either out of fear, as they afterwards pretended, lest Pompey should debauch the army, and thereby render himself master of Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his low condition, (as friends, in bad fortune, often turn enemies,) spoke favorably to the deputies in public, and invited Pompey to court; but privately despatched Achillas, captain of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and L. Septimius, a military tribune, with orders to murder him. They accosted him with an air of frankness, especially Septimius, who had served under him as a centurion in the war with the pirates; and, inviting him into the boat, treacherously slew him. L. Lentulus was likewise seized by the king's command, and put to death in prison.

86. When Cæsar arrived in Asia, he found that T.

Ampius, having formed the design of seizing the treasures of the Ephesian Diana, and summoned all the senators in the province to bear witness to the sum taken, had quitted that project on Cæsar's approach, and betaken himself to flight. Thus was the temple of Ephesus a second time saved from plunder by Cæsar. It was remarked in the temple of Minerva at Elis, that the very day Cæsar gained the battle of Pharsalia, the image of Victory, which before stood fronting the statue of the goddess, turned towards the portal of the temple. The same day, at Antioch, in Syria, such a noise of fighting and trumpets was heard two several times, that the inhabitants ran to arms, and manned their walls. The like happened at Ptolemais. At Pergamus, in the inner recesses of the temple, called by the Greeks Adyta, where none but priests are allowed to enter, the sound of cymbals was heard: and in the temple of Victory, at Trallis, where a statue was consecrated to Cæsar, a palm sprouted between the joining of the stones that arched the roof.

87. Cæsar, after a short stay in Asia, hearing that Pompey had been seen at Cyprus, and thence conjecturing that he was gone for Egypt, because of the interest he had in that kingdom, and the advantages it would afford him, left Rhodes, with a convoy of ten Rhodian galleys, and a few others from Asia, having on board two legions, one of which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other detached from Fufius's army in Achaia; and eight hundred horse. In these legions were no more than three thousand two hundred men: the rest, fatigued with the length of the march, or weakened with wounds, had not been able to follow him. But Cæsar, depending on the reputation of his former exploits, scrupled not to trust the safety of his person to a feeble escort, believing

no place would dare to attempt any thing against him. At Alexandria he was informed of Pompey's death; and, on landing, was accosted in a clamorous manner by the soldiers, whom Ptolemy had left to garrison the city: and he observed that the mob appeared dissatisfied to see the fasces carried before him, which they interpreted a degradation of the sovereign authority. Though this tumult was appeased, yet each day produced some fresh disturbance, and many of the Roman soldiers were murdered in all parts of the city.

88. For these reasons, he sent into Asia for some of the legions which he had raised out of the remains of Pompey's army; being himself necessarily detained by the Etesian winds, which are directly contrary to any passage by sea from Alexandria. Meantime, considering the difference between Ptolemy and his sister as subject to the cognisance of the Roman people, and of him as consul; and the rather, because the alliance with Ptolemy the father had been contracted during his former consulship; he gave the king and Cleopatra to understand, that it was his pleasure they should dismiss their troops, and, instead of having recourse to arms, come and plead their cause before him.

89. Pothinus the eunuch, governor to the young king, had the chief management of affairs during his minority. This minister complained bitterly to his friends, that the king should be summoned to plead his cause before Cæsar: afterwards, finding among those that sided with the king, some who were disposed to enter into his views, he privately sent for the army from Pelusium to Alexandria, and conferred the chief command on Achillas, the same we have spoken of before; inciting him by letters and promises, both in the king's name and his own, to execute such orders

as he should receive from him. Ptolemy the father, by his will, had appointed the eldest of his two sons, and his elder daughter, joint-heirs of the kingdom. For the more certain accomplishment of his design, he in the same will implored the protection of the Roman people; adjuring them by all the gods, and the treaties he had made at Rome, to see it put in execution. A copy of this will was sent by ambassadors to Rome, to be deposited in the public treasury; but the domestic troubles preventing it, it was left in the hands of Pompey. The original, signed and sealed, was kept at Alexandria.

90. While this affair was debated before Cæsar, who passionately desired to terminate the matter amicably, and to the satisfaction of both parties, he was informed that the king's army, with all the cavalry, were arrived at Alexandria. Cæsar's forces were by no means sufficient to give battle without the town; and therefore the only course left was, to secure the most convenient posts within the city, till he should get acquainted with Achillas' designs. Meantime he ordered all the soldiers to their arms, and admonished the king to send some persons of the greatest authority to Achillas to forbid his approach. Dioscorides and Serapion, who had both been ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with Ptolemy the father, were deputed to this office: but no sooner did they come before Achillas, than, without giving them a hearing, or inquiring after the message they brought, he ordered them to be seized and put to death. One was killed on the spot; and the other, having received a dangerous wound, was carried off for dead by his attendants. On hearing this, Cæsar took care to secure the king's person, the authority of whose name would authorise

his proceedings, and occasion Achillas and his associates to be esteemed seditious and rebellious.

91. Achillas' army was far from being contemptible, whether we regard their number, courage, or experience in war. It amounted to twenty thousand effective men, many of whom were originally Romans, brought into the country by Gabinius, when he came to settle Auletes on the throne; and who, having afterwards married and settled in Alexandria, were devoted to the Ptolemean interest. There were also some brigades raised in Syria and Cilicia, together with a considerable number of renegade slaves, who had deserted their masters, and found protection in Egypt, by entering into the service. If any of these was seized by his master, their companions flocked to his rescue, regarding his safety as a common cause, because they were all embarked in the like guilt. These would often take on them to put to death the king's ministers, to plunder the rich, for the sake of increasing their pay, to invest the royal palace, to banish some, and send for others home, with other liberties of the like nature, which the Alexandrian army claims by a kind of prescription. Besides these, he had likewise two thousand horse, who, during the late troubles, and the wars that ensued, had had opportunies of inuring themselves to arms. These had restored Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, killed Bibulus' two sons, warred against the Egyptians with success, and acquired a thorough experience in military affairs.

92. Achillas, trusting to the valor of his troops, and despising the handful of men that followed Cæsar, quickly made himself master of Alexandria, the palace only excepted, where Cæsar thought proper to make his stand, and which he attacked briskly, though with-

out effect. But it was on the side of the harbor that the greatest efforts were made. On that, in effect, the victory depended. Besides two and twenty constant guard-ships, there were in the port fifty galleys, from three to five banks of oars, which the year before had been sent to Pompey's assistance, and were returned since the battle of Pharsalia. Had Achillas been once master of these vessels, he might have cut Cæsar off from all communication with the ocean, and consequently from all hopes of receiving supplies of victuals or forces. Thus the Egyptians in hopes of a complete victory, and the Romans to avoid a certain ruin, exerted themselves with incredible vigor. At length, Cæsar carried his point, and not only set fire to the vessels above-mentioned, but to all that were in the arsenals, after which he passed some troops into the Isle of Pharos.

93. The Pharos is a tower of prodigious height and wonderful workmanship, built in an island from whence it takes its name. This island lying over against Alexandria, makes a haven, and is joined to the continent by a causeway of nine hundred paces, and by a bridge. Here dwell several Egyptians, who have built a town, and live by pillaging the ships that are thrown on their coast, either by mistake or tempest. As it is situate at the entrance of the port, which is but narrow, it absolutely commands it. Cæsar, knowing the importance of this post, whilst the enemy were engaged in the assault, landed some troops there, seized the tower, and put a garrison into it; thereby securing a safe reception for the supplies he had sent for on all sides. In the other quarters of the town, the fight was maintained with equal advantage, neither party losing ground, because of the narrowness of the passes, which enabled them easily to support themselves. After a few men

killed on both sides, Cæsar, having secured the most necessary places, fortified them in the night. In this quarter was a small part of the king's palace, where Cæsar was lodged on his first arrival; and adjoining thereto a theatre, that served instead of a citadel, and had a communication with the port and other arsenals. These works he increased afterwards, that they might serve instead of a rampart, to prevent his being obliged to fight against his will. Meantime Ptolemy's youngest daughter, hoping the throne would be vacant, fled from the palace to Achillas, and joined with him in the prosecution of the war. But they soon disagreed about the command, which increased the largesses to the soldiers, each party endeavoring to gain them by large presents. During these transactions, Pothinus, Ptolemy's governor, and regent of the kingdom, being discovered in a clandestine correspondence with Achillas, whom he encouraged to the vigorous prosecution of his enterprise, Cæsar ordered him to be put to death. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war.

ALEXANDRIAN WAR.

HIRTIUS' COMMENTARIES.

ALEXANDRIAN WAR.

1. The war thus commencing at Alexandria, Cæsar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for his fleet; to Crete, for archers; and to Malchus, king of the Nabatheans, for cavalry: he likewise ordered military engines to be provided, corn to be brought, and forces despatched to him with all diligence. Meanwhile, he was daily employed in augmenting his works; and such parts of the town as appeared less tenable, were strengthened with tortoises and mantelets. Openings were made in the walls, through which the battering rams might play; and whatever houses were thrown down, or taken by force, were brought within the intrenchments: for Alexandria is in a manner secure from fire, because the inhabitants use no wood in their buildings, the houses being all vaulted, and roofed with tile or pavement. Cæsar's principal aim was, to inclose with works the smallest part of the town, separated from the rest by a morass towards the south: for thus the army would lie closer together, be subject to one command, and could readily despatch relief where it was most wanted. Above all, he by this

means made sure of water and forage, which was of so much the more consequence, as he was but ill provided of the one, and wholly destitute of the other. The morass, on the contrary, served abundantly to supply him with both.

2. Nor were the Alexandrians remiss on their side, or less active in the conduct of their affairs. They had sent deputies and commissioners into all parts, where the power and territories of Egypt extend, with orders to levy troops. They had carried vast quantities of darts and engines into the town, and drawn together an innumerable multitude of soldiers. Yet not contented with all these preparations, they established workshops in every part of the city, for the making of arms; and enlisted all the slaves that were of age, the richer citizens paying and maintaining them. With these they guarded the remoter parts of the town; while the veteran cohorts, exempt from all other service, were quartered in the squares and open places; that on whatever side an attack should be made, they might be at hand to give relief, and march fresh and intire to the charge. All the avenues and passes were shut up by a triple wall, built of square stones, and carried to the height of forty feet. The lower parts of the town were defended by very high towers of ten stories: besides which, they had likewise contrived a kind of moving towers, which consisted of the same number of stories; and being fitted with ropes and wheels, could, by means of horses, as the streets of Alexandria were quite even and level, be conveyed wherever their service was necessary. The city, abounding in every thing, and being very rich, furnished ample materials for these several works; and as the people were extremely ingenious, and quick of apprehension, they so well copied what they saw done by us, that our men

seemed rather to imitate them. They even invented many things themselves, and at once invested our works, and defended their own. Their chiefs every where represented, 'that the people of Rome were endeavoring by degrees to steal into the possession of Egypt; that a few years before Gabinius had come thither with an army; that Pompey had chosen it for the place of his retreat; that Cæsar was now among them with a considerable body of troops, and, notwithstanding his rival's death, made no offers to return; that if they did not therefore find means to expel him, they would soon, from a kingdom, be reduced to a Roman province: that no time was to be lost in this attempt, because the season of the year having put a stop to navigation, he could receive no supplies from beyond sea.'

3. Meanwhile, a division arising between Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, and Arsinoe, the youngest daughter of king Ptolemy, as has been demonstrated above; while they mutually endeavored to supplant one another, each striving to engross the supreme authority; Arsinoe, by the assistance of the slave Ganymed, her governor, at length prevailed, and caused Achillas to be slain. After his death, being possessed of the whole power without a rival, she raised Ganymed to the command of the army; who, on his entrance into that high office, augmented the allowance of the troops, and with equal diligence discharged all other parts of his duty.

4. Alexandria is almost quite hollow underneath, occasioned by the many aqueducts to the Nile, that furnish private houses with water; where, being received in cisterns, it settles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. This is preserved for the use of the master and his family: for the water of the Nile, being

extremely thick and muddy, is apt to breed many distempers: the common people, however, are forced to be contented with it, because there is not a single spring in the whole city. The river was in that part of the town where the Alexandrians were masters: hence Ganymed conceived that a way might be found to deprive the Romans of water; because being distributed into several streets, for the more easy defence of the works, they made use of that which was preserved in the cisterns of private houses. With this view, he began a great and difficult work; for having stopped up all the canals by which his own cisterns were supplied, he drew vast quantities of water out of the sea, by the help of wheels and other engines, pouring it continually into the canals of Cæsar's quarter. The cisterns in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter than ordinary, and occasioned great wonder among the men, who could not think from what cause it proceeded. They were even ready to disbelieve their senses; when those who were quartered a little lower in the town assured them, that they found the water the same as before. This put them on comparing the cisterns one with another, and by trial they easily perceived the difference. But in a little time the water in the nearest houses became quite unfit for use, and that lower down grew daily more tainted and brackish; on which a terror ensued among the troops, that they fancied themselves reduced to the last extremity. Some complained of Cæsar's delay, that he did not order them immediately to repair to their ships; others dreaded a yet greater misfortune, as it would be impossible to conceal their design of retreating from the Alexandrians, who were so near them; and no less so to embark in the face of a vigorous and pursuing enemy. There were besides a great number of the

townsmen in Cæsar's quarter, whom he had not thought proper to force from their houses, because they openly pretended to be in his interest, and to have quitted the party of their fellow-citizens. But to offer here at a defence either of the sincerity or conduct of these Alexandrians, would be only labor in vain; since all who know the genius and temper of the people must be satisfied, that they are the fittest instruments in the world for treason.

5. Cæsar labored to remove his soldiers' fears, by encouraging and reasoning the case with them. 'They might easily,' he told them, 'find water, by digging wells, as all sea-coasts naturally abounded with fresh springs: that if Egypt was singular in this respect, and differed from every other soil; yet still, as the sea was open, and the enemy without a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their fetching it at pleasure in their ships, either from Parætonium on the left, or Pharos on the right; which two places lying different ways, the wind could never exclude them from both at the same time: that a retreat was on no account to be thought of, not only by those who had a concern for their honor, but even by such as regarded nothing but life: that it was with the utmost difficulty they could defend themselves behind their works; but if they once quitted that advantage, neither in number nor situation would they be a match for the enemy: that to embark would require much time, and be attended with great danger, especially where it must be managed by little boats: that the Alexandrians, on the contrary, were nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted with the streets and buildings: that, flushed with so manifest an advantage, they would not fail to run before, seize all the advantageous posts, possess themselves of the tops of the houses, and by annoying them in their retreat,

effectually prevent their getting on board: that they might therefore think no more of retiring, but place all their hopes of safety in victory.' Having by this speech reassured his men, he ordered the centurions to lay aside all other cares, and apply themselves day and night to the digging of wells. The work once begun, they pushed it on so vigorously, that the very first night abundance of fresh water was found. Thus with labor on our side, the mighty projects and painful attempts of the Alexandrians were intirely frustrated.

6. During these transactions, the thirty-seventh legion, composed of Pompey's veterans that had surrendered to Cæsar, embarking by order of Domitius Calvinus, with arms, darts, provisions, and military engines, arrived on the coast of Africa, a little above Alexandria. An easterly wind, which continued to blow for several days together, hindered their being able to gain the port; but all along that coast it is very safe riding at anchor. Being detained, however, longer than they expected, and pressed with want of water, they gave notice of it to Cæsar, by a despatch sloop. Cæsar, that he might himself be able to determine what was best to be done, went on board one of the ships in the harbor, and ordered the whole fleet to follow. He took none of the land forces with him, because he was unwilling to leave the works unguarded during his absence. Being arrived at that part of the coast known by the name of Cherronesus, he sent some mariners on shore to fetch water. Part of these venturing too far into the country for the sake of plunder, were intercepted by the enemy's horse. From them the Egyptians learned that Cæsar himself was on board, without any soldiers. On this information, they thought fortune had thrown a fair occasion in their way, of attempting something with success: they therefore

manned all the ships that were in condition to sail, and met Cæsar on his return. He declined fighting that day, for two reasons; because he had no soldiers on board, and it was past four in the afternoon. The night, he was sensible, must be highly advantageous to his enemies, who were perfectly well acquainted with the coast: and he would himself be deprived of the benefit of encouraging his men, which could not be done with any effect in the dark, where courage and cowardice must remain equally unknown. He therefore drew all his ships towards the shore, where he imagined the enemy would not follow him.

7. There was one Rhodian galley in Cæsar's right wing, considerably distant from the rest: this being observed by the enemy, they came forward with four decked ships, and several open barks, to attack her. Cæsar was obliged to advance to her relief, that he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one of his galleys sunk before his eyes; though, had he left her to perish, she seemed to deserve it for her rashness. The attack was sustained with great courage by the Rhodians, who, though at all times distinguished by their valor and experience in engagements at sea, yet exerted themselves in a particular manner on this occasion, that they might not draw on themselves the charge of having occasioned a misfortune to the fleet. Accordingly they obtained a complete victory, took one four-benched galley, sunk another, disabled a third, and slew all that were on board, besides a great number belonging to the other ships. Nay, had not night interposed, Cæsar would have made himself master of their whole fleet. During the consternation that followed on this defeat, Cæsar, finding the contrary winds to abate, took the transports in tow, and advanced with the victorious fleet to Alexandria.

8. The Alexandrians, disheartened at this loss, as finding themselves now worsted, not by the superior valor of the soldiers, but by the skill and ability of the mariners, retired to the tops of their houses, and blocked up the entrance of their streets, as fearing our fleet might attack them even by land. But soon after, Ganymed assuring them in council, that he would not only restore the vessels they had lost, but even increase their number, they began to repair their old ships with great expectation and confidence, and resolved to apply more than ever to the putting their fleet in a good condition: and although they had lost above a hundred and ten ships in the port and arsenal, yet did not all this discourage them; because, by making themselves masters at sea, they saw they would have it in their power to hinder Cæsar's receiving any reinforcements or supplies. Besides, being naturally mariners, born on the sea coast, and exercised from their infancy in naval affairs, they were desirous to return to that wherein their true and proper strength lay, remembering the advantages they had formerly gained, even with their little ships. They therefore applied themselves with all diligence to the equipping a fleet.

9. Vessels were stationed at all the mouths of the Nile, for receiving and gathering in the customs. Several old ships were likewise lodged in the king's private arsenals, where they had remained unrigged for many years. These last they refitted, and recalled the former to Alexandria. To supply themselves with oars, they uncovered the porticoes, academies, and public buildings, and made use of the planks they furnished. Their natural ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to be met with in the city, supplied every want. In fine, they had no long navigation to provide for, and were only solicitous about present exigences, fore-

seeing they would have no occasion to fight but in the port. In a few days, therefore, contrary to all expectation, they had fitted out twenty-two quadriremes, and five quinqueremes. To these they added a great number of small open barks; and employing the rowers in the harbor, to practise and exercise themselves, put a sufficient number of soldiers on board, and prepared every thing necessary for an engagement. Cæsar had nine Rhodian galleys, (for, of the ten which were sent, one was shipwrecked on the coast of Egypt) eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve out of Asia. Of these, ten were quadriremes, and five quinqueremes; the rest were of an inferior bulk, and for the most part without decks. Yet, trusting to the valor of his soldiers, and knowing the strength of the enemy, he prepared for an engagement.

10. When both sides were come to have sufficient confidence in their own strength, Cæsar sailed round Pharos, and formed in line of battle over against the enemy. The Rhodian galleys were in his right wing, and those of Pontus in his left. Between these he left a space of four hundred paces, to serve for the extending and working the vessels. This disposition being made, he drew up the rest of the fleet as a reserve, giving them the necessary orders, and distributing them in such manner, that every ship followed that to which she was appointed to give succor. The Alexandrians came forth with great confidence; and drew up their fleet, placing their twenty-two quadriremes in front, and disposing the rest behind them in a second line, by way of reserve. They had, besides, a great number of boats and smaller vessels, that carried fire and combustible weapons, with design to fright us by their number, cries, and flaming darts. Between the two fleets were certain flats, separated by very

narrow channels, [illegible] which would be on the African coast, as being in that division of Alexandria which belongs to Africa. Both sides waited which should first pass these shallows, because whoever entered the narrow channels between them, in case of any misfortune, would find it very difficult either to retreat, or work the ships to advantage.

11. Euphranor commanded the Rhodian fleet; who, for valor and greatness of mind, deserved rather to be ranked among the Romans than the Grecians. The Rhodians had raised him to the post of admiral, on account of his known courage and experience. He, perceiving Cæsar's design, addressed him to this effect: 'You seem afraid of passing the shallows first, lest you should be thereby forced to come to an engagement before the rest of the fleet can be brought up. Leave the matter to us; we will sustain the fight, and I hope too without disappointing your expectations, until the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It is both dishonorable and afflicting, that they should so long continue in our sight with an air of triumph.' Cæsar, encouraging him in his design, and bestowing many praises on him, gave the signal for engaging. Four Rhodian ships having passed the shallows, the Alexandrians gathered round and attacked them. They maintained the fight with great bravery, disengaging themselves by their art and address, and working their ships with so much skill, that notwithstanding the inequality of number, none of the enemy were suffered to run alongside, or break their oars. Meantime the rest of the fleet came up; when, on account of the narrowness of the place, art becoming useless, the success depended wholly on valor. The Alexandrians and Romans who were in the town, laying aside all thoughts of attack and defence, mounted the tops of the houses,

[redacted] eminences that would give a view of the fight, addressing the gods by vows and prayers for victory.

12. The event of the battle was by no means equal. A defeat would have deprived us of all resource either by land or sea; and even victory itself would not much better our condition. The Alexandrians, on the contrary, by a victory, gained every thing; and if defeated, might yet again have recourse to fortune. It was likewise a matter of the highest concern, to see the safety of all depend on the bravery of a few, whose want of courage would expose their whole party to destruction. This Cæsar had often represented to his troops during the preceding days, that they might be thereby induced to fight with the more resolution, when they knew the common safety to depend on their bravery. Every man said the same to his comrade, companion, and friend; requesting him not to disappoint the expectation of those who had chosen him preferably to others for the defence of the common interest. Accordingly they fought with so much resolution, that neither the art nor address of the Egyptians, a maritime and seafaring people, could stand them in any stead, nor the multitude of their ships be of service to them; nor the valor of those selected for this engagement stand in competition with the determined courage of the Romans. In this action a quinquereme was taken, and a bireme, with all the soldiers and mariners on board, besides three sunk, without any loss on our side. The rest fled towards the town, sheltering themselves under the mole and forts, whither we durst not pursue them.

13. To deprive the enemy of this resource for the future, Cæsar thought it by all means necessary to render himself master of the mole and island: for,

having already in great measure completed his works within the town, he was in hopes of being able to defend himself both in the island and city. This resolution being taken, he put into boats and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic cavalry as he thought most for his purpose, and sent them against the island; whilst, at the same time, to occasion a diversion, he attacked it on the other with his fleet, promising great rewards to those who should first render themselves masters of it. At first the attack was brisk, and the defence vigorous; for they both annoyed our men from the tops of the houses, and gallantly maintained their ground along the shore, which, being steep and craggy, our men could find no way of approach; all the more accessible avenues being skilfully defended by small boats, and five galleys, properly stationed for that purpose. But when, after examining the approaches, and sounding the shallows, a few of our men got on the shore, and were followed by others, who pushed the islanders without intermission, the Pharians at last betook themselves to flight. On this, abandoning the defence of the port, they quitted their ships, and retired into the town, to provide for the security of their houses. But they could not long maintain their ground there; though, to compare small things with great, their buildings resembled those of Alexandria, and their towers were high, and joined together so as to form a kind of wall; and our men had neither ladders, fascines, nor any weapons for assault. But fear often deprives men of counsel and strength, as happened on this occasion. Those who had ventured to oppose us on even ground, terrified by the loss of a few men, and the general rout, durst not face us from a height of thirty feet; but, throwing themselves from the mole, into the sea,

endeavored to gain the town, though above eight hundred paces distant. Many however were slain, and about six hundred taken.

14. Cæsar, giving up the plunder to the soldiers, ordered the houses to be demolished; but fortified the castle at the end of the bridge next the island, and placed a garrison in it. This the Pharians had abandoned; but the other, towards the town, which was considerably stronger, was still held by the Alexandrians. Cæsar attacked it next day; because, by getting possession of these two forts, he would be intirely master of the port, and prevent sudden excursions and piracies. Already he had, by means of his arrows and engines, forced the garrison to abandon the place, and retire towards the town. He had also landed three cohorts, which was all the place would contain; and disposed the rest of his troops aboard to sustain them. He then fortified the bridge on the side of the enemy, built an arch across the entrance of the port, and filled it up, in such a manner, with stones, that not the smallest boat could pass. When the work was almost finished, the Alexandrians sallied in crowds from the town, and drew up, in an open place, over against the intrenchment we had cast up at the head of the bridge. At the same time, the vessels, which they had been wont to make pass under the bridge, to set fire to our ships of burden, were ranged along the mole. Our men fought from the bridge and the mole; the enemy from the area, over against the bridge, and from their ships, by the side of the mole. While Cæsar, attentive to what passed, was exhorting his troops, a number of rowers and mariners, quitting their ships, threw themselves on the mole; partly out of curiosity, partly to have a share in the action. At first, with stones and slings, they forced the enemy's ships from the mole,

and seemed to do still greater execution with their darts: but when, some time after, a few Alexandrians found means to land, and attack them in flank, as they had left their ships without order or discipline, so they soon began to fly with precipitation. The Alexandrians, encouraged by this success, landed in great numbers, and vigorously pushed our men, who were by this time in great confusion. Those that remained in the galleys perceiving this, drew up the ladders, and put off from the shore, to prevent the enemies boarding them. The three cohorts, who were at the head of the mole, to guard the bridge, astonished at this disorder, the cries they heard behind them, and the general rout of their party; unable, besides, to bear up against the multitude of darts which came pouring on them, and fearing to be surrounded, and have their retreat cut off, by the departure of their ships, abandoned the defence of the bridge, and ran, with all the speed they could, towards the galleys. Some, getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded and sunk them: part, making head against the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians: others, more fortunate, got to the ships that rode at anchor; and a few, by the help of their bucklers, swam to the nearest vessels. Cæsar, endeavoring to reanimate his men, and lead them back to the defence of the works, was exposed to the same danger with the rest: when, finding them universally to give ground, he retreated to his own galley; whither such a multitude followed, and crowded after him, that it was impossible either to work or put her off. Foreseeing what must happen, he flung himself into the sea, and swam to a ship that lay at some distance. Hence despatching boats to succor his men, he, by that means, preserved a small number. His own ship, sunk

by the multitude that crowded into her, perished with all that were on board. We lost in this action about four hundred legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that number of sailors and rowers. The Alexandrians secured the fort by strong works, and a great number of engines; and having cleared away the stones with which Cæsar had blocked up the port, enjoyed henceforward a free and open navigation.

15. Our men, instead of being disheartened at this loss, seemed rather roused and animated by it. They were making continual sallies on the enemy, to destroy or check the progress of their works; fell on them as often as they had an opportunity; and never failed to intercept them, when they ventured to advance beyond their fortifications. In short, the legions were so bent on fighting, that they even outstripped the orders and exhortations of Cæsar. They were inconsolable for their late disgrace, and impatient to come to blows with the enemy; insomuch, that he found it rather necessary to restrain and check their ardor, than incite them to action.

16. The Alexandrians, perceiving that success confirmed the Romans, and that adverse fortune only animated them the more; as they knew of no medium between these, on which to ground any farther hopes, resolved, either by the advice of the friends of their king who were in Cæsar's quarter, or of their own motion; or, perhaps, on an intimation from the king himself, suggested to him by secret emissaries, to send ambassadors to Cæsar to demand their king. They represented, 'that the people, weary of subjection to a woman, of living under a precarious government, and submitting to the cruel laws of the tyrant Ganymed, instead of obeying their own lawful king, desired nothing so much as to have him amongst them: that, in

granting their request, he would pave the way to an alliance, and extinguish all the fears and objections that had hitherto obstructed it.' Though Cæsar knew the nation to be false and perfidious, seldom speaking as they really thought, he judged it best however to comply with their desire. He even flattered himself, that his condescension in sending back their king at their request, would prevail on them to be faithful; or, as was more agreeable to their character, if they only wanted the king to head their army, at least it would be more for his honor and credit to have to do with a monarch, than with a band of slaves and fugitives. Accordingly he sent Ptolemy to them, exhorting him, 'to take the government into his own hands, and consult the welfare of so fair and illustrious a kingdom, defaced by hideous ruins and conflagrations;—that he would make his subjects sensible of their duty, preserve them from the destruction that threatened them, and act with fidelity towards himself and the Romans, who put so much confidence in him, as to send him amongst armed enemies.' Then taking him by the hand, he told him he was at liberty to depart. But the young prince, thoroughly versed in the art of dissimulation, and no way degenerating from the character of his nation, intreated Cæsar, with tears, not to send him back; for that his company was to him preferable to a kingdom. Cæsar, moved at his concern, dried up his tears; and telling him, if these were his real sentiments, they would soon meet again, dismissed him. The king, like a wild beast escaped out of confinement, carried on the war with such acrimony against Cæsar, that the tears he shed at parting seemed to have been tears of joy. Cæsar's lieutenants, friends, centurions, and soldiers, were not a little pleased at this; because, through his easiness of temper, he had suf-

fered himself to be imposed on by a child: as if, in truth, Cæsar's behavior on this occasion had been the effect of easiness of temper, and not of the most consummate prudence.

17. When the Alexandrians found that the restitution of their king had neither rendered their own party stronger, nor the Romans weaker; that the troops despised the youth and weakness of their king; and that their affairs were no way bettered by his presence; they were greatly discouraged: the rather, because a report ran, that a great body of troops was marching by land from Syria and Cilicia to Cæsar's assistance, of which he had not as yet himself received information. This however did not hinder their design of intercepting the convoys that came to him by sea. To this end, having equipped some ships, they ordered them to cruise before the Canopic branch of the Nile, by which they thought it most likely our supplies would arrive. Cæsar, who was informed of it, sent likewise his fleet to sea, under the command of Tiberius Nero. The Rhodian galleys made part of this squadron, headed by Euphranor their admiral, without whom he had little hopes of success from any maritime expedition. But fortune, which often reserves the heaviest disasters for those who have been loaded with her highest favors, encountered Euphranor, on this occasion, with an aspect very different from what she had hitherto worn: for when our ships had arrived at Canopus, and the fleets drawn up on each side had begun the engagement, Euphranor, according to custom, having made the first attack, and pierced and sunk one of the enemy's ships; as he pursued the next a considerable way, without being sufficiently sustained by those that followed him, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. None of the fleet advanced to

his relief, either out of fear for their own safety, or because they imagined he would easily be able to extricate himself by his courage and good fortune. Accordingly he alone behaved well in this action; and, being abandoned by all the rest, perished with his victorious galley.

18. About the same time, Mithridates of Pergamus, a man of illustrious descent, distinguished for his bravery and knowlege in the art of war, and who bore a very high place in the friendship and confidence of Cæsar; having been sent in the beginning of the Alexandrian war to raise succors in Syria and Cilicia, arrived by land at the head of a great body of troops, which his diligence, and the affection of these two provinces, had enabled him to draw together in a very short time. He conducted them first to Pelusium, a city which joins Syria to Egypt. Achillas, who was perfectly well acquainted with its importance, had seized and put a strong garrison into it. For Egypt is considered as defended on all sides by strong barriers; towards the sea by the Pharos, and towards Syria by Pelusium, which are accounted the two keys of that kingdom. He attacked it so briskly with a large body of troops, fresh men continually succeeding in the place of those that were fatigued; and urged the assault with so much firmness and perseverance, that he carried it the same day, and placed a garrison in it. Thence he pursued his march to Alexandria, reducing all the provinces through which he passed, and conciliating them to Cæsar, by that authority which always accompanies victory.

19. Not far from Alexandria lies Delta, the most celebrated province of Egypt, which borrows its name from the Greek letter so called: for the Nile, dividing the two channels, which gradually run off as they ap-

proach the sea, into which they at last discharge themselves, at a considerable distance from one another, leaves an intermediate space in form of a triangle. The king, understanding that Mithridates approached this place, and knowing he must pass the river, sent a great body of troops against him, sufficient, as he thought, if not to overwhelm and crush him, at least to stop his march; for though he earnestly desired to see him defeated, yet he thought it a great point gained, to hinder his junction with Cæsar. The troops that first passed the river, and came up with Mithridates, attacked him immediately, that they might alone have the honor of the victory. Mithridates at first confined himself to the defence of his camp, which he had with great prudence fortified according to the custom of the Romans: but observing that they advanced insolently and without caution, he sallied on them from all parts, and put a great number of them to the sword; insomuch, that but for their knowlege of the places, and the neighborhood of the vessels in which they had passed the river, they must have been all destroyed. But, recovering by degrees from their terror, and joining the troops that followed them, they again prepared to attack Mithridates.

20. Mithridates sent to inform Cæsar of what had happened; the king was likewise informed on his side. Thus, much about the same time, Ptolemy set out to crush Mithridates, and Cæsar to relieve him. The king made use of the more expeditious conveyance of the Nile, where he had a large fleet in readiness. Cæsar declined the navigation of the river, that he might not be obliged to fight the enemy's fleet; and, coasting along the African shore, found means to join the victorious troops of Mithridates, before Ptolemy could attack him.

21. The king had encamped in a very dangerous place, being an eminence surrounded on all sides by a plain. Three of its sides were secured by various defences. One adjoined to the Nile, the other was steep and inaccessible, and the third was defended by a morass. Between Ptolemy's camp and Cæsar's route lay a narrow river with very high banks, which discharged itself into the Nile. This river was about seven miles from the king's camp; who, understanding that Cæsar directed his march that way, sent all his cavalry, with a choice body of light-armed foot, to hinder Cæsar from passing, and maintain an unequal fight from the banks, where courage had no opportunity to exert itself, and cowardice ran no hazard. Our men, both horse and foot, were extremely mortified that the Alexandrians should so long maintain their ground against them. Wherefore the German cavalry, dispersing in quest of a ford, some found means to swim the river where the banks were lowest; and the legionaries at the same time cutting down several large trees that reached from one bank to another, and throwing them into the water, by their help got to the other side. The enemy, unable to sustain their first charge, betook themselves to flight, but in vain; for very few returned to the king, being almost all cut to pieces in the pursuit.

22. Cæsar, on this success, judging that his sudden approach must strike great terror into the Alexandrians, advanced towards their camp with his victorious army; but finding it well intrenched, strongly fortified by nature, and the ramparts crowded with armed soldiers, he did not think proper to attack it at that time, as his troops were very much fatigued, both by their march and the late battle; and therefore encamped at a small distance from the enemy. Next day

he attacked a fort, in a village not far off, which the king had joined to his camp by a line of communication, with a view of keeping possession of the village. He employed his whole army in this assault; not because it would have been difficult to carry it with a few forces; but with design of falling immediately on the enemy's camp, during the alarm the loss of this fort must give them. Accordingly the Romans, in continuing the pursuit of those that fled from the fort, arrived at last before the Alexandrian camp, where a furious battle ensued. There were two approaches by which it might be attacked: one by the plain, of which we have spoken before; the other by a narrow pass, between their camp and the Nile. The first, which was much the easiest, was defended by a numerous body of their best troops; and the access on the side of the Nile gave the enemy great advantages in distressing and wounding our men; for they were exposed to a double shower of darts: in front, from the rampart; behind, from the river; where the enemy had stationed a great number of ships, furnished with archers and slingers, that kept a continual discharge. Cæsar observing that his troops fought with the utmost ardor, and yet made no great progress, on account of the disadvantage of the ground; as he saw they had left the highest part of their camp unguarded, because, being sufficiently fortified by nature, they had all crowded to the other attacks, partly to have a share in the action, partly to be spectators of the issue; he ordered some cohorts to wheel round the camp, and gain that ascent; appointing Carsulenus to command them, a brave officer, and well acquainted with the service. When they had reached the place, where they found but very few to defend it, our men attacked them so briskly, that the Alexandrians, terrified by the

cries they heard behind them, and seeing themselves attacked both in front and rear, fled in the utmost consternation on all sides. Our men, animated by the confusion of the enemy, entered the camp in several places at the same time; and running down from the higher ground, put a great number of them to the sword. The Alexandrians, endeavoring to escape, threw themselves in crowds over the rampart next the river. The foremost tumbling into the ditch, where they were crushed to death, furnished an easy passage for those that followed. The king made his escape the same way; but by the crowd that followed him, the ship to which he fled was overloaded and sunk.

23. After this speedy and successful action, Cæsar, in confidence of so great a victory, marched the nearest way by land to Alexandria with his cavalry, and entered triumphant into that part of the town possessed by the enemy. He was not mistaken in thinking, that the Alexandrians, on hearing of the issue of the battle, would give over all thoughts of war. Accordingly, as soon as he was arrived, he reaped the just fruit of his valor and magnanimity; for the Alexandrians, throwing down their arms, abandoning their works, and assuming the habit of suppliants, came forth to surrender themselves to Cæsar, preceded by all those sacred symbols of religion with which they were wont to mollify their offended kings. Cæsar, accepting their submission, and encouraging them, advanced through the enemy's works into his own quarter of the town, where he was received with the universal congratulations of his party, who were no less overjoyed at his arrival and presence, than at the happy issue of the war.

24. Cæsar, having thus made himself master of Alexandria and Egypt, lodged the government in the hands

of those to whom Ptolemy had bequeathed it by will, appointing the people of Rome his executors, and requesting them to confirm his choice: for the eldest of his two sons being dead, he settled the kingdom on the youngest, in conjunction with his sister Cleopatra, who had always continued faithful to the Romans. The younger, Arsinoe, in whose name Ganymed, as we have seen, reigned for some time, he thought proper to banish the kingdom, that she might not raise any new disturbance, before the king's authority should be firmly established. Things thus settled, he carried the sixth legion with him into Syria, leaving the rest to support the authority of the king and queen, who neither stood well in the affections of their subjects, on account of their attachment to Cæsar, nor could be supposed to have given any fixed foundation to their power, in an administration of only a few days continuance. It was also for the honor and interest of the republic, that if they continued faithful, our forces should protect them; if otherwise, should be in a condition to restrain them. Having thus settled the kingdom, he marched by land into Syria.

25. While these things passed in Egypt, king Dejotarus applied to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Cæsar had intrusted the government of Asia and the neighboring provinces, beseeching him, 'not to suffer Pharnaces to seize and lay waste the Lesser Armenia, which was his kingdom; or Cappadocia, which belonged to Ariobarzanes; because, unless they were delivered from these insults, it would be impossible for them to execute Cæsar's orders, or raise the money they stood engaged to pay.' Domitius, who was not only sensible of the necessity of money to defray the expenses of the war, but likewise thought it dishonorable to the people of Rome and Cæsar, as well as infamous to himself, to

suffer the dominions of allies and friends to be usurped by a foreign prince; sent ambassadors to Pharnaces, to acquaint him, 'that he must withdraw immediately out of Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer insult the majesty and right of the Roman people, engaged in a civil war.' But believing that his deputation would have greater weight, if he was ready to second it himself at the head of an army; he repaired to the legions which were then in Asia, ordering two of them into Egypt, at Cæsar's desire, and carrying the thirty-sixth along with him. To this Dejotarus added two more, which he had trained up for several years, according to our discipline; and a hundred horse. The like number of horse were furnished by Ariobarzanes. At the same time, he sent P. Sextius to C. Plætorius the questor, for the legion which had been lately levied in Pontus; and Quinctius Patisius into Cilicia, to draw thence a body of auxiliary troops. All these forces had orders to rendezvous, as soon as possible, at Comana.

26. Meanwhile his ambassadors returned, with Pharnaces' answer, 'That he had quitted Cappadocia; but kept possession of the Lesser Armenia, as his own, by right of inheritance: however, he was willing to submit all to the decision of Cæsar, to whose commands he would pay immediate obedience.' C. Domitius, sensible that he had quitted Cappadocia, not voluntarily, but out of necessity; because he could more easily defend Armenia, which lay contiguous to his own kingdom, than Cappadocia, which was more remote; and because believing, at first, that Domitius had brought all the three legions along with him, on hearing that two were gone to Cæsar, he seemed more determined to keep possession; insisted 'on his quitting Armenia likewise, the reason, in both cases, being

the same; nor was it just to demand that the matter should be postponed till Cæsar's return, unless things were put in the condition in which they were at first.' Having returned this answer, he advanced towards Armenia, with the forces above-mentioned, directing his march along the hills: for from Pontus, by way of Comana, runs a woody ridge of hills, that extends as far as Armenia the Less, dividing it from Cappadocia. The advantages he had in view, by such a march, were, that he would thereby effectually prevent all surprises, and be plentifully furnished with provisions from Cappadocia.

27. Meantime Pharnaces was perpetually sending ambassadors to Domitius with presents, and to treat of peace. All these he firmly rejected, telling the deputies, 'that nothing was more sacred with him, than the majesty of the Roman people, and the rights of their allies.' After a long march, he reached Nicopolis, a city of Armenia the Less, situated in a plain, having mountains, however, on its two sides, at a considerable distance. Here he encamped, about seven miles from the town. Between his camp and Nicopolis lay a difficult and narrow pass, where Pharnaces placed a chosen body of foot and all his horse, in ambuscade. He ordered a great number of cattle to be dispersed in the pass, and the townsmen and peasants to show themselves; that if Domitius entered the defile as a friend, he might have no suspicion of an ambuscade, when he saw the men and flocks dispersed, without apprehension, in the fields; or if he should come as an enemy, that the soldiers, quitting their ranks to pillage, might fall an easy prey to his troops.

28. While this design was going forward, he never ceased sending ambassadors to Domitius, with proposals of peace and amity, as fancying, by this means,

the more easy to insnare him. The expectation of peace kept Domitius in his camp; so that Pharnaces, disappointed of his hopes, and fearing the ambuscade might be discovered, drew off his troops. Next day Domitius approached Nicopolis, and encamped near the town. While our men were working at the trenches, Pharnaces drew up his army in order of battle, forming his front into one line, according to the custom of the country, and securing his wings with a triple body of reserves. Domitius, ordering part of the troops to continue under arms before the rampart, completed the fortifications of his camp.

29. Next night, Pharnaces, having intercepted the couriers who brought Domitius an account of the posture of affairs at Alexandria, understood that Cæsar was in great danger, and requested Domitius to send him succors speedily, and come himself to Alexandria by the way of Syria. Pharnaces, on this intelligence, imagined that protracting the time would be equivalent to a victory; because Domitius, he supposed, must very soon depart. He therefore dug two ditches, four feet deep, at a moderate distance from each other, on that side where lay the easiest access to the town, and our forces might, with most advantage, attack him; resolving not to advance beyond them. Between these, he constantly drew up his army, placing all his cavalry on the wings without them, which greatly exceeded ours in number, and would otherwise have been useless.

30. Domitius, more concerned at Cæsar's danger than his own, and believing he could not retire with safety, should he now desire the conditions he had rejected, or march away without any apparent cause; drew his forces out of the camp, and ranged them in order of battle. He placed the thirty-sixth legion on

the right, that of Pontus on the left, and those of Dejotarus in the main body; drawing them up with a very narrow front, and posting the rest of the cohorts to sustain the wings. The armies thus drawn up on each side, they prepared for battle; and the signal being given at the same time by both parties, the engagement began. The conflict was sharp and various: for the thirty-sixth legion, falling on the king's cavalry, that was drawn up without the ditch, charged them so successfully, that they drove them to the very walls of the town, passed the ditch, and attacked their infantry behind. But on the other side, the legion of Pontus having given way; the second line, which advanced to sustain them, fetching a compass round the ditch, in order to attack the enemy in flank, was overwhelmed and borne down by a shower of darts, in endeavoring to pass it. The legions of Dejotarus scarce made any resistance; so that the victorious right wing, and main body of the king's army, fell on the thirty-sixth legion, which yet made a brave stand; and though surrounded by the forces of the enemy, with wonderful presence of mind, cast themselves into an orb, and retired to the foot of a mountain, whither Pharnaces did not think fit to pursue them, because of the disadvantage of the place. Thus the legion of Pontus being almost wholly cut off, with great part of those of Dejotarus, the thirty-sixth legion retreated to an eminence, with the loss of about two hundred and fifty men. Several Roman knights, of illustrious rank, fell in this battle. Domitius, after this defeat, rallied the remains of his broken army, and retreated, by safe ways, through Cappadocia, into Asia.

31. Pharnaces, elated with this success, and hoping that Cæsar would never be able to extricate himself at Alexandria, entered Pontus with all his forces. There

acting as conqueror and king, and promising himself a happier destiny than his father, he ravaged their towns, seized the effects of the Roman citizens and natives, inflicted punishments worse than death on such as were distinguished by their age or beauty; and having made himself master of all Pontus, as there was no one to oppose his progress, boasted that he had recovered his father's kingdom.

32. About the same time, we received a considerable check in Illyricum; which province, Q. Cornificius, Cæsar's questor, had defended the preceding months, not only without insult, but even with honor, and a conduct worthy of praise. Cæsar had sent him thither, the summer before, with two legions; and though it was of itself little able to subsist an army, and at that time in particular almost totally ruined by the neighborhood of so many wars; yet by his prudence, vigilance, and uncommon care, he defended and kept possession of it: for he made himself master of several forts, built on eminences, whose advantageous situation tempted the inhabitants to make descents and inroads on the country; and gave the plunder of them to his soldiers; which, though but inconsiderable, yet as they were no strangers to the distress and ill condition of the province, did not cease to be grateful; the rather, as it was the fruit of their own valor. And when, after the battle of Pharsalia, Octavius had retreated to that coast with a large fleet; Cornificius, with some vessels of the Judertini, who had always continued faithful to the commonwealth, made himself master of the greatest part of his ships, which, joined to those of the Judertini, rendered him capable of sustaining even a naval engagement: and while Cæsar, victorious, was pursuing Pompey to the remotest parts of the earth; n advice that the enemy had, for the most part, re-

tired into Illyricum, on account of its neighborhood to Macedonia, and were there uniting into a body; he wrote to Gabinius, 'To repair directly thither, with the new-raised legions, and join Cornificius, that in case of any danger to the province, they might be the better able to protect it: but if less forces sufficed, to march into Macedonia, which he foresaw would never be free from commotions, so long as Pompey lived.'

33. Gabinius, whether he imagined the province better provided than it really was, or depended much on the auspicious fortune of Cæsar, or confided in his own valor and abilities, having often terminated, with success, difficult and dangerous wars; marched into Illyricum, in the middle of winter, and the most difficult season of the year; where, not finding sufficient subsistence in the province, which was partly ruined, partly ill-affected; and having no supplies by sea, because the season of the year had put a stop to navigation; he found himself compelled to carry on the war, not according to his own inclination, but as necessity allowed. As he was therefore obliged to lay siege to forts and castles in a very rude season, he received many checks, and fell under such contempt with the barbarians, that retiring to Salona, a maritime city, inhabited by a set of brave and faithful Romans, he was attacked on his march; and after the loss of two thousand soldiers, thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes, got to Salona with the rest; where his wants continually increasing, he died a few days after. His misfortunes and sudden death gave Octavius great hopes of mastering the province: but fortune, whose influence is so great in matters of war, joined to the diligence of Cornificius, and the valor of Vatinius, soon put an end to his triumphs.

34. For Vatinius, who was then at Brundusium, having intelligence of what passed in Illyricum, by letters from Cornificius, who pressed him to come to the assistance of the province, and informed him, that Octavius had leagued with the barbarians, and, in several places, attacked our garrisons, partly by sea, with his fleet, partly by land, with the troops of the barbarians: Vatinius, I say, on notice of these things, though extremely weakened by sickness, insomuch, that his strength of body no way answered his resolution and greatness of mind; yet, by his valor, surmounted all opposition, the force of his distemper, the rigor of the season, and the difficulties of a sudden preparation: for having himself but a very few galleys, he wrote Q. Kalenus, in Achaia, to furnish him with a squadron of ships: but these not coming with that despatch which the danger our army was in required, because Octavius pressed hard on them; he fastened beaks to all the barks and vessels that lay in the port, whose number was considerable enough, though they were not sufficiently large for an engagement. Joining these to what galleys he had, and putting the veteran soldiers aboard, whereof he had a great number, who had been left sick at Brundusium, when the army went over to Greece, he sailed for Illyricum; where, having subjected several maritime states that had declared for Octavius, and neglecting such as continued obstinate in their revolt, because he would suffer nothing to retard his design of meeting the enemy,—he came up with Octavius before Epidaurus; and obliging him to raise the siege, which he was carrying on with great vigor by sea and land, joined the garrison to his own forces.

35. Octavius, understanding that Vatinius' fleet consisted mostly of small barks, and confiding in the

strength of his own, stopped at the isle of Tauris. Vatinius followed him thither, not imagining he would halt at that place, but because he was determined to pursue him wherever he went. Vatinius, who had no suspicion of an enemy, and whose ships were moreover dispersed by a tempest, perceived, as he approached the isle, a vessel filled with soldiers, that advanced towards him, with full sails. On this, he gave orders for furling the sails, lowering the sail-yards, and arming the soldiers; and hoisting a flag, as a signal for battle, intimated to the ships that followed to do the same. Our men prepared themselves in the best manner their sudden surprise would allow, while Octavius advanced in good order from the port. The two fleets drew up. Octavius had the advantage as to disposition, and Vatinius in the bravery of his troops.

36. Vatinius, finding himself inferior to the enemy both in the number and largeness of his ships, resolved to commit the affair to fortune, and therefore, in his own quinquereme, attacked Octavius in his four-benched galley. This he did with such violence, and the shock was so great, that the beak of Octavius' galley was broke. The battle raged with great fury likewise in other places, but chiefly round the two admirals: for as the ships on each side advanced to sustain those that fought, a close and furious conflict ensued in a very narrow sea, where the nearer the vessels approached, the more had Vatinius' soldiers the advantage; for, with admirable courage, they leaped into the enemy's ships, and forcing them, by this means, to an equal combat, soon mastered them by their superior valor. Octavius' galley was sunk; many others were taken, or suffered the same fate. The soldiers were partly slain in the ships, partly thrown overboard into the sea. Octavius got into a

boat, which sinking under the multitude that crowded after him, he himself, though wounded, swam to his brigantine, where being taken up, and night having put an end to the battle, as the wind blew very strong, he spread all his sails and fled. A few of his ships, that had the good fortune to escape, followed him.

37. Vatinius, seeing the enemy intirely defeated, sounded a retreat, and entered victorious the port whence Octavius had sailed to fight him, without the loss of a single vessel. He took, in this battle, one quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-benched galleys, and a great number of rowers. The next day was employed in repairing his own fleet, and the ships he had taken from the enemy: after which, he sailed for the island of Issa, imagining Octavius would retire thither after his defeat. In this island was a florishing city, well affected to Octavius, which however surrendered to Vatinius on the first summons. Here he understood that Octavius, attended by a few small barks, had sailed, with a fair wind, for Greece, whence he intended to pass on to Sicily, and afterwards to Africa. Vatinius having, in so short a space, successfully terminated the affairs of Illyricum, restored the province, in a peaceable condition, to Cornificius, and driven the enemy's fleet out of those seas, returned victorious to Brundusium, with his army and fleet in good condition.

38. While Cæsar besieged Pompey at Dyrrhachium, triumphed at Pharsalia, and carried on the war, with so much danger, at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had been left in Spain as propretor of the farther province, either through his natural disposition, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the province, because of a wound he had treacherously received there, when questor, drew on himself the general dislike of the peo-

ple. He discerned this temper among them, partly from a consciousness that he deserved it, partly from the manifest indications they gave of their discontent. To secure himself against their disaffection, he endeavored to gain the love of the soldiers; and having for this purpose assembled them together, he promised them a hundred sesterces a man. Soon after, having made himself master of Medobrega, a town in Lusitania, and of Mount Herminius, whither the Medobregians had retired; and being, on that occasion, saluted Imperator by the army, he gave them another hundred sesterces each. These, accompanied with other considerable largesses, in great number, seemed, for the present, to increase the good will of the army; but tended gradually and imperceptibly to the relaxation of military discipline.

39. Cassius, having sent his army into winter quarters, fixed his residence at Cordova, for the administration of justice. Being greatly in debt, he resolved to pay it by laying heavy impositions on the province; and according to the custom of prodigals, made his liberalities a pretence to justify the most exorbitant demands. He taxed the rich at discretion, and compelled them to pay, without the least regard to their remonstrances; frequently improving light and trifling offences, as a handle for all manner of extortions. All methods of gain were pursued, whether great and apparent, or mean and sordid. None that had any thing to lose could escape accusation; insomuch, that the plunder of their private fortunes was aggravated by the dangers they were exposed to from pretended crimes.

40. Thus Longinus, acting the same part when proconsul which he had done when questor, drew on himself the like conspiracies against his life. Even his

own dependents concurred in the general hatred; who, though the ministers of his rapine, yet hated the man by whose authority they committed those crimes. The odium still increased on his raising a fifth legion, which added to the expense and burden of the province. The cavalry was augmented to three thousand, with costly ornaments and equipage; nor had the people any respite from his extortions.

41. Meanwhile he received orders from Cæsar to transport his army into Africa, and march through Mauritania towards Numidia, because king Juba had sent considerable succors to Pompey, and was preparing to send more. These letters filled him with an insolent joy, for the opportunity they offered him of pillaging new provinces, and a wealthy kingdom. He therefore hastened into Lusitania to assemble his legions, and draw together a body of auxiliaries; appointing certain persons to provide corn, ships, and money, that nothing might retard him at his return, which was much sooner than expected; for when interest called, Cassius wanted neither industry nor vigilance.

42. Having got his army together, and encamped near Cordova, he made a speech to the soldiers, wherein he acquainted them with the orders he had received from Cæsar, and promised them a hundred sesterces each when they should arrive in Mauritania. The fifth legion, he told them, was to remain in Spain. Having ended his speech, he returned to Cordova. The same day, about noon, as he went to the hall of justice, one Minutius Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented him with a paper, in a soldier's habit, as if he had some request to make: then retiring behind Racilius, (who walked beside Cassius) as if waiting for an answer, he insensibly drew near; and a favorable op-

portunity offering, seized Cassius with his left hand, and wounded him twice with a dagger in his right. The noise this occasioned was as a signal to the conspirators, who all rushed on him in a body. Munatius Plancus killed the lictor that was next Longinus, and wounded Q. Cassius, his lieutenant. T. Vasius, and L. Mergilio, seconded their countryman Plancus; for they were all Italians. L. Licinius Squillus flew on Longinus himself, and gave him several slight wounds as he lay on the ground. By this time his guards came up to his assistance, (for he always had a body of veterans, armed with darts, to attend him) and surrounded the rest of the conspirators, who were advancing to complete the assassination. Of this number were Calpurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tusculus. Cassius was carried home; and Minutius Silo, stumbling on a stone, as he endeavored to make his escape, was taken and brought to him. Racilius retired to the neighboring house of a friend till he should have certain information of the fate of Cassius. L. Laterensis, not doubting but he was despatched, ran, in a transport of joy, to the camp, to congratulate the second and the new-raised legions on it, who, he knew, bore a particular hatred to Cassius; and who, immediately on this intelligence, placed him on the tribunal, and proclaimed him pretor: for there was not a native of the province, nor a soldier of the new-raised legion, nor a person, who by long residence was naturalised to the province, of which kind the second legion consisted, who did not join in the general hatred of Cassius. Meantime Laterensis was informed that Cassius was still alive; at which being rather grieved than disconcerted, he immediately so far recovered himself, as to go and wait on him. By this time the thirtieth legion, having notice of what had passed, marched to

Cordova, to the assistance of their general. The twenty-first and fifth followed their example. As only two legions remained in the camp, the second, fearing they should be left alone, and thereby have their sentiments known, did the same: but the new-raised legion continued firm, nor could be induced by any motives of fear to stir from its place. Cassius ordered all the accomplices of the conspiracy to be seized, and sent back the fifth legion to the camp, retaining the other three. By the confession of Minutius, he learned that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and Annius Scapula, a man of great authority and credit in the province, and equally in his confidence with Laterensis and Racilius, were concerned in the plot: nor did he long defer his revenge, but ordered them to be put to death. He delivered Minutius to be racked by his freedmen; likewise Calpurnius Salvianus; who, turning evidence, increased the number of the conspirators; justly, as some think; but others pretend that he was forced. L. Mergilio was likewise put to the torture. Squillus impeached many others, who were all condemned to die, except such as redeemed their lives by a fine: for he pardoned Calpurnius for ten, and Q. Sextius for fifty thousand sesterces; who, though deeply guilty, yet having, in this manner, escaped death, showed Cassius to be no less covetous than cruel.

43. Some days after, he received letters from Cæsar, with an account of Pompey's defeat and flight; which news equally affected him with joy and sorrow. Cæsar's success gave him pleasure; but the conclusion of the war would put an end to his rapines: insomuch that he was uncertain which to wish for, victory, or an unbounded licentiousness. When he was cured of his wounds, he sent to all who were indebted to him in any sums, and insisted on immediate

payment. Such as were taxed too low had orders to furnish larger sums. Such Roman citizens as had been levied in the several colonies of the province, and were alarmed at the thoughts of a foreign expedition, obtained their discharge for a certain sum. This brought in a vast revenue, but greatly increased the general hatred. He afterwards reviewed the army; sent the legions and auxiliaries, designed for Africa, towards the Straits of Hercules; and went himself to Seville, to examine the condition of the fleet. He stayed there some time, in consequence of an edict he had published, ordering all who had not paid the sums in which they were amerced, to repair to him thither; which created a universal murmuring and discontent.

44. In the mean time, L. Titius, a military tribune of the new-raised legion, sent him notice of a report, that the thirtieth legion, one of those he was carrying with him to Africa, had mutinied at Ilurgis, killed some of the centurions that opposed them, and were gone over to the second legion, who marched another way towards the Straits. On this intelligence he set out by night, with five cohorts of the twenty-first legion, and came up with them in the morning. He stayed there that day, to consult what was proper to be done, and then went to Carmona, where he found the thirtieth and twenty-first legions, with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the cavalry assembled. Here he learned, that the new-raised legion had surprised four cohorts, near Obucula, and forced them along with them to the second legion, where all joining, they had chosen T. Thorius, an Italian, for their general. Having instantly called a council, he sent Marcellus to Cordova, to secure that town, and Q. Cassius, his lieutenant, to Seville. A few days after, news was brought that Cordova had revolted, and that Marcel-

lus, either voluntarily, or through force, (for the reports were various) had joined them; as likewise the two cohorts of the fifth legion, that were in garrison there. Cassius, provoked at these mutinies, decamped, and the next day came to Segovia, on the river Xenil. There summoning an assembly, to sound the disposition of the troops, he found that it was not out of any regard to him, but to Cæsar, though absent, that they continued faithful, and were ready to undergo any danger for the recovery of the province.

45. Meantime Thorius marched the veteran legions to Cordova; and that the revolt might not appear to spring from a seditious inclination in him or the soldiers, as likewise to oppose an equal authority to that of Q. Cassius, who was drawing together a great force in Cæsar's name, he publicly gave out, that his design was to recover the province for Pompey. Nay, perhaps he was really influenced by a love for Pompey, whose name was dear to those legions that had served under Varro. Be this as it will, Thorius at least made it his pretence; and the soldiers were so infatuated with the thought, that they had Pompey's name inscribed on their bucklers. The citizens of Cordova, men, women, and children, came out to meet the legions; 'begging they would not enter Cordova as enemies, seeing they joined with them in their aversion to Cassius, and only desired they might not be obliged to act against Cæsar.'

46. The soldiers, moved by the prayers and tears of so great a multitude, and seeing they stood in no need of Pompey's name and memory to spirit up a revolt against Cassius, as he was equally odious to the partisans of both parties, neither being able to prevail with Marcellus, or the people of Cordova, to declare against Cæsar; they erased Pompey's name from their buck-

lers, chose Marcellus their commander, joined the citizens of Cordova, and encamped near the town. Two days after, Cassius encamped on an eminence, on this side the Bætis, about four miles from Cordova, and within view of the town; whence he sent letters to Bogud, in Mauritania, and M. Lepidus, proconsul of Hither Spain, to come to his assistance as soon as possible, for Cæsar's sake. Meanwhile he ravaged the country, and set fire to the buildings round Cordova.

47. The legions under Marcellus, provoked at this indignity, ran to him, and begged to be led against the enemy, that they might have an opportunity of fighting them before they could have time to destroy, with fire and sword, the rich and noble possessions of the Cordovians. Marcellus, though averse to battle, which, whoever was victorious, must turn to Cæsar's detriment, yet, unable to restrain the legions, crossed the Bætis, and drew up his men. Cassius did the same, on a rising ground; but as he would not quit his advantageous post, Marcellus persuaded his men to return to their camp. He had already begun to retire, when Cassius, knowing himself to be stronger in cavalry, fell on the legionaries with his horse, and made a considerable slaughter in their rear, on the banks of the river. This check making Marcellus sensible of the mistake he had committed in passing the river, he removed his camp to the other side, where both armies frequently drew up, but did not engage, on account of the inequality of the ground.

48. Marcellus was stronger in foot, for he commanded veteran soldiers, of great experience in war: Cassius depended more on the fidelity than the courage of his troops. The two camps being very near each other, Marcellus seized a spot of ground, where he built a fort, very convenient for depriving the enemy

of water. Longinus, apprehending he should be besieged, in a country where all were against him, quitted his camp in the night, and, by a quick march, reached Ulla, a town on which he thought he could rely. There he encamped so near the walls, that both by the situation of the place, (for Ulla stands on an eminence) and the defences of the town, he was on all sides secure from an attack. Marcellus followed him, and encamped as near the town as possible. Having taken a view of the place, he found himself reduced, by necessity, to do what was most agreeable to his own inclination; and neither engage Cassius, which the ardor of his soldiers would have forced him to, had it been possible; nor suffer him by his excursions to infest the territories of other states, as he had done those of Cordova. He therefore raised redoubts in proper places, and continued his works quite round the town, inclosing both Ulla and Cassius within his lines. But before they were finished, Cassius sent out all his cavalry, who he imagined might do him great service, by cutting off Marcellus' provisions and forage; and could only be a useless incumbrance on him, by consuming his provisions, if he was shut up in his camp.

49. A few days after, king Bogud having received Cassius' letters, came and joined him with all his forces, consisting of one legion, and several auxiliary cohorts: for, as commonly happens in civil dissensions, some of the states of Spain at that time favored Cassius, but a yet greater number Marcellus. Bogud came up to the advanced works of Marcellus, where many sharp skirmishes happened, with various success: however, Marcellus still kept possession of his works.

50. Meanwhile Lepidus, from the higher province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, and a great body of

horse and auxiliaries, came to Ulla, with design to adjust the differences between Cassius and Marcellus. Marcellus submitted without hesitation; but Cassius kept within his works, either because he thought his cause the justest, or from an apprehension that his adversary's submission had prepossessed Lepidus in his favor. Lepidus encamped with Marcellus, at Ulla, prevented a battle, invited Cassius into his camp, and engaged his honor to act without prejudice. Cassius hesitated long, but at last desired that the circumvallation should be levelled, and free egress given him. The truce was not only concluded, but the works demolished, and the guards drawn off; when king Bogud attacked one of Marcellus' forts, that lay nearest to his camp, unknown to any, (unless perhaps Longinus, who was not exempt from suspicion on this occasion) and slew a great number of his men: and had not Lepidus interposed, much mischief would have been done.

51. A free passage being made for Cassius, Marcellus joined camps with Lepidus; and both together marched for Cordova, while Cassius retired to Carmona. At the same time, Trebonius, the proconsul, came to take possession of the province. Cassius, having notice of his arrival, sent his legions and cavalry into winter quarters, and hastened, with all his effects, to Melaca, where he embarked immediately, though it was the winter season, that he might not, as he pretended, come into the power of Marcellus, Lepidus, and Trebonius; as his friends gave out, to avoid passing through a province, great part of which had revolted from him; but, as was more generally believed, to secure the money he had amassed, by his numberless extortions. The wind favoring him as far as could be expected at that season of the year, he put into the Iberus, to avoid sailing in the night; and thence con-

tinuing his voyage, which he thought he might do w safety, though the wind blew considerably fresher, was encountered by such a storm, at the mouth of t river, that being neither able to return, because of t stream, nor stem the fury of the waves, the ship a all that were in her perished.

52. Cæsar arriving in Syria from Egypt, and und standing, by those who attended him there, from Ro and the letters he received, at the same time, that t government there was on a very bad footing, and the affairs of the commonwealth managed indiscreetl that the contests of the tribunes were producing p petual seditions, and the remissness of the officers the legions destroying military discipline; all whi required his speedy presence to redress;—thought yet first incumbent on him to settle the state of the p vinces through which he passed; that, freeing th from domestic contentions, and the fear of a forei enemy, the laws might have a free course. This hoped soon to effect in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia, b cause these provinces were not involved in war. Bithynia and Pontus, indeed, he expected more tro ble, because he understood Pharnaces still continu in Pontus, and was not likely to quit it easily, bei flushed with the victory he had obtained over Domiti Calvinus. He made a short stay in most states of no distributing rewards both publicly and privately to su as deserved them; determining old controversies; a receiving into his protection the kings, princes, a potentates, as well of the provinces as of the neighbo ing countries: and having settled the necessary reg lations for the defence of the country, he dismiss them, fully satisfied with himself and the republic.

53. After a stay of some days in those parts, h named Sextus Cæsar, his friend and relation, to th

command of Syria, and the legions appointed to guard it; and sailed himself for Cilicia, with the fleet he had brought from Egypt. He summoned the states to assemble at Tarsus, the strongest and finest city of the province; where having settled every thing that regarded either it or the neighboring countries, his warlike ardor would not suffer him to tarry longer; but, marching through Cappadocia with the utmost expedition, where he stopped two days at Mazaca, he arrived at Comana, renowned for the ancient and sacred temple of Bellona, where she is worshipped with so much veneration, that her priest is accounted next in power and dignity to the king. He conferred this dignity on Lycomedes of Bithynia, descended of the ancient kings of Cappadocia, who demanded it in right of inheritance; his ancestors having lost it on occasion of the sceptre's being transferred to another line. As for Ariobarzanes, and his brother Ariarates, who had both deserved well of the commonwealth, he confirmed the first in his kingdom, and put the other under his protection; after which, he pursued his march with the same despatch.

54. On his approaching Pontus, and the frontiers of Gallogræcia, Dejotarus, tetrarch of that province, (whose title however was disputed by the neighboring tetrarchs) and king of the Lesser Armenia, laying aside the regal ornaments, and assuming the habit, not only of a private person, but even of a criminal, came in a suppliant manner to Cæsar, 'to beg forgiveness for obeying and assisting Pompey, at a time when Cæsar could afford him no protection; urging that it was his business to obey the governors who were present, without pretending to judge of the disputes of the people of Rome.' Cæsar, after putting him in mind 'of the many services he had done him, and the decrees he

had procured in his favor when consul; that his defection could claim no excuse from want of information, because one of his industry and prudence could not but know who was master of Italy and Rome, where the senate, the people, and the majesty of the republic resided; who in fine was consul after Marcellus and Lentulus; told him, that he would notwithstanding forgive his present fault, in consideration of his past services, the former friendship that had subsisted between them, the respect due to his age, and the solicitation of those who interceded in his behalf: adding, that he would refer the controversy relating to the tetrarchate to another time.' He restored him the royal habit, and commanded him to join him with all his cavalry, and the legion he had trained up after the Roman manner.

55. When he had arrived in Pontus, and had drawn all his forces together, which were not very considerable either for their number or discipline; (for, except the sixth legion, composed of veteran soldiers, which he had brought with him from Alexandria, and which, by its many labors and dangers, the length of its marches and voyages, and the frequent wars in which it had been engaged, was reduced to less than a thousand men, he had only the legion of Dejotarus, and two more that had been in the late battle between Domitius and Pharnaces) ambassadors arrived from Pharnaces, 'to intreat that Cæsar would not look on him as an enemy, he being ready to submit to all his commands.' Particularly they represented, 'that Pharnaces had granted no aid to Pompey, as Dejotarus had done, whom he had nevertheless pardoned.' Cæsar replied, 'that Pharnaces should meet with the utmost justice, if he performed his promises; but at the same time admonished the ambassadors, in gentle

rms, to forbear mentioning Dejotarus, and not to rerrate the having refused aid to Pompey. He told em he was always ready to forgive the suppliant, but ould never look on private services to himself as an onement for public injuries done the province: that harnaces' refusal of aiding Pompey had turned chiefly his own advantage, as he had thereby avoided all are in the disaster of Pharsalia: that he was how-rer willing to forgive the injuries done to the Roman tizens in Pontus, because it was now too late to think redressing them; as he could neither restore life to e dead, or manhood to those he had deprived of it, a punishment more intolerable to the Romans than ath itself: but that he must quit Pontus immedi-ely, send back the farmers of the revenues, and re-ore to the Romans and their allies what he unjustly tained from them. These things performed, he might en send the presents which successful generals were ent to receive from their friends:' (for Pharnaces d sent him a golden crown.) With this answer he smissed the ambassadors.

66. Pharnaces promised every thing; but hoping at Cæsar, who was in haste to be gone, would give sy credit to whatever he said, that he might the oner set out on more urgent affairs, (for every body new that his presence was much wanted at Rome) he rformed but slowly, wanted to protract the day of s departure, demanded other conditions, and, in fine, deavored to elude his engagements. Cæsar, per-iving his drift, did now, out of necessity, what he s usually wont to do through inclination, and re-lved to decide the affair as soon as possible by a ttle.

67. Zela is a town of Pontus, well fortified, though uated in a plain; for a natural eminence, as if raised

by art, sustains the walls on all sides. All around are a great number of large mountains, intersected by valleys. The highest of these, famed by the victory of Mithridates, the defeat of Triarius, and the destruction of our army, is not above three miles from Ziela, and has a ridge that almost extends to the town. Here Pharnaces lodged himself, with all his forces, repairing the fortifications of a camp which had proved so fortunate to his father.

58. Cæsar encamped about five miles from the enemy; and observing that the valleys which defended the king's camp would likewise defend his own, at the same distance, if the enemy, who were much nearer, did not seize them before him, he ordered a great quantity of fascines to be brought within the intrenchments. This being quickly performed, next night, at the fourth watch, leaving all the baggage in the camp, he set out with the legions; and arriving at day-break, unsuspected by the enemy, possessed himself of the same post where Mithridates had defeated Triarius. Hither he commanded all the fascines to be brought, employing the servants of the army for that purpose, that the soldiers might not be called off from the works; because the valley, which divided the eminence where he was intrenching himself from the enemy, was not above a mile over.

59. Pharnaces, perceiving this next morning, ranged all his troops in order of battle before his camp. But the approach towards us was so dangerous, that Cæsar concluded it to be no more than a review; or done with design to retard his works, by keeping a great number of his men under arms; or perhaps for ostentation, to show that he trusted no less to his army, than the advantage of his post. Therefore, keeping only his first line in order of battle, he commanded the

rest of the army to go on with the works. But Pharnaces, either prompted by the place itself, which had been so fortunate to his father; or induced by favorable omens, as we were afterwards told; or despising the small number of our men that were in arms, for he took all that were employed in carrying materials to the works to be soldiers; or confiding in his veteran army, who valued themselves on having defeated the twenty-second legion; and at the same time, contemning our troops, whom he had worsted under Domitius; was determined on a battle, and to that end began to cross the valley. Cæsar, at first, laughed at his ostentation, in crowding his army into so narrow a place, where no enemy, in his right senses, would have ventured; while, in the mean time, Pharnaces continued his march, and began to ascend the steep hill on which Cæsar was posted.

60. Cæsar, astonished at his incredible rashness and confidence, and finding himself suddenly and unexpectedly attacked, called off his soldiers from the works, ordered them to arms, opposed the legions to the enemy, and ranged his troops in order of battle. The suddenness of the thing occasioned some terror at first; and the chariots, armed with scythes, falling in with our ranks before they were completed, disordered them considerably: however, the multitude of darts discharged against them soon put a stop to their career. The enemy's army followed them close, and began the battle with a shout. Our advantageous situation, but especially the assistance of the gods, who preside over all the events of war, and more particularly those where human conduct can be of no service, favored us greatly on this occasion.

61. After a sharp and obstinate conflict, victory began to declare for us on the right wing, where the

sixth legion was posted. The enemy there was totally overthrown, but in the centre and left the battle was long and doubtful: however, with the assistance of the same gods, we at last prevailed there also, and drove them, with the utmost precipitation, down the hill, which they had so easily ascended before. Great numbers being slain, and many crushed, by the flight of their own troops, such as had the good fortune to escape were nevertheless obliged to throw away their arms; so that, having crossed the valley, and got on the opposite ascent, they could yet, because unarmed, derive no benefit from the advantage of the ground. Our men, flushed with victory, made no scruple to follow them, and even attack their camp; which they soon forced, notwithstanding the resistance made by the cohorts left by Pharnaces to guard it. Almost the whole army was cut to pieces or made prisoners. Pharnaces himself escaped, with a few horse; and had not our soldiers been detained some time by the assault of the camp, he must certainly have fallen alive into Cæsar's hands.

62. Though Cæsar was accustomed to victory, yet the present success gave him no small joy; because he had so speedily put an end to a very great war. The remembrance too of the danger to which he had been exposed, enhanced the pleasure, as he had obtained an easy victory in a very difficult conjuncture. Having thus recovered Pontus, and abandoned the plunder of the enemy's camp to the soldiers, he set out next day, with a guard of light horse. The sixth legion had orders to return to Italy, to receive the honors and rewards they had merited: the auxiliary troops of Dejotarus were sent home: and Cælius Vinicianus was left with two legions to protect the kingdom of Pontus.

63. Through Gallogræcia and Bithynia he went into Asia, settling all the controversies of the provinces as he passed, and establishing the limits and jurisdictions of the several kings, states, and tetrarchs. Mithridates of Pergamus, who had so speedily and successfully served him in Egypt, as we have related above, a man of royal descent and education (for Mithridates king of all Asia, out of regard to his birth, had carried him along with him when very young, and kept him in his camp several years), was appointed king of Bosphorus, which had belonged to Pharnaces. And thus were the provinces of the Roman people screened from the attempts of barbarous and hostile kings, by the interposition of a prince steadily attached to the interests of the republic. To this was added the tetrarchate of Gallogræcia, which belonged to him of right, though it had been possessed for some years by Dejotarus. Thus Cæsar, staying no where longer than the necessity of affairs required, and, having settled all things relating to the provinces with the utmost success and despatch, returned to Italy much sooner than was expected.

AFRICAN WAR.

HIRTIUS' COMMENTARIES.

AFRICAN WAR.

1. CÆSAR, setting out for Rome, advanced by moderate journeys towards Sicily; and continuing his march without intermission, arrived on the nineteenth of December at Lilybæum. Designing to embark immediately, though he had only one legion of new levies, and not quite six hundred horse, he ordered his tent to be pitched so near the sea-side, that the waves flowed up to the very foot of it. This he did with a view to take away all hopes of delay, and keep his men in readiness at a day or an hour's warning. The wind at that time proving contrary, he nevertheless suffered none of the soldiers or mariners to come on shore, that he might lose no opportunity of sailing; the rather, because the inhabitants of the province were perpetually talking of the mighty forces of the enemy; a cavalry not to be numbered; four legions headed by Juba, together with a body of light-armed troops; ten legions under the command of Scipio; a hundred and twenty elephants, and fleets in abundance. Yet all these reports alarmed him not, nor aught abated his resolution and confidence. Meantime the

number of galleys and transports increased daily; the new-levied legions flocked in to him from all parts; among the rest the fifth, a veteran legion, and about two thousand horse.

2. Having got together six legions, and about two thousand horse, he embarked the legions as fast as they arrived in the galleys, and the cavalry in the transports: then sending the greatest part of the fleet before, with orders to sail for the island of Aponiana, not far from Lilybæum; he himself continued a little longer in Sicily, to expose to public sale some confiscated estates. Leaving all other affairs to the care of Allienus the pretor, who then commanded in the island; and strictly charging him to use the utmost expedition in embarking the remainder of the troops; he set sail the twenty-seventh of December, and soon came up with the rest of the fleet. As the wind was favorable, and afforded a quick passage, he arrived the fourth day within sight of Africa, attended by a few galleys: for the transports, being mostly dispersed and scattered by the winds, were driven different ways. Passing Clupea and Neapolis with the fleet, he continued for some time to coast along the shore, leaving many towns and castles behind him.

3. When he came before Adrumetum, where the enemy had a garrison, commanded by C. Considius, and where Cn. Piso appeared on the shore, towards Clupea, with the cavalry of Adrumetum, and about two thousand Moors; having stopped a while, facing the port, till the rest of the fleet should come up, he landed his men, though their number at that time did not exceed three thousand foot, and a hundred and fifty horse. There encamping, before the town, he continued quiet in his intrenchments, without offering any act of hostility, or suffering his men to plunder the

country. Meantime the inhabitants manned the walls, and assembled, in great numbers, before the gates, to defend the town, whose garrison amounted to two legions. Cæsar, having taken a view of the place, and thoroughly examined its situation on all sides, returned to his camp. Some blamed his conduct on this occasion, and charged him with a considerable oversight, in not appointing a place of rendezvous to the pilots and captains of the fleet, or at least, not delivering them sealed instructions, according to his usual custom; which being opened at a certain time, might have directed them where to assemble. But in this Cæsar acted not without design: for as he knew of no port in Africa that was clear of the enemy's forces, and where the fleet might rendezvous in security, he chose to rely intirely on fortune, and land where occasion offered.

4. In the mean time, L. Plancus, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, desired leave to treat with Considius, and try, if possible, to bring him to reason. Leave being granted accordingly, he wrote him a letter, and sent it into the town by a messenger. When the messenger arrived and presented the letter, Considius, demanding whence it came, and being told from Cæsar, the Roman general, answered, that he knew no general of the Roman forces but Scipio. Then commanding the messenger to be immediately slain in his presence, he delivered the letter, unopened, to a trusty partisan, with orders to carry it directly to Scipio.

5. Cæsar had now continued a day and a night before the town, without receiving any answer from Considius; the rest of the forces were not yet arrived; his cavalry was very inconsiderable; the troops he had with him were mostly new levies, and not sufficiently numerous to invest the place: neither did he think it

advisable, on his first landing, to expose the army to wounds and fatigue; more especially, as the town was strongly fortified, extremely difficult of access, and the garrison full of spirits, in expectation of a great body of horse, who were said to be on their march to join them. For all these reasons, he determined not to attempt a siege; lest, while he pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry should come behind and surround him. But as he was drawing off his men, the garrison made a sudden sally; and Juba's horse, whom he had sent to receive their pay, happening just then to come up, they jointly took possession of the camp Cæsar had left, and began to harass his rear. This being perceived, the legionaries immediately halted; and the cavalry, though few in number, boldly charged the vast multitude of the enemy. On this occasion it was, that less than thirty Gallic horse, by an incredible and astonishing effort of valor, repulsed two thousand Moors, and drove them quite within the town. Having thus compelled the enemy to retire, and shelter themselves behind their walls, Cæsar resumed his intended march: but observing that they often repeated their sallies, renewing the pursuit from time to time, and again flying when attacked by the horse; he posted some veteran cohorts, with part of the cavalry in the rear, to cover his retreat, and so proceeded slowly on his march. The farther he advanced from Adrumetum, the less eager were the Numidians to pursue. Meantime, deputies arrived from the several towns and castles on the road, offering to furnish him with corn, and receive his commands. Towards the evening of that day, which was the first of January, he reached Ruspina, and there fixed his camp.

6. Thence he removed, and came before Leptis, a free city, and governed by its own laws. Here he was

also met by deputies from the town, who came, in the name of the inhabitants, to make an offer of their submission and services. Whereon, placing centurions and a guard before the gates, to prevent the soldiers from entering, or offering violence to any of the inhabitants, he himself encamped towards the shore, not far distant from the town. Hither by accident arrived some of the galleys and transports, by whom he was informed, that the rest of the fleet, uncertain what course to pursue, had been steering for Utica. This obliged him to keep with the army near the sea, and avoid marching into the inland provinces, that he might be at hand to join his troops on their arrival. He likewise sent the cavalry back to their ships, probably to hinder the country from being plundered, and ordered fresh water to be carried to them on board. Meanwhile, the rowers, who were employed in this service, were suddenly and unexpectedly attacked by the Moorish horse, who killed some, and wounded many with their darts: for the manner of these barbarians is, to lie in ambush with their horses among the valleys, and suddenly launch on an enemy; they seldom choosing to engage hand to hand in a plain.

7. In the mean time, Cæsar despatched letters and messengers into Sardinia and the neighboring provinces, with orders, as soon as the letters came to hand, to send supplies of men, corn, and warlike stores; and, having unloaded part of the fleet, detached it, with Rabirius Posthumus, into Sicily, to bring over the second embarkation. At the same time he ordered out ten galleys to get intelligence of the transports that had missed their way, and maintain the freedom of the sea. C. Sallustius Crispus, the pretor, was likewise sent out at the head of a squadron to seize Cercina, then in the hands of the enemy, be-

cause he heard there was great store of corn in that island: in giving these orders and instructions, he used all possible endeavors to leave no room for excuse or delay. Meanwhile, having informed himself, from the deserters and natives, of the condition of Scipio and his followers, and understanding that they were at the whole charge of maintaining Juba's cavalry, he could not but pity the infatuation of men, who thus rather chose to be tributaries to the king of Numidia, than securely enjoy their fortunes at home with their fellow-citizens.

8. The third of January he decamped; and, leaving six cohorts at Leptis, under the command of Saserna, returned with the rest of the forces to Ruspina, whence he had come the day before. Here he deposited the baggage of the army; and, marching out with a light body of troops to forage, ordered the inhabitants to follow with their horses and carriages. Having by this means got together a great quantity of corn, he came back to Ruspina. His design was, as far as I can judge, that by keeping possession of the maritime cities, and providing them with garrisons, he might secure a retreat for his fleet.

9. Leaving therefore P. Saserna, the brother of him who commanded at Leptis, to take charge of the town, with one legion, and ordering all the wood that could be found to be carried into the place; he set out from Ruspina with seven cohorts, part of the veteran legions who had behaved so well in the fleet under Sulpicius and Vatinius; and marching directly for the port, which lies at about two miles distance, embarked with them in the evening, without imparting his intentions to the army, who were extremely inquisitive concerning the general's design. His departure occasioned the utmost sadness and consternation among the

troops; for being few in number, mostly new levies, and those not all suffered to land, they saw themselves exposed, on a foreign coast, to the mighty forces of a crafty nation, supported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor had they any resource in their present circumstances, or expectation of safety in their own conduct; but derived all their hope from the alacrity, vigor, and wonderful cheerfulness that appeared in the general's countenance; for he was of an intrepid spirit, and behaved with undaunted resolution and confidence. On his conduct therefore they intirely relied, and promised themselves to a man, that under so able and experienced a leader, all difficulties would vanish before them.

10. Cæsar, having continued the whole night on board, about day-break prepared to set sail; when, all on a sudden, the part of the fleet that had given so much concern, appeared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore, ordering his men to quit their ships immediately, and receive the rest of the troops in arms on the shore, he made the new fleet enter the port with the utmost diligence; and landing all the forces, horse and foot, returned again to Ruspina. Here he established his camp; and taking with him thirty cohorts, without baggage, advanced into the country to forage. Thus was Cæsar's purpose at length discovered; that he meant, unknown to the enemy, to have sailed to the assistance of the transports that had missed their way, lest they should unexpectedly fall in with the African fleet. Nor would he even impart his design to his own soldiers left behind in garrison, from an apprehension, that when they came to reflect on their own weakness, and the strength of the enemy, they might too much give way to fear.

11. Cæsar had not marched above three miles from

his camp, when he was informed by his scouts, and some advanced parties of horse, that the enemy's forces were in view. At the same time a great cloud of dust began to appear. On this intelligence, Cæsar ordered all his horse, of which he had at that time but a very small number, to advance, as likewise his archers, only a few of whom had followed him from the camp; and the legions to march after him in order of battle, while he went forward at the head of a small party. Soon after, having discovered the enemy at some distance, he commanded the soldiers to repair to their arms, and prepare for battle. Their number in all did not exceed thirty cohorts, with about four hundred horse, and the archers.

12. Meanwhile the enemy, under the command of Labienus and the two Pacidii, drew up, with a very large front, consisting mostly of horse, whom they intermixed with light-armed Numidians and archers; forming themselves in such close order, that Cæsar's army, at a distance, mistook them all for infantry; and strengthening their right and left with many squadrons of horse. Cæsar drew up his army in one line, obliged to it by the smallness of his numbers; covering his front with the archers, and placing his cavalry in the two wings, with particular instructions not to suffer themselves to be surrounded by the enemy's numerous horse; for he imagined that he was to have to do only with infantry.

13. As both sides stood in expectation of the signal, and Cæsar chose to continue without stirring from his post, as being sensible, that with such few troops, against so great a force, he must depend more on conduct and contrivance than strength; on a sudden, the enemy began to extend themselves, spread out on the hills on every side, and prepared to surround our

horse, who were hardly able to maintain their ground against them. Meanwhile both the main bodies advancing to engage, the enemy's cavalry, intermixed with some light-armed Numidians, suddenly sprung forward, and attacked the legions with a shower of darts. Our men, preparing to return the charge, their horse retreated a little, while the foot continued to maintain their ground, till the others having rallied, came on again, with fresh vigor, to sustain them.

14. Cæsar, perceiving that his ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, (for our foot, in pursuing the enemy's horse, as they retreated, being forced to advance a considerable way beyond their colors, were flanked by the light-armed Numidians; while, at the same time, they could do but little execution against the cavalry, by reason of the quickness wherewith they retired) gave express orders, that no soldier should advance above four feet beyond the ensigns. Meanwhile Labienus' cavalry, confiding in their numbers, endeavored to surround those of Cæsar, who, being few in number, and overpowered by the multitude of the enemy, were forced to give ground a little, their horses being almost all wounded. The enemy, encouraged by this, pressed on more and more; so that, in an instant, the legions, being surrounded on all sides, were obliged to cast themselves into an orb, and fight, as if inclosed with barriers.

15. Labienus, with his head uncovered, advanced on horseback to the front of the battle, to encourage his men. Sometimes addressing Cæsar's legions: 'So ho! you raw soldiers there!' says he, 'why so fierce? Has he infatuated you too with his words? Truly he has brought you into a fine condition! I pity you sincerely.' On this, one of the soldiers, 'I am none of your raw warriors, but a veteran of the tenth legion.'—'Where's

your standard?' replied Labienus. 'I'll soon make you sensible who I am,' answered the soldier. Then pulling off his helmet, to discover himself, he threw a javelin, with all his strength, at Labienus, which wounding his horse severely in the breast, 'Know, Labienus,' says he, 'that this dart was thrown by a soldier of the tenth legion.' However, the whole army was not a little daunted, especially the new levies; and began to cast their eyes on Cæsar, minding nothing, for the present, but to defend themselves from the enemy's darts.

16. Cæsar meanwhile perceiving the enemy's design, endeavored to extend his order of battle as much as possible, directing the cohorts to face about alternately to the right and left. By this means, he broke the enemy's circle with his right and left wings; and attacking one part of them, thus separated from the other, with his horse and foot, at last put them to flight. He pursued them but a little way, fearing an ambuscade, and returned again to his own men. The same was done by the other division of Cæsar's horse and foot; so that the enemy being driven back, on all sides, he retreated towards his camp, in order of battle.

17. Meanwhile M. Petreius, and Cn. Piso, with eleven hundred select Numidian horse, and a considerable body of foot, arrived to the assistance of the enemy; who, recovering from their terror, on this reinforcement, and again resuming courage, fell on the rear of the legions, as they retreated, and endeavored to hinder them from reaching their camp. Cæsar, perceiving this, ordered his men to wheel about, and renew the battle. As the enemy still pursued their former plan, and avoided a close engagement, Cæsar, considering that the horses had not yet recovered the

fatigue of their late voyage; that they were besides weakened with thirst, weariness, and wounds, and of course unfit for a vigorous and long pursuit, which even the time of the day would not allow, ordered both horse and foot to fall at once briskly on the enemy, and not slacken the pursuit till they had driven them quite beyond the farthest hills, and taken possession of them themselves. Accordingly, on a signal given, the enemy fighting in a faint and careless manner, he suddenly charged them with his horse and foot; who in a moment driving them from the field, and over the adjoining hill, kept possession of that post for some time, and then retired slowly, in order of battle, to their camp. The enemy, who in this last attack had been very rudely handled, thought proper likewise to do the same.

18. The action being over, a great number of deserters, of all kinds, flocked to Cæsar's camp, besides multitudes of horse and foot, that were made prisoners. By them we learned, that it was the design of the enemy to have astonished our raw troops with their new and uncommon manner of fighting; and after surrounding them with their cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as they had done Curio; and that they had marched against us expressly with that intention. Labienus had even said, in the council of war, that he would lead such a numerous body of troops against us, as should fatigue us with the very slaughter, and defeat us even in the bosom of victory; for he relied more on the number than the valor of his troops. He had heard of the mutiny of the veteran legions at Rome, and their refusal to go into Africa; and was likewise well assured of the fidelity of his troops, who had served three years under him, in Africa. He had a great number of Numidian cavalry and light-armed troops,

besides the Gallic and German horse, whom he had drawn together, out of the remains of Pompey's army, and carried over with him from Brundusium: he had likewise the freedmen raised in the country, and trained to fight on horseback; and the multitude of Juba's forces, his hundred and twenty elephants, his innumerable cavalry and legionaries, amounting to about twelve thousand. Emboldened by the hope such mighty forces raised in him, on the fourth of January, six days after Cæsar's arrival, he came against him, with sixteen hundred Gallic and German horse, nine hundred under Petreius, eight thousand Numidians, four times that number of light-armed foot, with a multitude of archers and slingers. The battle lasted from eleven till sunset, during which Petreius receiving a dangerous wound, was obliged to quit the field.

19. Meantime Cæsar fortified his camp with much greater care, reinforced the guards, and threw up two intrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his camp to the sea likewise; to secure the communication, and receive supplies without danger. He landed a great number of darts and military engines, armed part of the mariners, Gauls, Rhodians, and others, that, after the example of the enemy, he might have a number of light-armed troops, to intermix with his cavalry. He likewise strengthened his army with a great number of Syrian and Iturean archers, whom he drew from the fleet into his camp: for he understood, that within three days Scipio was expected, with all his forces, consisting of eight legions, and four thousand horse. At the same time, he established workshops, made a great number of darts and arrows, provided himself with leaden bullets and palisades, wrote to Sicily for hurdles and wood to make rams, because he

had none in Africa, and likewise gave orders for sending corn; for the harvest, in that country, was like to be inconsiderable, the enemy having taken all the laborers into their service the year before, and stored up the grain in a few fortified towns, after demolishing the rest, forcing the inhabitants into the garrisoned places, and laying waste the whole country.

20. In this necessity, by soothing the people, he obtained a small supply, and husbanded it with care. Meantime he was very exact in visiting the works, and relieving the guards. Labienus sent his sick and wounded, of which the number was very considerable, in waggons, to Adrumetum. Meanwhile Cæsar's transports, unacquainted with the coast, or where their general had landed, wandered up and down, in great uncertainty; and being attacked, one after another, by the enemy's coasters, were, for the most part, either taken or burned. Cæsar, being informed of this, stationed his fleet along the coast and islands, for the security of his convoys.

21. Meanwhile M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, never ceased urging and exhorting young Pompey, in words to this effect: 'Your father, when he was at your age, and observed the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and daring men, and the honest party either slain, or driven by banishment from their country and relations, incited by the greatness of his mind, and the love of glory, though then very young, and only a private man, had yet the courage to rally the remains of his father's army, and deliver Rome from the yoke of slavery and tyranny under which it groaned. He also recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia, Mauritania, with amazing despatch; and, by that means, gained an illustrious and extensive reputation among all nations, and triumphed at three and twenty, while but a Roman

knight. Nor did he enter on the administration of public affairs, distinguished by the shining exploits of his father, or the fame and reputation of his ancestors, or the honors and dignities of the state. You, on the contrary, possessed of these honors, and the reputation acquired by your father; sufficiently distinguished by your own industry and greatness of mind; will you not bestir yourself, join your father's friends, and vindicate your own liberty, that of the commonwealth, of every good and honest man?' The youth, roused by the remonstrances of that grave and worthy senator, got together about thirty sail, of all sorts, of which some few were ships of war; and sailing from Utica to Mauritania, invaded the kingdom of Bogud; and leaving his baggage behind him, with an army of two thousand men, partly freemen, partly slaves, some armed, some not, approached the town of Ascurum, in which the king had a garrison. The inhabitants suffered him to advance to the very walls and gates; when, sallying out, all on a sudden, they drove him quite back to his ships. This ill success determined him to leave that coast; nor did he afterwards land in any place, but steered directly for the Balearean isles.

22. Meantime, Scipio, leaving a strong garrison at Utica, began his march, with the forces we have described above, and encamped first at Adrumetum; when, after a stay of a few days, setting out in the night, he joined Petreius and Labienus, lodging all the forces in one camp, about three miles distant from Cæsar's. Their cavalry were making continual excursions to our very works, intercepted those who ventured too far in quest of wood or water, and obliged us to keep within our intrenchments. This soon occasioned a great scarcity of provisions among Cæsar's

men, because no supplies had yet arrived from Sicily or Sardinia. The season too was dangerous for navigation, and he did not possess above six miles, every way, in Africa, which also greatly straitened him for want of forage. The veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had been engaged in many wars, both by sea and land, and often struggled with wants and misfortunes of this kind, gathering sea-weed and washing it in fresh water, by that means subsisted their horses and cattle.

23. While things were in this situation, king Juba, being informed of Cæsar's difficulties, and the few troops he had with him, resolved not to allow him time to remedy his wants or increase his army. Accordingly he left his kingdom, at the head of a great body of horse and foot, and marched to join his allies. Meantime, P. Sitius, and king Bogud, having intelligence of Juba's march, joined their forces, entered Numidia, and laying siege to Cirta, the most opulent city in the country, carried it in a few days, with two others belonging to the Getulians. They had offered the inhabitants leave to depart in safety, if they would peaceably deliver up the towns; but these conditions being rejected, they were taken by storm, and the citizens all put to the sword. They then fell to ravaging the country, and laying all the cities under contribution; of which Juba having intelligence, though he was on the point of joining Scipio and the other chiefs, he determined to return to the relief of his own kingdom, rather than run the hazard of being driven from it while he was assisting others, and perhaps, after all, miscarry too in his designs against Cæsar. He therefore retired with his troops, leaving only thirty elephants behind him, and marched to the relief of his own cities and territories.

24. Meanwhile, Cæsar, knowing that the province

still doubted of his arrival, and imagined that not himself in person, but some of his lieutenants had come over with the forces lately sent, despatched letters to all the several states, to inform them of his presence. On this, many persons of rank fled to his camp, complaining of the barbarity and cruelty of the enemy. Hitherto he had continued quiet in his post; but, touched with their fears, and a sense of their sufferings, he resolved to take the field as soon as the weather would permit, and he could draw his troops together. He immediately despatched letters into Sicily, to Allienus and Rabirius Posthumus, the pretors, that without delay or excuse, either of the winter or the winds, they must send over the rest of the troops, to save Africa from utter ruin; because, without some speedy remedy, not a single house would be left standing, nor any thing escape the fury and ravages of the enemy. But such was his impatience, and so long did the time appear, that from the day the letters were sent, he complained without ceasing of the delay of the fleet, and had his eyes night and day turned towards the sea. Nor ought we to wonder at his behavior on this occasion; for he saw the villages burned, the country laid waste, the cattle destroyed, the towns plundered, the principal citizens either slain or put in chains, and their children dragged into servitude under the name of hostages; nor could he, amidst all this scene of misery, afford any relief to those who implored his protection, because of the small number of his forces. He kept the soldiers however at work on the intrenchments, built forts and redoubts, and carried on his lines quite to the sea.

25. Meanwhile, Scipio made use of the following contrivance for training and disciplining his elephants. He drew up two parties in order of battle; one of slingers,

who were to act as enemies, and discharge small stones against the elephants; and fronting them, the elephants themselves, in one line, with his whole army behind them in battle array; that when the enemy, by their discharge of stones, had frightened the elephants, and forced them to turn on their own men, they might again be made to face the enemy, by the volleys of stones from the army behind them. The work however went on but slowly; because these animals, after many years teaching, are often no less prejudicial to those who bring them into the field, than to the enemy against whom they were intended.

26. Whilst the two generals were thus employed near Ruspina, C. Virgilius Pretorius, who commanded in Thapsus, a maritime city, observing some of Cæsar's transports that had missed their way, uncertain where he had landed or held his camp, and thinking that a fair opportunity offered of destroying them; manned a galley that was in the port with soldiers and archers, and, joining with it a few armed barks, began to pursue Cæsar's ships. Though he was repulsed on several occasions, he still pursued his design; and at last fell in with one, on board of which were two young Spaniards, of the name of Titus, who were tribunes of the fifth legion, and whose father had been made a senator by Cæsar. There was with them a centurion of the same legion, T. Salienus by name, who had invested the house of M. Messala, Cæsar's lieutenant, at Messana, and expressed himself in very seditious language; nay, even seized the money and ornaments destined for Cæsar's triumph, and for that reason dreaded his resentment. He, conscious of his demerits, persuaded the young men to surrender themselves to Virgilius, by whom they were sent, under a strong guard, to Scipio, and three days after put to death. It is said,

that the elder Titus begged of the centurions who were charged with the execution, that he might be first put to death; which being easily granted, they both suffered according to their sentence.

27. The cavalry that mounted guard in the two camps were continually skirmishing with one another. Sometimes, too, the German and Gallic cavalry of Labienus entered into discourse with those of Cæsar. Meantime, Labienus, with a party of horse, endeavored to surprise the town of Leptis, which Saserna guarded with three cohorts; but was easily repulsed, because the town was strongly fortified, and well provided with warlike engines: but at several times he renewed the attempt. One day, as a strong squadron of the enemy had posted themselves before the gate, their officer being slain by an arrow discharged from a scorpion, the rest were terrified and took to flight; by which means the town was delivered from any farther attempts.

28. At the same time, Scipio daily drew up his troops in order of battle, about three hundred paces from his camp; and after continuing in arms the greatest part of the day, retreated again to his camp in the evening. This he did several times, no one meanwhile offering to stir out of Cæsar's camp, or approach his forces; which forbearance and tranquillity gave him such a contempt of Cæsar and his army, that, drawing out all his forces, and his thirty elephants, with towers on their backs, and extending his horse and foot as wide as possible, he approached quite up to Cæsar's intrenchments. On this, Cæsar quietly, and without noise or confusion, recalled to his camp all that were gone out either in quest of forage, wood, or to work on the fortifications: he likewise ordered the cavalry that were on guard, not to quit their post until the enemy

were within reach of dart; and if they then persisted to advance, to retire in good order within the intrenchments. The rest of the cavalry were enjoined to hold themselves in readiness on the first notice. These orders were not given by himself in person, or after viewing the disposition of the enemy from the rampart; but sitting in his tent, and informing himself of their motions by his scouts; such was his consummate knowlege in the art of war, that he gave all the necessary directions by his officers. He very well knew, that, whatever confidence the enemy might have in their numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the camp of a general, who had so often repulsed, terrified, and put them to flight; who had frequently pardoned and granted them their lives; and whose very name had weight and authority enough to intimidate their army. He was besides well intrenched with a high rampart and deep ditch, the approaches to which were rendered so difficult by the sharp spikes, which he had disposed in a very artful manner, that they were even sufficient of themselves to keep off the enemy. He was likewise well provided with military engines, and all sorts of weapons necessary for a vigorous defence, which compensated in some measure for the fewness of his troops, and the inexperience of his new levies. His forbearance therefore did not proceed from fear, or any distrust of the valor of his troops; but because he was unwilling to purchase a bloody victory over the shattered remains of his dispersed enemies, after such a series of great actions, conquests, and triumphs; and therefore resolved to bear their insults and bravadoes, till the arrival of his veteran legions by the second embarkation.

29. Scipio, after a short stay before the intrenchments, as if in contempt of Cæsar, withdrew slowly to

his camp; and having called the soldiers together, enlarged on the terror and despair of the enemy; when, encouraging his men, he assured them of a complete victory in a short time. Cæsar made his soldiers again return to the works; and, under pretence of fortifying his camp, inured the new levies to labor and fatigue. Meantime, the Numidians and Getulians deserted daily from Scipio's camp. Part returned home; part came over to Cæsar, because they understood he was related to C. Marius, from whom their ancestors had received considerable favors. Of these he selected some of distinguished rank, and sent them home, with letters to their countrymen, exhorting them to levy troops for their own defence, and not listen to the suggestions of his enemies.

30. While these things passed near Ruspina, deputies from Acilla, and all the neighboring towns, arrived in Cæsar's camp, with offers of submission, and to supply him with corn and other necessaries, if he would send garrisons to protect them from the enemy. Cæsar readily complied with their demands; and having assigned a garrison, sent C. Messius, who had been edile, to command in Acilla. On intelligence of this, Considius Longus, who was at Adrumetum with two legions and seven hundred horse, leaving a garrison in that city, posted to Acilla at the head of eight cohorts; but Messius, having accomplished his march with great expedition, arrived first at the place. When Considius therefore approached, and found Cæsar's garrison in possession of the town, not daring to make any attempt, he returned again to Adrumetum. But some days after, Labienus having sent him a reinforcement of horse, he found himself in a condition to renew the siege.

31. Much about the same time, C. Sallustius Cris-

pus, who, as we have seen, had been sent a few days before to Cercina with a fleet, arrived in that island. On which, C. Decimus, the questor, who, with a strong party of his own domestics, had charge of the magazines erected there, went on board a small vessel, and fled. Sallustius meanwhile was well received by the Cercinates; and finding great store of corn in the island, loaded all the ships then in the port, whose number was very considerable, and despatched them to Cæsar's camp. At the same time, Allienus, the proconsul, put on board the transports at Lilybæum the thirteenth and fourteenth legions, with eight hundred Gallic horse, and a thousand archers and slingers, and sent them over into Africa. This fleet meeting with a favorable wind, arrived in four days at Ruspina, where Cæsar had his camp. Thus he experienced a double pleasure on this occasion; receiving at one and the same time, both a supply of provisions, and a reinforcement of troops; which animated the soldiers, and delivered them from the apprehensions of want. Having landed the legions and cavalry, he allowed them some time to recover from the fatigue and sickness of their voyage, and then distributed them into the forts and along the works.

32. Scipio and the other generals were greatly surprised at Cæsar's conduct, and could not conceive how one, who had always been forward and active in war, should all of a sudden change his measures; which they therefore suspected must proceed from some very powerful reasons. Uneasy and disturbed to see him so patient, they made choice of two Getulians, on whose fidelity they thought they could rely; and promising them great rewards, sent them, under the name of deserters, to get intelligence of Cæsar's designs. When they were brought before him, they begged

they might have leave to speak without offence; which being granted, 'It is now a long time, great general,' said they, 'since many of us Getulians, clients of C. Marius, and almost all Roman citizens of the fourth and sixth legions, have wished for an opportunity to come over to you; but have hitherto been prevented by the guards of Numidian horse Now we gladly embrace the occasion; being sent by Scipio, under the name of deserters, to discover what ditches and traps you have prepared for his elephants, how you intend to oppose these animals, and what dispositions you are making for battle.' Cæsar commended them, rewarded them liberally, and sent them to the other deserters. We had soon a proof of the truth of what they had advanced; for, next day, a great many soldiers of these legions mentioned by the Getulians deserted to Cæsar's camp.

33. Whilst affairs were in this posture at Ruspina, M. Cato, who commanded in Utica, was daily enlisting freedmen, Africans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear arms, and sending them without intermission to Scipio's camp. Meanwhile deputies from the town of Tisdra came to Cæsar, to inform him, that some Italian merchants had brought three hundred thousand bushels of corn into that city; and to demand a garrison, as well for their own defence, as to secure the corn. Cæsar thanked the deputies, promised to send the garrison they desired, and, having encouraged them, sent them back to their fellow-citizens. Meantime P. Sitius entered Numidia with his troops, and made himself master of a castle situated on a mountain, where Juba had laid up a great quantity of provisions, and other things necessary for carrying on the war.

34. Cæsar, having increased his forces with two veteran legions, and all the cavalry and light-armed

roops that had arrived in the second embarkation, de-
ached six transports to Lilybæum, to bring over the
est of the army. On the twenty-seventh of January,
rdering the scouts and lictors to attend him at six in
he evening, he drew out all the legions at midnight,
nd directed his march towards Ruspina, where he had
garrison, and which had first declared in his favor,
o one knowing or having the least suspicion of his
esign. Thence he continued his route, by the left of
he camp, along the sea, and passed a little declivity,
hich opened into a fine plain, extending fifteen miles,
nd bordered on a chain of mountains of moderate
eight, that formed a kind of theatre. In this ridge
ere some hills that rose higher than the rest, where
orts and watch-towers had formerly been erected, and
t the farthest of which Scipio's outguards were posted.

35. Cæsar having gained the ridge, began to raise
edoubts on the several eminences, which he executed
n less than half an hour. When he was near the last,
hich bordered on the enemy's camp, and where, as
e have said, Scipio had his outguard of Numidians,
e stopped a moment; and having taken a view of the
round, and posted his cavalry in the most commo-
ious situation, he ordered the legions to throw up an
ntrenchment along the middle of the ridge, from the
lace at which he was arrived, to that whence he set
ut. This being observed by Scipio and Labienus,
hey drew all their cavalry out of the camp, formed
hem in order of battle; and, advancing about a thou-
and paces, posted their infantry by way of a second
ine, somewhat less than half a mile from their camp.

36. Cæsar, unmoved by the appearance of the enemy's forces, encouraged his men to go on with the work. But when he perceived that they were within fifteen hundred paces of the intrenchment, and that their design was to interrupt and disturb the soldiers, and

oblige him to draw them off from the work; he ordered a squadron of Spanish cavalry, sustained by some light-armed infantry, to attack the Numidian guard on the nearest eminence, and drive them from that post. They easily possessed themselves of the place, the Numidians being partly killed, and partly made prisoners. This being perceived by Labienus, that he might the more effectually succor the fugitives, he wheeled off almost the whole right wing of the horse. Cæsar waited till he was at a considerable distance from his own men, and then detached his left wing to intercept his return.

37. In the plain where this happened was a large villa, with four turrets, which prevented Labienus from seeing that he was surrounded: he had therefore no apprehension of the approach of Cæsar's horse, till he found himself charged in the rear; which struck such a sudden terror into the Numidian cavalry, that they immediately betook themselves to flight. The Gauls and Germans who stood their ground, being surrounded on all sides, were intirely cut off. This being perceived by Scipio's legions, who were drawn up in order of battle before the camp, they fled, in the utmost terror and confusion. Scipio and his forces being driven from the plain and the hills, Cæsar sounded a retreat, and ordered all the cavalry to retire behind the works. When the field was cleared, he could not forbear admiring the huge bodies of the Gauls and Germans, who partly induced by the authority of Labienus, had followed him out of Gaul; partly had been drawn over by promises and rewards. Some, being made prisoners in the battle with Curio, and having their lives granted them, continued faithful, out of gratitude. Their bodies, of surprising shape and largeness, lay scattered all over the plain.

38. Next day, Cæsar drew all his forces together,

and formed them in order of battle, on the plain. Scipio, discouraged by so unexpected a check, and the numbers of his wounded and slain, kept within his lines. Cæsar, with his army in battalia, marched along the roots of the hills, and gradually approached his trenches. The legions were, by this time, got within a mile of Uzita, a town possessed by Scipio, whence he had his water, and other conveniences for his army. Resolving therefore to preserve it at all hazards, he brought forth his whole army, and drew them up, in four lines, forming the first of cavalry, supported by elephants, with castles on their backs. Cæsar, believing that Scipio approached with design to give battle, continued where he was posted, not far from the town. Scipio meanwhile, having the town in the centre of his front, extended his two wings, where were his elephants, in full view of our army.

39. When Cæsar had waited till sun-set, without finding that Scipio stirred from his post; who seemed rather disposed to defend himself by his advantageous situation, than hazard a battle in the open field; he did not think proper to advance farther that day, because the enemy had a strong garrison of Numidians in the town, which besides covered the centre of their front; and he foresaw great difficulty in forming, at the same time, an attack on the town, and opposing their right and left, with the advantage of the ground; especially as the soldiers had continued under arms, and fasted since morning. Having therefore led back his troops to their camp, he resolved next day to extend his lines near the town.

40. Meantime Considius, who besieged eight mercenary cohorts of Numidians and Getulians in Acilla, where C. Messius commanded; after continuing long before the place, and seeing all his works burned and destroyed by the enemy; on the report of the late

battle of the cavalry, set fire to his corn, destroyed his wine, oil, and other stores; and abandoning the siege of Acilla, divided his forces with Scipio, and retired, through the kingdom of Juba, to Adrumetum.

41. Meanwhile one of the transports, belonging to the second embarkation, in which were Q. Cominius, and L. Ticida, a Roman knight, being separated from the rest of the fleet in a storm, and driven to Thapsus, was taken by Virgilius, and all the persons on board sent to Scipio. A three-benched galley likewise, belonging to the same fleet, being forced, by the winds, to Ægimurum, was intercepted by the squadron under Varus and M. Octavius. In this vessel were some veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few new levies; whom Varus treated respectfully, and sent, under a guard, to Scipio. When they came into his presence, and appeared before his tribunal; 'I am satisfied,' said he, 'it is not by your own inclination, but at the instigation of your wicked general, that you impiously wage war on your fellow-citizens, and on the honestest part of the republic. If therefore, now that fortune has put you in our power, you will take this opportunity to unite with the good citizens, in the defence of the common-weal, I not only promise you your life, but you may expect to be rewarded. Let me know what you think of the proposal.' Scipio having ended his speech, and expecting a thankful return to so gracious an offer, permitted them to reply; when the centurion, who on this occasion was spokesman, thus addressed him: 'Scipio,' said he, ('for I cannot give you the appellation of general) I return you my hearty thanks for the good treatment you are willing to show to prisoners of war; and perhaps I might accept of your kindness, were it not to be purchased at the expense of a horrible crime. What! shall I carry arms, and fight against Cæsar, my gene-

ral, under whom I have served as centurion; and against his victorious army, to whose renown I have so many years endeavored to contribute by my valor? It is what I will never do; and even advise you not to push the war any farther. You know not what troops you have to deal with, nor the difference betwixt them and yours; of which, if you please, I will give you an indisputable instance. Do you pick out the best cohort you have in your army; and give me only ten of my comrades, which are now your prisoners, to engage them. You shall see, by the success, what you are to expect from your soldiers.' When the centurion had made this reply, Scipio, incensed at his boldness, and resenting the affront, made a sign to some of his officers to kill him on the spot, which was immediately put in execution. At the same time, ordering the other veteran soldiers to be separated from the new levies; 'Carry away,' said he, 'these villains, pampered with the blood of their fellow-citizens.' Accordingly they were conducted without the rampart, and cruelly massacred. The new-raised soldiers were distributed among his legions; and Comibius and Ticida forbid to appear in his presence. Cæsar, concerned for this misfortune, broke, with ignominy, the officers, whose instructions being to secure the coast, and advance to a certain distance into the main sea, to protect and facilitate the approach of the transports, had been negligent on that important station.

42. About this time, a most incredible accident befel Cæsar's army: for the Pleiades being set, about nine at night, a terrible storm arose, attended with hail of an uncommon size. But what contributed to render this misfortune the greater, was, that Cæsar had not, like other generals, put his troops into winter quarters; but was every three or four days changing his

camp; to gain ground on the enemy; which keeping the soldiers continually employed, they were utterly unprovided of any conveniences to protect them from the inclemency of the weather. Besides, neither officer nor soldier had been permitted to take their equipages or utensils with them, nor so much as a vessel, or a single slave, when they parted from Sicily; and so far had they been from acquiring or providing themselves with any thing in Africa, that by reason of the great scarcity of provisions, they had even consumed their former stores. Impoverished by these accidents, very few of them had tents: the rest had made themselves a kind of covering, either by spreading their clothes, or with mats and rushes. But these being soon penetrated by the storm and hail, the soldiers had no resource left, but wandered up and down the camp, covering their heads with their bucklers, to shelter them from the weather. In a short time the whole camp was under water, the fires extinguished, and all their provisions washed away or spoiled. The same night, the shafts of the javelins belonging to the fifth legion, of their own accord, took fire.

43. In the mean time, king Juba, having received advice of the horse engagement with Scipio, and being earnestly solicited, by letters from that general, to come to his assistance, left Sabura at home, with part of the army, to carry on the war against Sitius: and imagining his name and presence sufficient to free Scipio's troops from the dread they had of Cæsar, began his march, with three legions, eight hundred horse, a body of Numidian cavalry, great numbers of light-armed infantry, and thirty elephants. When he arrived, he lodged himself, with all his forces, in a separate camp, at no great distance from that of Scipio. Cæsar's army had, for some time past, been possessed with no small terror of Juba's forces; and the report

of his approach had increased the inquietude, and produced a general suspense and expectation among the troops: but his arrival, and the appearance of his camp, soon dispelled all these apprehensions; and they as much despised the king of Mauritania, now he was present, as they had feared him, when at a distance. It was easy to be seen, however, that the reinforcement brought by the king greatly raised the courage and confidence of Scipio: for next day, drawing out all his own and the royal forces, with sixty elephants, he ranged them, in order of battle, with great ostentation, advanced a little beyond his intrenchments, and, after a short stay, retreated to his camp.

44. Cæsar, knowing that Scipio had received all the supplies he expected, and judging he would no longer decline coming to an engagement, began to advance along the ridge with his forces, extend his lines, secure them with redoubts, and possess himself of the eminences between him and Scipio. The enemy, confiding in their numbers, seized a neighboring hill, and thereby prevented the progress of our works. Labienus had formed the design of securing this post; and as it lay nearest his quarters, soon got thither. Cæsar had the same project in view: but before he could reach the place, was necessitated to pass a broad and deep valley, of rugged descent, broken with caves, and beyond which was a thick grove of olives. Labienus, perceiving that Cæsar must march this way, and having a perfect knowlege of the country, placed himself in ambush, with the light-armed foot, and part of the cavalry. At the same time, he disposed some horse behind the hills, that when he should fall unexpectedly on Cæsar's foot, they might suddenly advance from behind the mountain. Thus the enemy, attacked in front and rear, surrounded with danger on all sides,

and unable either to retreat or advance, would, he imagined, fall an easy prey to his victorious troops. Cæsar, who had no suspicion of the ambuscade, sent his cavalry before; and arriving at the place, Labienus' men, either forgetting or neglecting the orders of their general, or fearing to be trampled to death in the ditch, by our cavalry, began to issue in small parties from the rock, and ascend the hill. Cæsar's horse pursuing them, slew some, and took others prisoners: then making towards the hill, drove thence Labienus' detachment, and immediately took possession. Labienus, followed by a small party of horse, escaped with great difficulty.

45. The cavalry having thus cleared the mountain, Cæsar resolved to intrench himself there, and distributed the work to the legions. He then ordered two lines of communication to be drawn from the greater camp, across the plain on the side of Uzita, which stood between him and the enemy, and was garrisoned by a detachment of Scipio's army. These lines were so contrived, as to meet at the right and left angles of the town. His design in this work was, that when he approached the town with his troops, and began to attack it, these lines might secure his flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from surrounding him, and compelling him to abandon the siege. It likewise gave his men more frequent opportunities of conversing with the enemy, and facilitated the means of desertion to such as favored his cause; many of whom had already come over, though not without great danger to themselves. He wanted also, by drawing nearer the enemy, to see how they stood inclined to a battle. Add to all these reasons, that the place itself being very low, he might there sink some wells; whereas before he had a long and troublesome way to send for water. While the

legions were employed in these works, part of the army stood ready drawn up before the trenches, and had frequent skirmishes with the Numidian horse and light-armed foot.

46. In the evening, when Cæsar was drawing off his legions from the works, Juba, Scipio, and Labienus, at the head of all their horse and light-armed foot, fell furiously on his cavalry; who, overwhelmed by the sudden and general attack of so great a multitude, were forced to give ground a little. But the event was very different from what the enemy expected: for Cæsar leading back his legions to the assistance of his cavalry, they immediately rallied, turned on the Numidians, and, charging them vigorously whilst they were dispersed and disordered with the pursuit, drove them with great slaughter to the king's camp: and had not night intervened, and the dust raised by the wind obstructed the prospect, Juba and Labienus would both have fallen into Cæsar's hands, and their whole cavalry and light-armed infantry been cut off. Meanwhile Scipio's men, of the fourth and sixth legions, left him in crowds; some deserting to Cæsar's camp, others flying to such places as were most convenient for them. Curio's horse likewise, distrusting Scipio and his troops, followed the same counsel.

47. While these things passed near Uzita, the ninth and tenth legions, sailing in transports from Sicily, when they came before Ruspina, observing Cæsar's ships that lay at anchor about Thapsus, and fearing it might be the enemy's fleet stationed there to intercept them; they imprudently stood out to sea; and, after being long tossed by the winds, provisions and water failing them, at last arrived at Cæsar's camp.

48. Soon after they were landed, Cæsar, calling to mind their licentious behavior in Italy, and the ra-

pines of some of their officers, seized the pretence furnished by C. Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, who, when he set out from Sicily, filled a ship intirely with his own equipage and attendants, without taking on board one single soldier. Wherefore summoning all the military tribunes and centurions to appear before his tribunal next day, he addressed them in these terms: 'I could have wished that those, whose insolence and former licentious character have given me cause of complaint, had been capable of amendment, and of making a good use of my mildness, patience, and moderation: but since they know not how to confine themselves within bounds, I intend to make an example of them, according to the law of arms, in order that others may be taught a better conduct. You, C. Avienus, when you were in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the Roman people to revolt from the republic; you have been guilty of rapines and plunders in the municipal towns; and you have never been of any real service, either to the commonwealth, or to your general: lastly, in lieu of soldiers, you have crowded the transports with your slaves and equipage; so that, through your fault, the republic fails in soldiers, who at this time are not only useful, but necessary. For all these causes, I break you with ignominy, and order you to leave Africa this very day. In like manner I break you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved yourself as a seditious officer, and as a bad citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusinus, have attained the rank of centurions through my indulgence, and not through your own merit; and since you have been invested with that rank, have neither shown bravery in war, nor good conduct in peace. Instead of endeavoring to act according to the rules of modesty and decency, your whole study has been to

stir up the soldiers against your general. I therefore think you unworthy of continuing centurions in my army: I break you, and order you to quit Africa as soon as possible.' Having concluded this speech, he delivered them over to some centurions, with orders to confine them separately on board a ship, allowing each of them a single slave to wait on them.

49. Meantime the Getulian deserters, whom Cæsar had sent home with letters and instructions, as we have related above, arrived among their countrymen; who, partly swayed by their authority, partly by the name and reputation of Cæsar, revolted from Juba; and speedily and unanimously taking up arms, scrupled not to act in opposition to their king. Juba having thus three wars to sustain, was compelled to detach six cohorts from the army destined to act against Cæsar, and send them to defend the frontiers of his kingdom against the Getulians.

50. Cæsar, having finished his lines of communication, and pushed them so near the town as to be just without reach of dart, intrenched himself there. He caused warlike engines in great numbers to be placed in the front of his works, wherewith he played perpetually against the town; and to increase the enemy's apprehensions, drew five legions out of his other camp. This opportunity gave several persons of rank, in both armies, a desire to see and converse with their friends, which Cæsar foresaw would turn to his advantage: for the chief officers of the Getulian horse, with other illustrious men of that nation, whose fathers had served under C. Marius, and from his bounty obtained considerable estates in their country, but after Sylla's victory had been made tributaries to king Hiempsal;—taking the opportunity of the night, when the fires were lighted, with their horses and servants, to the

number of about a thousand, came over to Cæsar's camp near Uzita.

51. As this accident could not but disturb Scipio and his followers, they perceived, much about the same time, M. Aquinius in discourse with C. Saserna. Scipio sent him word, that he did not do well to correspond with the enemy. Aquinius paid no attention to this reprimand, but pursued his discourse. Soon after, one of Juba's guards came to him, and told him, in the hearing of Saserna, 'The king forbids you to continue this conversation.' He no sooner received this order, than immediately he retired, for fear of offending the king. One cannot wonder enough at this step in a Roman citizen, who had already attained to considerable honors in the commonwealth; that though neither banished his country, nor stripped of his possessions, he should pay a more ready obedience to the orders of a foreign prince than those of Scipio; and choose rather to behold the destruction of his party than return into the bosom of his country. Nor was Juba's arrogance confined to M. Aquinius, a new man, and an inconsiderable senator; but reached even Scipio himself, a man of illustrious birth, distinguished honors, and high dignity in the state: for as Scipio, before the king's arrival, always wore a purple coat of mail; Juba is reported to have told him, that he ought not to wear the same habit as he did. Accordingly Scipio changed his purple robe for a white one, submitting to the caprice of a haughty barbarian monarch.

52. Next day they drew out all their forces from both camps; and forming them on an eminence not far from Cæsar's camp, continued thus in order of battle. Cæsar likewise drew out his men, and disposed them in battle array before his lines; not doubting but the enemy, who exceeded him in number of troops, and

had been so considerably reinforced by the arrival of king Juba, would advance to attack him. Wherefore having rode through the ranks, encouraged his men, and given them the signal of battle, he stayed expecting the enemy's charge: for he did not think it advisable to remove far from his lines; because the enemy having a strong garrison in Uzita, which was opposite to his right wing, he could not advance beyond that place without exposing his flank to a sally from the town. Besides, the access to Scipio's army was rough and difficult, and would have disordered his troops before they gave the onset.

53. And here it may not be improper to describe the order of battle of both armies. Scipio's troops were drawn up in this manner: he posted his own legions, and those of Juba, in the front; behind them the Numidians, as a body of reserve; but in so very thin ranks, and so far extended in length, that to see them at a distance, you would have taken the main battle for a simple line of legionaries, which was doubled only on the wings. The elephants were placed at equal distances on the right and left, sustained by the light-armed troops and auxiliary Numidians. All the bridled cavalry were on the right; for the left was covered by the town of Uzita, nor had the cavalry room to extend themselves on that side. Accordingly he stationed the Numidian horse, with an incredible multitude of light-armed foot, about a thousand paces from his right, towards the foot of a mountain, considerably removed from his own and the enemy's troops. His design in this was, that during the progress of the battle, the cavalry, having room to extend themselves, might wheel round on Cæsar's left, and disorder it with their darts. Such was Scipio's disposition. Cæsar's order of battle, to describe it from

left to right, was as follows: the ninth and seventh legions formed the left wing; the thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and twenty-sixth, the main body; and the thirtieth and twenty-ninth the right. His second line on the right, consisted partly of the cohorts of those legions we have already mentioned, partly of the new levies. His third line was posted to the left, extending as far as the middle legion of the main body, and so disposed, that the left wing formed a triple order of battle. The reason of this disposition was, because his right wing being defended by the works, it behoved him to make his left the stronger, that they might be a match for the numerous cavalry of the enemy; for which reason he had placed all his horse there, intermixed with light-armed foot; and as he could not rely much on them, had detached the fifth legion to sustain them. The archers were dispersed up and down the field, but principally in the two wings.

54. The two armies thus facing one another in order of battle, with a space of no more than three hundred paces between, continued so posted from morning till night without fighting, of which perhaps there never was an instance before. But when Cæsar began to retreat within his lines, suddenly all the Numidian and Getulian horse without bridles, who were posted behind the enemy's army, made a motion to the right, and began to approach Cæsar's camp on the mountain; while the regular cavalry under Labienus, continued in their post, to keep our legions in check. On this, part of Cæsar's cavalry, with the light-armed foot, advancing hastily, and without orders, against the Getulians, and venturing to pass the morass, found themselves unable to deal with the superior multitude of the enemy; and being abandoned by the light-armed troops, were forced

to retreat in great disorder, after the loss of one trooper, twenty-six light-armed foot, and many of their horses wounded. Scipio, overjoyed at this success, returned towards night to his camp. But as fortune's favors are seldom permanent to those engaged in the trade of war, the day after, a party of horse sent by Cæsar to Leptis in quest of provisions, falling in unexpectedly with some Numidian and Getulian stragglers, killed or made prisoners about a hundred of them. Cæsar, meanwhile, omitted not every day to draw out his men, and labor at the works; carrying a ditch and rampart quite across the plain, to prevent the incursions of the enemy. Nor was Scipio less active in forwarding his works, and securing his communication with the mountain. Thus both generals were busied about their intrenchments; yet seldom a day passed, without some skirmish between the cavalry.

55. In the mean time, Varus, on notice that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed from Sicily, speedily equipped the fleet he had brought to winter at Utica; and manning it with Getulian rowers and mariners, went out a cruising, and came before Adrumetum with fifty-five ships. Cæsar, who knew nothing of his arrival, sent L. Cispius, with a squadron of twenty-seven sail, to cruise about Thapsus, for the security of his convoys; and likewise despatched Q. Aquila to Adrumetum, with thirteen galleys, on the same errand. Cispius soon reached the station appointed to him; but Aquila, being attacked by a storm, could not double the cape, which obliged him to put into a creek at some distance, that afforded convenient shelter. The rest of the fleet anchored before Leptis, where the mariners went on shore, some to refresh themselves, others to buy provisions in the towns, and left their ships quite defenceless. Varus, having notice of this from the de-

serters, and resolving to take advantage of the enemy's negligence, left Adrumetum about nine at night; and arriving early next morning with his whole fleet before Leptis, burned all the transports that were out at sea, and took without opposition two five-benched galleys, in which were none to defend them.

56. Cæsar had an account brought him of this unlucky accident as he was inspecting the works of his camp. Whereon, he immediately took horse, went full speed to Leptis, which was but two leagues distant, and going on board a brigantine, ordered all the ships in the port to follow him, and, in this manner, put to sea. He soon came up with Aquila, whom he found dismayed and terrified at the number of ships he had to oppose; and continuing his course, began to pursue the enemy's fleet. Meantime Varus, astonished at Cæsar's boldness and despatch, tacked about with his whole fleet, and made the best of his way for Adrumetum: but Cæsar, after four miles sail, came up with him, recovered one of his galleys, with the crew and a hundred and thirty men, left to guard her; and took a three-benched galley belonging to the enemy, with all the soldiers and mariners on board. The rest of the fleet doubled the cape, and made the port of Adrumetum. Cæsar could not double the cape with the same wind; but keeping the sea all night, appeared early next morning before Adrumetum. He set fire to all the transports without the haven; took what galleys he found there, or forced them into the harbor; and having waited some time to offer the enemy battle, returned again to his camp. On board the ship he had taken was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius Afranius, the same who had prosecuted the war against him in Spain, and who, instead of acknowleging the conqueror's generosity, in granting him his liberty, had

ined Pompey in Greece; and after the battle of Pharlia, had gone into Africa to Varus, there to continue the service of the same cause. Cæsar, to punish his rfidy and breach of oath, gave immediate orders for s execution: but he pardoned P. Vestrius, because s brother had paid his ransom at Rome; and he made appear, that being taken in Nasidius' fleet, and conmned to die, Varus had saved his life, since which opportunity had offered of making his escape.

57. It is usual for the people of Africa to deposit eir corn privately in vaults, under ground, to secure in time of war, and guard it from the sudden incurons of an enemy. Cæsar, having intelligence of this om a spy, drew out two legions, with a party of calry, at midnight, and sent them about ten miles off; hence they returned, loaded with corn, to the camp. abienus, being informed of it, marched about seven iles, through the mountains Cæsar had passed the y before, and there encamped with two legions; here expecting that Cæsar would often come the me way in quest of corn, he daily lay in ambush, ith a great body of horse and light-armed foot. æsar, having notice of this from the deserters, suffred not a day to pass, till the enemy, by repeating e practice often, had abated a little of their circumection. Then issuing unexpectedly one morning, by e Decuman port, with eight veteran legions, and a rty of horse, he ordered the cavalry to march before; ho coming suddenly on the enemy's light-armed foot, at lay in ambush among the valleys, slew about five ndred, and put the rest to flight. Meantime Labiea advanced, with all his cavalry, to support the runrays, and was on the point of overpowering our small rty with his numbers, when suddenly Cæsar apared with the legions, in order of battle. This sight

checked the ardor of Labienus, who thought proper to sound a retreat. The day after, Juba ordered all the Numidians who had deserted their post and fled to their camp, to be crucified.

58. Meanwhile Cæsar, being straitened for want of corn, recalled all his forces to the camp; and having left garrisons at Leptis, Ruspina, and Acilla, ordered Cispius and Aquila to cruise with their fleets, the one before Adrumetum, the other before Thapsus, and set fire to his camp at Uzita, he set out, in order of battle, at three in the morning, disposed his baggage in the left, and came to Agar, a town that had been often vigorously attacked by the Getulians, and as valiantly defended by the inhabitants. There encamping in the plain before the town, he went, with part of his army, round the country in quest of provisions; and having found store of barley, oil, wine, and figs, with a small quantity of wheat, after allowing the troops some time to refresh themselves, he returned to his camp. Scipio meanwhile hearing of Cæsar's departure, followed him along the hills, with all his forces, and posted himself about six miles off, in three different camps.

59. The town of Zeta lying on Scipio's side of the country, was not above ten miles from his camp; but might be about eighteen from that of Cæsar. Scipio had sent two legions thither to forage; which Cæsar having intelligence of from a deserter, removed his camp from the plain to a hill, for the greater security; and leaving some troops to guard it, marched at three in the morning, with the rest of his forces, passed the enemy's camp, and possessed himself of the town. Scipio's legions were gone farther into the country to forage; against whom setting out immediately, he found the whole army come up to their assistance, which obliged him to give over the pursuit. He took, on this

occasion, C. Mutius Reginus, a Roman knight, Scipio's intimate friend, and governor of the town; also P. Atrius, a Roman knight likewise, of the province of Utica, with twenty-two camels, belonging to king Juba. Then leaving a garrison in the place, under the command of Oppius, his lieutenant, he set out on his return to his own camp.

60. As he drew near Scipio's camp, by which he was necessitated to pass, Labienus and Afranius, who lay in ambuscade among the nearest hills, with all their cavalry and light-armed infantry, started up and attacked his rear. Cæsar, detaching his cavalry to receive their charge, ordered the legions to throw all their baggage into a heap, and face about on the enemy. No sooner was this order executed, than on the first charge of the legions, the enemy's horse and light-armed foot began to give way, and were, with incredible ease, driven from the higher ground. But when Cæsar, imagining them sufficiently deterred from any farther attempts, began to pursue his march, they again issued from the hills; and the Numidians, with the light-armed infantry, who are wonderfully nimble, and accustom themselves to fight intermixed with the horse, with whom they keep an equal pace either in advancing or retiring, fell a second time on our foot. As they repeated this often, pressing on our rear when we marched, and retiring when we endeavored to engage, always keeping at a certain distance, and with singular care avoiding a close fight, as holding it enough to wound us with their darts; Cæsar plainly saw that their whole aim was, to oblige him to encamp in that place, where no water was to be had; that his soldiers, who had tasted nothing from three in the morning till four in the afternoon, might perish with hunger, and the cattle with thirst. Sunset now approached; when

Cæsar, finding he had not gained a hundred paces complete in four hours, and that by keeping his cavalry in the rear, he lost many horse, ordered the legions to fall behind, and close the march. Proceeding thus, with a slow and gentle pace, he found the legions fitter to sustain the enemy's charge. Meantime the Numidian horse, wheeling round the hills, to the right and left, threatened to inclose Cæsar's forces with their numbers, while part continued to harass his rear: and if but three or four veteran soldiers faced about, and darted their javelins at the enemy, no less than two thousand of them would take to flight; but suddenly rallying, returned to the fight, and charged the legionaries with their darts. Thus Cæsar, one while marching forward, one while halting, and going on but slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven that evening, having only ten men wounded. Labienus too retreated to his camp, after having thoroughly fatigued his troops with the pursuit; in which, besides a great number wounded, his loss amounted to about three hundred men. And Scipio withdrew his legions and elephants, whom, for the greater terror, he had ranged before his camp within view of Cæsar's army.

61. Cæsar, having such an enemy to deal with, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, not like a general of a veteran army, which had been victorious in so many battles; but like a fencing-master, training up his gladiators; with what foot they must advance or retire; when they were to oppose and make good their ground, when to counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner to launch their javelins: for the enemy's light-armed troops gave wonderful trouble and disquiet to our army; because they not only deterred the cavalry from the encounter, by killing their horses with their javelins, but likewise wearied out

the legionary soldiers by their swiftness: for as often as these heavy-armed troops advanced to attack them, they evaded the danger by a quick retreat. This gave Cæsar no small trouble; because as often as he engaged with his cavalry, without being sustained by the infantry, he found himself by no means a match for the enemy's horse, supported by their light-armed foot: and as he had no experience of the strength of their legions, he foresaw still greater difficulties when these should be united, as the shock must then be wonderful. The number too and size of the elephants greatly increased the terror of the soldiers; for which however he found a remedy, in causing some of those animals to be brought over from Italy, that his men might be accustomed to the sight of them, know their strength and courage, and in what part of the body they were most likely to be wounded: for as the elephants were covered with trappings and ornaments, it was necessary to inform them what parts of the body remained naked, that they might direct their darts thither. It was likewise needful to familiarise his horses to the cry, smell, and figure of these animals; in all which he succeeded to a wonder: for the soldiers quickly came to touch them with their hands, and to be sensible of their tardiness; and the cavalry attacked them with blunted darts, and, by degrees, brought their horses to endure their presence. For these reasons already mentioned, Cæsar was not without his anxieties, and proceeded with more slowness and circumspection than usual, abating considerably of his wonted expedition and celerity. Nor ought we to wonder; for in Gaul his troops had been accustomed to fight in a champaign country, against an open undesigning enemy, who despised artifice, and valued themselves only on their bravery: but now he was to

habituate his soldiers to the arts and contrivances of a crafty enemy, and teach them what to pursue, and what to avoid. The sooner therefore to instruct them in these matters, he took care not to confine his legions to one place; but under pretence of foraging, engaged them in frequent marches and counter-marches; knowing well that the enemy would take care not to lose sight of him. Three days after, he drew up his forces with great art, and marching past Scipio's camp, waited for him in an open plain; but, seeing that he still declined a battle, he retreated to his camp in the evening.

62. Meantime ambassadors arrived from the town of Vacca, bordering on Zeta, of which we have observed Cæsar had possessed himself. They requested and intreated that he would send them a garrison, promising to furnish many of the necessaries of war. At the same time, by an uncommon piece of good fortune for Cæsar, a deserter informed him, that Juba had, by a quick march, reached the town, massacred the inhabitants, and abandoned the place itself to the plunder of his soldiers. Thus was Cæsar's garrison prevented from setting out, and by that means saved from destruction.

63. Cæsar, having reviewed his army the eighteenth of February, advanced next day, with all his forces, five miles beyond his camp, and remained a considerable time in order of battle, two miles from Scipio's. When he had waited sufficiently long to invite the enemy to an engagement, finding them still decline it, he led back his troops. Next day he decamped, and directed his march towards Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians, and a magazine of corn. Labienus, being informed of this motion, fell on his rear with the cavalry and light-armed troops; and, having

made himself master of part of the baggage, was encouraged to attack the legions themselves, believing they would fall an easy prey, under the load and incumbrance of a march. But Cæsar, from a foresight of what might happen, had ordered three hundred men out of each legion, to hold themselves in readiness for action. These being sent against Labienus, he was so terrified at their approach, that he shamefully took to flight, great numbers of his men being killed or wounded. The legionaries returned to their standards, and pursued their march. Labienus still followed us at a distance along the summit of the mountains, and kept hovering on our right.

64. Cæsar, arriving before Sarsura, took it in presence of the enemy, who durst not advance to its relief; and put to the sword the garrison which had been left there by Scipio, under the command of P. Cornelius, who, after a vigorous defence, was surrounded and slain. Having given all the corn in the place to the army, he marched next day to Tisdra, where Considius was, with a strong garrison, and his cohort of gladiators. Cæsar, having taken a view of the town, and being deterred from besieging it for want of corn, set out immediately, and after a march of four miles, encamped near a river. Here he stayed about four days, and then returned to his former camp at Agar. Scipio did the same, and retreated to his old quarters.

65. Meantime the Thabenenses, a nation situated in the extreme confines of Juba's kingdom, along the seacoast, and who had been accustomed to live in subjection to that monarch, having massacred the garrison left there by the king, sent deputies to Cæsar to inform him of what they had done, and to beg he would take under his protection a city which deserved

so well of the Roman people. Cæsar, approving their conduct, sent M. Crispus the tribune, with a cohort, a party of archers, and a great number of warlike engines, to charge himself with the defence of Thabena.

66. At the same time the legionary soldiers, who either on account of sickness, or for other reasons, had not been able to come over into Africa with the rest, to the number of four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers, now arrived all together. With these, and his former troops, he advanced into a plain eight miles distant from his own camp, and four from that of Scipio, where he waited the enemy in order of battle.

67. The town of Tegea was below Scipio's camp, where he had a garrison of four hundred horse. These he drew up on the right and left of the town; and bringing forth his legions, formed them in order of battle on a hill somewhat lower than his camp, and which was about a thousand paces distant from it. After he had continued a considerable time in this posture, without offering to make any attempt, Cæsar sent some squadrons of horse, supported by his light-armed infantry, archers, and slingers, to charge the enemy's cavalry, who were posted before the town. Our men advancing on the spur, Pacidius began to extend his front, that he might at once surround and give us a warm reception. On this, Cæsar detached three hundred legionaries to our assistance, while at the same time Labienus was continually sending fresh reinforcements, to replace those that were wounded or fatigued. Our cavalry, who were only four hundred in number, not being able to sustain the charge of four thousand, and being besides greatly incommoded by the light-armed Numidians, began at last to give ground: which Cæsar observing, detached the other

wing to their assistance, who joining those that were like to be overpowered, they fell in a body on the enemy, put them to flight, slew or wounded great numbers, pursued them three miles quite to the mountains, and then returned to their own men. Cæsar continued in order of battle till four in the afternoon, and then retreated to his camp without the loss of a man. In this action Pacidius received a dangerous wound in the head, and had many of his best officers either killed or wounded.

68. When he found that the enemy were by no means to be prevailed with to fight him on equal terms, and that he could not encamp nearer them for want of water, in consideration of which alone, and not from any confidence in their numbers, the Africans had dared to despise him; he decamped the fourteenth of April at midnight, marched sixteen miles beyond Agar to Thapsus, where Virgilius commanded with a strong garrison, and there fixed his camp. The very first day he began the circumvallation, and raised redoubts in proper places, as well for his own security, as to prevent any succors from entering the town. This step reduced Scipio to the necessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of abandoning Virgilius and the Thapsitani, who had all along remained firm to his party: and therefore following Cæsar without delay, he posted himself in two camps, eight miles from Thapsus.

69. Between a morass and the sea was a narrow pass of about fifteen hundred paces, by which Scipio hoped to throw succors into the place: but Cæsar, from a foresight of what might happen, had the day before raised a very strong fort at the entrance of it, where he left a triple garrison; and, encamping with the rest of his troops in form of a half moon, carried his works

round the town. Scipio, disappointed of his design, passed the day and night following a little above the morass; but early next morning advanced within a small distance of our fort, where he began to intrench himself about fifteen hundred paces from the sea. Cæsar, being informed of this, drew off his men from the works; and, leaving Asprenas, the proconsul, with two legions, to guard the camp and baggage, marched all the rest of his forces with the utmost expedition to the place where the enemy were posted. He left part of the fleet before Thapsus, and ordered the rest to make as near the shore as possible towards the enemy's rear, observing the signal he should give them; on which they were to raise a sudden shout, that the enemy, alarmed and disturbed by the noise behind them, might be forced to face about.

70. When Cæsar came to the place, he found Scipio's army in order of battle before the intrenchments, the elephants posted in the two wings, and part of the soldiers employed in fortifying the camp. On sight of this disposition, he drew up his army in three lines, placed the second and tenth legions in the right wing, the eighth and ninth in the left, five legions in the centre, covered his flanks with five cohorts posted over against the elephants, disposed the archers and slingers in the two wings, and intermingled the light-armed troops with his cavalry. He himself on foot went from rank to rank, to rouse the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their former bravery, and animating them by his soothing address. He exhorted the new levies to emulate the bravery of the veterans, and endeavor by a victory to attain the same degree of glory and renown.

71. As he ran from rank to rank, he observed the enemy very uneasy, hurrying from place to place, one

while retiring behind the rampart, another coming out again in great tumult and confusion. As the same was observed by many others in the army, his lieutenants and volunteers begged him to give the sign of battle, as the immortal gods promised him a certain victory. While he hesitated with himself, and strove to repress their eagerness and desires, as being unwilling to yield to the importunity of men, whose duty it was to wait his orders; on a sudden a trumpet in the right wing, without his leave, and compelled by the soldiers, sounded a charge. On this, all the cohorts ran to battle, in spite of the endeavors of the centurions, who strove to restrain them by force, but to no purpose. Cæsar, perceiving that the ardor of his soldiers would admit of no restraint, giving good fortune for the word, spurred on his horse, and charged the enemy's front. On the right wing, the archers and slingers poured their javelins without intermission on the elephants, and by the noise of their slings and stones, so terrified these unruly animals, that turning on their own men, they trod them down in heaps, and rushed through the gates of the camp, that were but half finished. At the same time, the Mauritanian horse, who were in the same wing with the elephants, seeing themselves deprived of their assistance, betook themselves to flight. Whereon the legions wheeling round the elephants, soon mastered the enemy's intrenchments. Some few that made resistance were slain: the rest fled with all expedition to the camp they had quitted the day before.

72. And here we must not omit taking notice of the bravery of a veteran soldier of the fifth legion: for when an elephant which had been wounded, in the left wing, and roused to fury by the pain, ran against an unarmed sutler, threw him under his feet, and leaning on him with his whole weight, brandishing his trunk, and

raising hideous cries, crushed him to death, the soldier could not refrain from attacking the animal. The elephant, seeing him advance with his javelin in his hand, quitted the dead body of the sutler, and seizing him with his trunk, wheeled him round in the air. But the soldier, amidst all the danger, losing nothing of his courage, ceased not with his sword to strike at the elephant's trunk; who, at last, overcome with the pain, quitted his prey, and fled to the rest with hideous cries.

73. Meanwhile the garrison of Thapsus, either designing to assist their friends, or abandon the town, sallied by the gate next the sea, and, wading navel deep in the water, endeavored to reach the land; but the servants and followers of the camp, attacking them with darts and stones, obliged them to return again to the town. Scipio's camp meanwhile being forced, and his men flying on all sides, the legions instantly began the pursuit, that they might have no time to rally. When they arrived at their former camp, by means of which they hoped to defend themselves, they began to think of choosing a commander, to whose authority and orders they might submit; but finding none on whom they could rely, they threw down their arms, and fled to Juba's quarter. This being likewise possessed by our men, they retired to a hill; where, despairing of safety, they endeavored to soften their enemies, saluting them by the name of brethren. But this stood them in little stead: for the veterans, transported with rage and anger, were not only deaf to the cries of their enemies, but even killed or wounded several citizens of distinction in their own army, whom they upbraided as authors of the war. Of this number was Tullius Rufus, the questor, whom a soldier knowingly ran through with a javelin; and Pompeius Ru-

fus, who was wounded with a sword in the arm, and would doubtless have been slain, had he not speedily fled to Cæsar for protection. This made several Roman knights and senators retire from the battle, lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory assumed an unbounded license, should be induced by the hopes of impunity to wreak their fury on them likewise. In short, all Scipio's soldiers, though they implored the protection of Cæsar, were yet, in the very sight of that general, and amidst his intreaties to his men to spare them, universally, and without exception, put to the sword.

74. Cæsar, having made himself master of the enemy's three camps, killed ten thousand of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to his own quarters, with the loss of no more than fifty men, and a few wounded. In his way, he appeared before Thapsus, and ranged all the elephants he had taken in the battle, amounting to sixty-four, with their ornaments, trappings, and castles, in full view of the place. He was in hopes, by this evidence of his success, to induce Virgilius to a surrender: he even called and invited him to submit, reminding him of his clemency and mildness; but no answer being given, he retired from before the town. Next day, after returning thanks to the gods, he assembled his army before Thapsus, praised his soldiers in presence of the inhabitants, rewarded the victorious, and from his tribunal extended his bounty to every one, according to their merit and services. Setting out thence immediately, he left the proconsul C. Rebellius, with three legions, to continue the siege, and sent Cn. Domitius, with two, to invest Tisdra, where Considius commanded. Then ordering M. Messala to go before with the cavalry, he began his march to Utica.

75. Scipio's cavalry, who had escaped out of the battle, taking the road of Utica, arrived at Parada; but being refused admittance by the inhabitants, who heard of Cæsar's victory, they forced the gates, lighted a great fire in the middle of the forum, and threw all the inhabitants into it, without distinction of age or sex, with their effects; avenging in this manner, by an unheard-of cruelty, the affront they had received. Thence they marched directly to Utica. M. Cato, some time before, distrusting the inhabitants of that city, because of the privileges granted them by the Julian law, had disarmed and expelled the populace, obliging them to dwell without the warlike gate, in a small camp environed with a slight intrenchment, round which he had planted guards, while at the same time he held the senators under confinement. The cavalry attacked their camp, as knowing them to be well-wishers to Cæsar, and to avenge, by their destruction, the shame of their own defeat. But the people, animated by Cæsar's victory, repulsed them with stones and clubs: they therefore threw themselves into the town, killed many of the inhabitants, and pillaged their houses. Cato, unable to prevail with them to abstain from rapine and slaughter, and undertake the defence of the town, as he was not ignorant what they aimed at, gave each a hundred sesterces to make them quiet. Sylla Faustus did the same out of his own money; and, marching with them from Utica, advanced into the kingdom of Juba.

76. A great many others, that had escaped out of the battle, fled to Utica. These Cato assembled, with three hundred more who had furnished Scipio with money for carrying on the war, and exhorted them to set their slaves free, and, in conjunction with them, defend the town. But finding that though part assembled, the

rest were terrified and determined to fly, he gave over the attempt, and furnished them with ships to facilitate their escape. He himself having settled all his affairs with the utmost care, and commended his children to L. Cæsar, his questor, without the least indication which might give cause of suspicion, or any change in his countenance and behavior, privately carried a sword into his chamber when he went to sleep, and stabbed himself with it. But the wound not proving mortal, and the noise of his fall creating a suspicion, a physician, with some friends, broke into his chamber, and endeavored to bind up the wound: which he no sooner was sensible of, than tearing it open again with his own hands, he expired, with undaunted resolution and presence of mind. The Uticans, though they hated his party, yet, in consideration of his singular integrity, his behavior so different from that of the other chiefs, and the wonderful fortifications he had directed to defend their town, interred him honorably. L. Cæsar, that he might procure some advantages by his death, assembled the people; and after haranguing them, exhorted them to open their gates, and throw themselves on Cæsar's clemency, from which they had the greatest reason to hope the best. This advice being followed, he came forth to meet Cæsar. Messala having reached Utica, according to his orders, placed guards at the gates.

77. Meanwhile Cæsar, leaving Thapsus, came to Usceta, where Scipio had laid up great store of corn, arms, darts, and other warlike provisions, under a small guard. He soon made himself master of the place, and marched directly to Adrumetum, which he entered without opposition. He took an account of the arms, provisions, and money in the town; pardoned Q. Ligarius, and C. Considius; and leaving Livineius Re-

gulus there, with one legion, set out the same day for Utica. L. Cæsar meeting him by the way, threw himself at his feet, and only begged for his life. Cæsar, according to his wonted clemency, easily pardoned him; as he did likewise Cæcina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. Colla, father and son, M. Eppius, M. Aquinius, Cato's son, and the children of Damasippus. He arrived at Utica in the evening, by torch-light, and continued all that night without the town.

78. Next morning early he entered the place, summoned an assembly of the people, and thanked them for the affection they had shown to his cause. At the same time, he censured severely, and enlarged on the crime of the Roman citizens and merchants, and the rest of the three hundred, who had furnished Scipio and Varus with money; but concluded with telling them that they might show themselves without fear, as he was determined to grant them their lives, and content himself with exposing their effects to sale; yet so, that he would give them notice when their goods were to be sold, and the liberty of redeeming them on payment of a certain fine. The merchants, half dead with fear, and conscious that they merited death, hearing on what terms life was offered them, greedily accepted the condition, and intreated Cæsar that he would impose a certain sum in gross on all the three hundred. Accordingly he amerced them in two hundred thousand sesterces, to be paid to the republic, at six equal payments, within the space of three years. They all accepted the condition; and, considering that day as a second nativity, joyfully returned thanks to Cæsar.

79. Meanwhile king Juba, who had escaped from the battle with Petreius, hiding himself all day in the villages, and travelling only by night, arrived at last in Numidia. When he came to Zama, his ordinary

e of residence, where were his wives and children, all his treasures, and whatever he held most valu-, and which he had strongly fortified at the begin- of the war, the inhabitants, having heard of Cæ- victory, refused him entrance; because, on de- ng war against the Romans, he had raised a mighty of wood in the middle of the forum, designing, if ccessful, to massacre all the citizens, fling their es and effects on the pile, then setting fire to the , and throwing himself on it, destroy all, without ption, wives, children, citizens, and treasures, in general conflagration. After continuing a consi- ble time before the gates, finding that neither ats nor intreaties would avail, he at last desired to deliver him his wives and children, that he t carry them along with him. But receiving no er, and seeing them determined to grant him no-, he quitted the place, and retired to one of his try seats with Petreius and a few horse.

. Meantime the Zamians sent ambassadors to Cæ- t Utica, to inform him what they had done, and quest his assistance against Juba, who was draw- is forces together to attack them. They assured of their submission, and resolution to defend the for him. Cæsar commended the ambassadors, sent them back to acquaint their fellow-citizens he was coming himself to their relief. Accord-, setting out the next day from Utica, with his ry, he directed his march towards Numidia. y of the king's generals met him on the way, and for pardon: to all whom, having given a favor- hearing, they attended him to Zama. The report is clemency and mildness spreading into all parts, vhole Numidian cavalry flocked to him at Zama, were there delivered of their fears.

81. During these transactions Considius, who commanded at Tisdra, with his own retinue, a garrison of Getulians, and a company of gladiators, hearing of the defeat of his party, and terrified at the arrival of Domitius and his legions, abandoned the town; and privately withdrawing, with a few of the barbarians, and all his money, took his way towards Numidia. The Getulians, to render themselves masters of his treasure, murdered him by the way, and fled every man where he could. Meantime C. Vergilius, seeing himself shut up by sea and land, without power of making a defence; his followers all slain or put to flight; M. Cato dead by his own hands at Utica; Juba despised and deserted by his own subjects; Sabura and his forces defeated by Sitius; Cæsar received without opposition at Utica; and that of so vast an army, nothing remained capable of screening him or his children; thought it his most prudent course to surrender himself and the city to the proconsul Caninius, by whom he was besieged.

82. At the same time king Juba, seeing himself excluded from all the cities of his kingdom, and that there remained no hopes of safety, having supped with Petreius, proposed an engagement, sword in hand, that they might die honorably. Juba, as being the stronger, easily got the better of his adversary, and laid him dead at his feet: but endeavoring afterwards to run himself through the body, and wanting strength to accomplish it, he was obliged to have recourse to one of his slaves, and, by his intreaties, prevailed on him to perform that mournful office.

83. In the mean time P. Sitius, having defeated the army of Sabura, Juba's lieutenant, and slain the general, and marching with a few troops through Mauritania, to join Cæsar, chanced to fall in with Faustus and

Afranius, who were at the head of the party that had plundered Utica, amounting in all to about fifteen hundred men, and designing to make the best of their way to Spain. Having expeditiously placed himself in ambuscade during the night, and attacking them by daybreak, he either killed or made them all prisoners, except a few that escaped from the van. Afranius and Faustus were taken among the rest, with their wives and children: but some few days after, a mutiny arising among the soldiers, Faustus and Afranius were slain. Cæsar pardoned Pompeia, the wife of Faustus, with her children, and permitted her the free enjoyment of all her effects.

84. Meanwhile Scipio, with Damasippus and Torquatus, and Plætorius Rustianus, having embarked on board some galleys, with a design to make for the coast of Spain, and being long and severely tossed by contrary winds, were at last obliged to put into the port of Hippo, where the fleet commanded by P. Sitius chanced at that time to be. Scipio's vessels, which were but small, and few in number, were easily surrounded and sunk, by the larger and more numerous ships of Sitius; on which occasion Scipio, and all those whom we have mentioned above as having embarked with him, perished.

85. Meanwhile Cæsar having exposed the king's effects to public sale at Zama, and confiscated the estates of those who, though Roman citizens, had borne arms against the republic, after conferring rewards on such of the Zamians as had been concerned in the design of excluding the king, he abolished all the royal tribunes, converted the kingdom into a province, and, appointing Crispus Sallustius to take charge of it, with the title of proconsul, returned again to Utica. There he sold the estates of the officers that had served under

Juba and Petreius; fined the people of Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, and the company of Roman merchants there thirty thousand; fined likewise the inhabitants of Adrumetum in thirty thousand, and their company in fifty thousand; but preserved the cities and their territories from insult and plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had pillaged some time before, and who, on complaint made to the senate by their deputies, had obtained arbitrators and restitution, were enjoined to pay yearly three hundred thousand pounds of oil; because, from the beginning of the war, in consequence of a dissension among their chiefs, they had made an alliance with the king of Numidia, and supplied him with arms, soldiers, and money. The people of Tisdra, because of their extreme poverty, were only condemned to pay annually a certain quantity of corn.

86. These things settled, he embarked at Utica on the thirtieth of June, and three days after arrived at Carales in Sardinia. Here he condemned the Sulcitani in a fine of one hundred thousand sesterces, for receiving and aiding Nasidius' fleet; and instead of a tenth, which was their former assessment, ordered them now to pay an eighth to the public treasury. He likewise confiscated the estates of some who had been more active than the rest, and weighing from Carales on the twenty-ninth of June, coasted along the shore, and after a voyage of twenty-eight days, during which he was several times obliged to put into port, by contrary winds, arrived safe at Rome.

SPANISH WAR.

HIRTIUS' COMMENTARIES.

SPANISH WAR.

1. PHARNACES being vanquished, and Africa reduced, those who escaped fled into Spain, to young Cn. Pompey; who having got possession of the farther province, whilst Cæsar was employed in distributing rewards in Italy, endeavored to strengthen himself by engaging the several states to join him: and partly by intreaty, partly by force, soon drew together a considerable army, with which he began to lay waste the country. In this situation of things, some states voluntarily sent him supplies, others shut the gates of their towns against him: of which, if any chanced to fall into his hands by assault, how well soever a citizen might have deserved of his father, yet if he was known to be rich, some ground of complaint was never wanting, under pretence of which to destroy him, that his estate might fall a prey to the soldiers. Thus the enemy, encouraged by the spoils of the vanquished, increased daily, in number and strength: insomuch, that the states in Cæsar's interest were continually sending messengers into Italy, to press his immediate march to their relief.

2. Cæsar, now a third time dictator, and nominated also a fourth time to the same dignity, hastening, with all diligence, into Spain, to put an end to the war, was met on the way by the ambassadors of Cordova, who had deserted from the camp of Cn. Pompey. They informed him that it would be an easy matter to make himself master of the town by night, because the enemy as yet knew nothing of his arrival in the province, the scouts sent out by Cn. Pompey to inform him of Cæsar's approach having been all made prisoners. They alleged besides many more other very probable reasons; all which so far wrought on him, that he sent immediate advice of his arrival to Q. Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus his lieutenants, to whom he had left the command of the troops in the province, ordering them to send him all the cavalry they had been able to raise. He came up with them much sooner than they expected, and was joined by the cavalry, according to his desire.

3. Sextus Pompey, the brother of Cneus, commanded at this time at Cordova, which was accounted the capital of the province. Young Cneus Pompey himself was employed in the siege of Ulia, which had now lasted some months. The besieged having notice of Cæsar's arrival, sent deputies to him, who passed unobserved through Pompey's camp, and requested, with great earnestness, that he would come speedily to their relief. Cæsar, who was no stranger to the merit of that people, and their constant attachment to the Romans, detached about nine at night eleven cohorts, with a like number of horse, under the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a good officer, well known in the province, and who was besides perfectly acquainted with the country. When he arrived at Pompey's quarters, a dreadful tempest arising, attended with a

violent wind; so great a darkness ensued, that it was difficult to distinguish even the person next you. This accident proved of great advantage to Paciecus; for being arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the cavalry to advance two by two, and march directly through the enemy's quarters to the town. Some of their guards calling to know who passed, one of our troopers bid them be silent, for they were just then endeavoring by stealth to approach the wall, in order to get possession of the town; and partly by this answer, partly by favor of the tempest, which hindered the sentinels from examining things diligently, they were suffered to pass without disturbance. When they reached the gates, on a signal given they were admitted; and both horse and foot raising a mighty shout, after leaving some troops to guard the town, sallied in a body on the enemy's camp; who having no apprehension of such an attack, were almost all like to have been made prisoners.

4. Ulia being relieved, Cæsar, to draw Pompey from the siege, marched towards Cordova; sending the cavalry before, with a select body of heavy-armed foot; who as soon as they came within sight of the place, got up behind the troopers, without being perceived by those of Cordova. On their approach to the walls, the enemy sallied in great numbers, to attack our cavalry; when the infantry leaping down, fell on them with such fury, that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, very few returned to the town. This so alarmed Sextus Pompey, that he immediately sent letters to his brother, requesting him to come speedily to his relief, lest Cæsar should make himself master of Cordova before his arrival. Thus Cn. Pompey, moved by his brother's letters, quitted the siege of Ulia, which

was on the point of surrendering, and began his march towards Cordova.

5. Cæsar arriving at the river Bætis, which he found too deep to be forded, sunk several baskets of stones in it; and raising a bridge on them, supported by double beams, carried over his forces in three bodies. Pompey arriving soon after with his troops, encamped directly over against him. Cæsar, to cut off his provisions and communication with the town, ran a line from his camp to the bridge. Pompey did the same; insomuch, that a struggle arose between the two generals, which should first get possession of the bridge; and this daily brought on small skirmishes, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other party had the better. At last the dispute becoming more general, they came to a close fight, though on very disadvantageous ground; for both sides striving earnestly to obtain the bridge, they found themselves as they approached straitened for want of room, and extending themselves towards the river side, many fell headlong from the banks. Thus the loss was pretty equal; for on either side lay heaps of slain: and Cæsar, for many days, used all possible endeavors to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible.

6. But finding that they carefully avoided a battle, with a view to which chiefly he had quitted the route of Ulia, he caused great fires to be lighted in the night, repassed the river with all his forces, and marched towards Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. Pompey having notice of this from the deserters, retreated the same day to Cordova, by a very narrow and difficult road, with a great number of carriages and machines of war. Cæsar began his attack

on Ategua, and carried lines quite round the town; of which Pompey having intelligence, set out on his march the same day. But Cæsar had taken care beforehand to secure all the advantageous posts, and possess himself of the forts; partly to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of infantry for the defence of his camp. The morning of Pompey's arrival was so foggy, that he found means, with some cohorts and troops of cavalry, to hem in a party of Cæsar's horse, and fell on them in such manner, that very few escaped slaughter.

7. The following night Pompey set fire to his camp, passed the river Salsus, and marching through the valleys, encamped on a rising ground, between the two towns of Ategua and Ucubis. Cæsar meanwhile continued his approaches, cast up a mount, and brought forward his machines. The country all around is mountainous, and seems formed for war. The river Salsus runs through the plains, and divides them from the mountains, which all lie on the side of Ategua, at about two miles distance from the river. Pompey's camp was on these mountains, within view of both the towns, but nearer to Ategua; to which he could however send no relief, though his army consisted of thirteen legions. Of these, he chiefly relied on four: two Spanish ones, which had deserted from Trebonius; one formed out of the Roman colonies in those parts; and a fourth which he had brought with him from Africa. The rest were for the most part made up of fugitives and deserters. As to light-armed foot and cavalry, we far exceeded him both in the number and goodness of the troops.

8. But what proved principally serviceable to Pompey's design of drawing out the war into length, was the nature of the country, full of mountains and ex-

tremely well adapted to encampments; for almost the whole province of farther Spain, though of an extremely fertile soil, and abounding in springs, is nevertheless very difficult of access. Here too, on account of the frequent incursions of the natives, all the places remote from great towns, are fortified with towers and castles, covered, as in Africa, not with tiles, but with earth. On these they place sentinels, whose high situation commands an extensive view of the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest part of the towns of this province are built on mountains, and places exceedingly strong by nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus sieges are rare and hazardous in Spain, it not being easy to reduce their towns by force, as happened in the present war; for Pompey having established his camp between Ategua and Ucubis, as related above, and within view of both towns, Cæsar found means to possess himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about four miles from his own camp, on which he built a fortress.

9. Pompey, who from the nature of the ground was covered by the same eminence, and besides at a sufficient distance from Cæsar's quarters, soon became sensible of the importance of this post: and as Cæsar was separated from it by the river Salsus, he imagined that the difficulty of sending relief would prevent his attempting any thing of that kind in its defence. Relying on this persuasion, he set out about midnight, and attacked the fort, which had been very troublesome to the besieged. The enemy, on thei rapproach, setting up a shout, discharged their javelins in great numbers, and wounded multitudes of our men: but those in the fort making a vigorous resistance, and despatching messengers to the greater camp to inform

Cæsar of what had happened, he hastened to their relief, with three legions. His approach struck the enemy with terror: many were slain, and a great number made prisoners; nay, multitudes in their flight threw away their arms; insomuch, that above fourscore shields were found which they had left behind them.

10. The day after Arguetius arrived from Italy, with the cavalry, and five standards taken from the Saguntines; but was forced to quit his post by Asprenas, who likewise brought a reinforcement from Italy to Cæsar. The same night Pompey set fire to his camp, and drew towards Cordova. A king, named Indus, who was bringing some troops to Cæsar, with a party of cavalry, following the pursuit of the enemy too briskly, was made prisoner and slain by the Spanish legionaries. Next day our cavalry pursued those who were employed in carrying provisions from the town to Pompey's camp, almost to the very walls of Cordova, and took fifty prisoners, besides horses. The same day, Q. Marcius, a military tribune in Pompey's army, deserted to us. At midnight the besieged fell furiously on our works, and by all the methods they could devise threw fire and combustible matter into the trenches. When the attack was ended, C. Fundanius, a Roman knight, quitted the enemy, and came over to us.

11. Next day, two Spanish legionaries, who pretended they were slaves, were made prisoners by a party of our horse: but being brought to the camp, they were known by the soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius and Pedius, and deserted from Trebonius, who would grant no quarter, but massacred them immediately. At the same time, some courtiers, sent from Cordova to Pompey, entering our camp by

mistake, were seized, had their hands cut off, and then were dismissed. About nine at night the besieged, according to custom, spent a considerable time in casting fire and darts on our soldiers, and wounded a great number of men. At day-break they sallied on the sixth legion, who were busy at the works, and began a sharp contest, in which however our men got the better, though the besieged had the advantage of the higher ground: and fifty of their horse, who had begun the attack, being vigorously opposed on our side, notwithstanding all the inconveniences we fought under, were at length obliged to retire into the town, with many wounds.

12. Next day Pompey began a line from the camp to the river Salsus; and a small party of our horse being attacked by a much greater body of the enemy, were driven from their post, with the loss of three of their number. The same day, A. Valgius, the son of a senator, whose brother was in Pompey's camp, mounted his horse and went over to the enemy, leaving all his baggage behind him. A spy, belonging to Pompey's second legion, was taken and slain. At the same time, a bullet was shot into the town, with this inscription: that notice should be given, by the signal of a buckler, when Cæsar advanced to storm the town. This encouraging some to hope that they might scale the walls and possess themselves of the town without danger, they fell the next day to sapping them, and threw down a considerable part of the outward wall. They then endeavored to mount the breach, but were made prisoners, and afterwards employed by the garrison to make an offer of surrendering the town to Cæsar, on condition he would suffer them to march out with their baggage. The answer was, that it had been always his custom to give, not accept of conditions; which being reported

to the garrison, they set up a shout, and began to pour their darts on our men from the whole circuit of the wall; which gave reason to believe that the garrison intended that day to make a vigorous sally. Wherefore, surrounding the town with our troops, the conflict was for some time maintained with great violence, and one of our batteries threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, in which were five of their men, and a boy, whose office it was to observe the battery.

13. After this, Pompey erected a fort on the other side of the Salsus, in which he met with no interruption from our men, and gloried not a little in the imagination of having possessed himself of a post so near us. Also the following day, extending himself in like manner still farther, he came up with our out-guard of cavalry; and charging them briskly, obliged several squadrons, and the light-armed foot to give ground: many of whom, by reason of the smallness of their numbers, incapable of any vigorous opposition, were trodden down by the enemy's horse. This passed within view of both camps, and not a little animated the Pompeians, to see our men pushed so far: but being afterwards reinforced by a party from our camp, they faced about with design to renew the fight.

14. In all battles of the horse this is found to hold; that when the troopers dismount with design to charge the infantry, the match evermore proves unequal, as happened on the present occasion; for a select body of the enemy's light-armed foot coming unexpectedly on our horse, they alighted to sustain the charge. Thus in a very little time, from a horse, it became a foot skirmish, and again from a foot changed to a horse encounter, in which our men were driven back to their very lines: but being there reinforced, about a hun-

dred and twenty-three of the enemy were slain, several forced to throw down their arms, many wounded, and the rest pursued quite to their camp. On our side, a hundred and eleven men were slain, besides twelve foot soldiers and five troopers wounded.

15. Towards the evening of the same day, the fight, as usual, was renewed before the walls; and the enemy having thrown many darts, and a great quantity of fire from the battlements, proceeded afterwards to an action of unexampled cruelty and barbarity: for in the very sight of our troops they fell to murdering the citizens, and tumbling them headlong from the walls: an instance of inhumanity of which no parallel is to be found in the history of the most savage nations.

16. When night came on, Pompey sent a messenger unknown to us, to exhort the garrison to make a vigorous sally about midnight, and set fire to our towers and mount. Accordingly, having poured on us a great quantity of darts and fire, and destroyed a considerable part of the rampart, they opened the gate which lay over against and within view of Pompey's camp, and sallied out with all their forces, carrying with them fascines to fill up the ditch; hooks and fire to destroy and reduce to ashes the barracks, which the soldiers had built mostly of reeds to defend them from the winter; and some silver and rich apparel to scatter among the tents, that while our men should be employed in securing the plunder, they might fight their way through and escape to Pompey; who, in expectation that they would be able to effect their design, had crossed the Salsus with his army, where he continued all night in order of battle, to favor their retreat. But though our men had no apprehension of this design, their valor enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and repulse the enemy with many wounds. They even made themselves masters

of the spoil, their arms, and some prisoners, who were put to death next day. At the same time a deserter from the town informed us that Junius, who was employed in the mine when the citizens were massacred, exclaimed against it as a cruel and barbarous action, which ill suited the kind treatment they had received, and was a direct violation of the laws of hospitality. He added many things besides, which made such an impression on the garrison, that they desisted from the massacre.

17. The next day Tullius, a lieutenant-general, accompanied by C. Antonius of Lusitania, came to Cæsar, and addressed him to this effect: 'Would to heaven I had rather been one of your soldiers, than a follower of C. Pompey, and given those proofs of valor and constancy in obtaining victories for you, rather than in suffering for him. The only advantage we reap from following his banners are doleful applauses; being reduced to the condition of indigent citizens, and by the melancholy fate of our country ranked among its enemies; who having never shared with Pompey in his good fortune, find ourselves yet involved in his disgrace; and after sustaining the attack of so many armed legions, employing ourselves day and night in works of defence, exposed to the darts and swords of our fellow-citizens: vanquished, deserted by Pompey, and compelled to give way to the superior valor of your troops, find ourselves at last obliged to have recourse to your clemency, and implore that you will not show yourselves less placable to fellow-citizens, than you have so often been to foreign nations.'—'I am ready,' returned Cæsar, 'to show the same favor to citizens which vanquished nations have always received at my hands.'

18. The ambassadors being dismissed, when they arrived at the gate of the town, Tiberius Tullius ob-

serving that C. Antony did not follow him, returned to the gate and laid hold of him, on which drawing a poniard from his breast, he wounded him in the hand, and in this condition they both fled to Cæsar. At the same time the standard-bearer of the first legion came over to our camp, and reported that the day when the skirmish happened between the horse, no less than thirty-five of his company fell; but it was not allowed to mention it in Pompey's camp, or so much as own the loss of one man. A slave, whose master was in Cæsar's camp, and who had left his wife and son in the city, cut his master's throat, and deceiving the guards, escaped privately to Pompey's camp; whence, by means of a bullet, on which he inscribed his intelligence, he gave us notice of the preparations made for the defence of the place. When we had read the inscription, those who were employed to throw the bullet returning to the city, two Lusitanian brothers deserted, and informed us, that Pompey in a speech made to his soldiers had said, 'that as he found it impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved to withdraw privately in the night, and retire towards the sea: to which one made answer, that it was better to hazard a battle than take refuge in flight; for which he was immediately killed. At the same time some of his couriers were intercepted, who were endeavoring to get into the town. Cæsar sent the letters to the inhabitants, and one of the messengers begging his life, he granted it, with promise of farther reward, if he would set fire to the enemy's wooden turret. The enterprise was not without difficulty: he undertook it, however, but was slain in the attempt. The same night a deserter informed us that Pompey and Labienus were greatly offended at the massacre of the citizens.

19. About nine at night, one of our wooden towers, which had been severely battered by the enemy's en-

gines, gave way as far as the third story. At the same time a sharp action happened near the walls, and the besieged, assisted by a favorable wind, burnt the remaining part of that tower and another. Next morning a matron threw herself from the wall, and came over to our camp, reporting, that the rest of her family had intended the same, but were apprehended and put to death: likewise a letter was thrown over, in which was written—L. Minutius to Cæsar: Pompey has abandoned me: if you will grant me my life, I promise to serve you with the same fidelity and attachment I have hitherto manifested towards him.' At the same time the deputies who had been sent before to Cæsar by the garrison, now waited on him a second time, offering to deliver up the town next day, on a bare grant of their lives: to which he replied, that he was Cæsar, and would perform his word. Thus having made himself master of the place the nineteenth of February, he was saluted emperor by the army.

20. Pompey being informed by some deserters that the town had surrendered, removed his camp towards Ucubis, where he began to build redoubts, and secure himself with lines. Cæsar also decamped and drew near him. At the same time a Spanish legionary soldier deserting to our camp, informed us that Pompey had assembled the people of Ucubis, and given it them in charge to inquire diligently who favored his party, who that of the enemy. Some time after, the slave, who, as we have related above, had murdered his master, was taken in a mine and burnt alive. About the same time eight Spanish centurions came over to Cæsar; and in a skirmish between our cavalry and that of the enemy, we were repulsed, and some of our light-armed foot wounded. The same night we took four of the enemy's spies. One, as being a legionary soldier,

was beheaded, but the other three, who were slaves, were crucified.

21. The day following, some of the enemy's cavalry and light-armed infantry deserted to us; and about eleven of their horse falling on a party of our men that were sent to fetch water, killed some, and took others prisoners; amongst which last were eight troopers. Next day Pompey beheaded seventy-four persons as favorers of Cæsar's cause, ordering the rest who lay under the same suspicion to be carried back to the town, of whom a hundred and twenty escaped to Cæsar.

22. Some time after, the deputies of Bursavola, whom Cæsar had taken prisoners in Ategua, and sent along with his own ambassadors to their city, to inform them of the massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had to apprehend from Pompey, who suffered his soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all manner of crimes with impunity, arriving in the town, none of our deputies, except such as were natives of the place, durst enter the city, though they were all Roman knights and senators. But after many messages backward and forward, when the deputies were on their return, the garrison pursued and put them all to the sword, except two who escaped to Cæsar, and informed him of what had happened. Some time after, the Bursavolenses sending spies to Ategua, to know the truth of what had happened, and finding the report of our deputies confirmed, were for stoning to death him who had been the cause of the murder of the deputies, and were with difficulty restrained from laying violent hands on him, which in the end proved the occasion of their own destruction: for having obtained leave of the inhabitants to go in person to Cæsar and justify himself, he privately drew together some troops, and when he thought

himself strong enough, returned in the night, and was treacherously admitted into the town; where he made a dreadful massacre of the inhabitants, slew all the leaders of the opposite party, and reduced the place under his obedience. Soon after, some slaves who had deserted informed us that he had sold all the goods of the citizens, and that Pompey suffered none of his soldiers to quit the camp but unarmed, because since the taking of Ategua, many despairing of success, fled into Bethuria, having given over all expectation of victory; and that if any deserted from our camp, they were put among the light-armed infantry, whose pay was only sixteen asses a day.

23. The day following Cæsar removed his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to draw a line to the river Salsus. Here, while our men were employed in the work, some of the enemy fell on us from the higher ground, and as we were in no condition to make resistance, wounded great numbers, obliging us, contrary to custom, to retreat. This being perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion passed the river, and restored the battle; when urging the enemy with astonishing bravery, one of them fell, overwhelmed by the multitude of darts discharged from above. The other continued the combat for some time; but seeing himself in danger of being surrounded, as he was endeavoring to make good his retreat, he stumbled and fell. His death being known, the enemy flocked together in still greater numbers, on which our cavalry passed the river, and drove them quite back to their intrenchments; but pursuing them with too much heat, were surrounded by their cavalry and light-armed foot; where, but for the most astonishing efforts of bravery, they must all unavoidably have been made prisoners: for they were so hemmed in by the enemy's lines, that they wanted room to defend themselves. Many were wounded on

our side in these two encounters, and among the rest Clodius Aquitius; but as the fight was carried on mostly at a distance, only the two centurions, of whom mention has been already made, and whom the desire of glory rendered regardless of their own safety, were killed.

24. Next day both parties withdrawing from Soricaria, we continued our works. But Pompey observing that our fort had cut off his communication with Aspavia, which is about five miles distant from Ucubis, judged it necessary to come to a battle. Yet he did not offer it on equal terms, but chose to draw up his men on a hill that he might have the advantage of the higher ground. Meanwhile both sides endeavoring to possess themselves of an eminence that lay extremely convenient, we at last got the better of the Pompeians, and drove them from the plain. The slaughter was very great, and would have been still greater, had they not been protected by the mountain rather than their valor. Night came on very opportunely to favor their escape; without which our men, though few in number, would have intirely cut off their retreat. Pompey lost on this occasion three hundred and twenty-four light-armed foot, and about a hundred and thirty-eight legionary soldiers, besides those whose armor and spoils we carried off. Thus the death of the two centurions, which happened the day before, was fully revenged.

25. The day after, Pompey's horse advanced according to their usual custom to our lines; for only the cavalry durst venture to draw up on equal ground. They therefore began to skirmish with our men who were at work, the legionaries calling out to us at the same time to choose our field of battle, with design to make us believe that they desired nothing so much as to come to blows. On this invitation our men quitted the eminence where they were encamped, and advanced

a great way into the plain, desiring no advantage of ground. But none of the enemy had the boldness to present themselves, Antistius Turpio excepted; who, presuming on his strength, and fancying no one on our side a match for him, offered us defiance. On this ensued a combat not unlike that recorded of Memnon and Achilles; for Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, quitting his rank, advanced to the encounter. The fierce air of Antistius having engaged the attention of all, the two armies drew up to be spectators of the issue of this challenge, and expressed no less impatience than if the whole fortune of the war had depended on it; and the wishes on both sides for success were equal to the anxiety and concern each felt for his own combatant. They advanced into the plain with great courage, having each a resplendent buckle of curious workmanship. And doubtless the combat would have been soon decided, had not some light-armed foot, drawn up near the lines, to serve as a guard to the camp, because of the approach of the enemy's horse * * * Our horse in retreating to their camp, being warmly pursued by the enemy, suddenly faced about with great cries; which so terrified the Pompeians, that they immediately betook themselves to flight, and retreated to their camp with the loss of many of their men.

26. Cæsar, to reward the valor of the Cassian troop, presented them with thirteen thousand sesterces, distributed ten thousand more among the light-armed foot, and gave Cassius himself two golden chains. The same day, A. Bebius, C. Flavius, and A. Trebellius, Roman knights of Asti, with their horses richly caparisoned and adorned with silver, came over to Cæsar, and informed him that all the rest of the Roman knights in Pompey's camp had like them conspired to come and join him, but that a discovery being made of

their design by a slave, they had been all seized, themselves excepted, who during the confusion found means to escape. The same day letters were intercepted, sent by Pompey to Ursao, importing, 'that hitherto he had all the success against the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner than was expected, could he have brought them to fight him on equal terms: that he did not think it advisable to venture new-levied troops on a plain: that the enemy defending themselves with their lines, seemed inclinable to draw out the war to length, investing city after city, and thence supplying themselves with provisions: that he would therefore endeavor to protect the towns of his party, and bring the war to as speedy an issue as possible: that he would send them a reinforcement of some cohorts, and made no doubt of forcing Cæsar in a short time to an engagement, by cutting off his provisions.'

27. Some time after, as our men were carelessly dispersed about the works, a few horse were killed, who had gone to a forest of olives to fetch wood. Several slaves deserted at this time, and informed us, that ever since the action at Soritia on the seventh of March, the enemy had been under continual alarms, and appointed Attius Varus to guard the lines. The same day Pompey decamped, and posted himself in an olive-wood over against Hispalis. Cæsar, before he removed, waited till midnight, when the moon began to appear. At his departure he ordered fire to be set to the fort of Ucubis, which the enemy had abandoned, and that the whole army should rendezvous in the greater camp. He afterwards laid siege to Ventisponte, which surrendered; and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the city, because the garrison refused to open the gates to him. A soldier who had murdered his brother in the camp, *being intercepted* by our men, was scourged and put to

death. Cæsar still pursuing his march, arrived in the plains of Munda, and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey.

28. Next day as Cæsar was preparing to set out with the army, notice was sent him by his spies that Pompey had been in order of battle ever since midnight. On this intelligence he ordered the standard to be erected. Pompey had taken this resolution in consequence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao, who were his firm adherents, in which he told them that Cæsar refused to come down into the plain, because his army consisted mostly of new-levied troops. This had greatly confirmed the city in its allegiance, which therefore serving as a sure resource behind him, he thought he might hazard a battle without danger; and the rather, as he was very advantageously encamped: for, as we observed before, this country is full of hills, which run in a continued chain, without any considerable breaks or hollows.

29. But we must by no means omit an accident which fell out about this time. The two camps were divided from one another by a plain about five miles in extent; insomuch, that Pompey by his situation enjoyed a double defence. On one side, the town, seated on an eminence; on the other, the nature of the ground where the camp stood: for across this valley ran a rivulet, which rendered the approach of the mountain extremely difficult, because it formed a deep morass on the right. Cæsar made no doubt but the enemy would descend into the plain and come to a battle, and his whole army were of the same mind; the rather because the plain would give their cavalry full room to act, and the day was so serene and clear, that the gods seemed to have sent it on purpose to bring on an engagement. Our men rejoiced at the favorable opportunity: some however were not alto-

gether exempt from fear, when they considered that their all was at stake, and the uncertainty of what might be their fate an hour after. He advanced however to the field of battle, fully persuaded that the enemy would do the same; but they durst not venture above a mile from the town, being determined to shelter themselves under its walls. Our men still continued before them in order of battle; but although the equality of the ground sometimes tempted them to come and dispute the victory, they nevertheless still kept their post on the mountain, in the neighborhood of the town. We doubled our speed to reach the rivulet, without their stirring from the place where they stood.

30. Their army consisted of thirteen legions: the cavalry was drawn up on the wings, with six thousand light-armed infantry and about the same number of auxiliaries. We had only eighty heavy-armed cohorts, and eight thousand horse. When we came to the extremity of the plain, as the ground was very disadvantageous, it would have been dangerous for us to advance farther, because the enemy were ready to charge us from the eminences: and therefore, that we might not rashly entangle ourselves, Cæsar had taken care to mark beforehand how far we might advance with safety. The army when commanded to halt, murmured greatly, as if they had been kept back from a certain victory. The delay however served to enliven the enemy, who fancied that our troops were afraid of coming to blows. They therefore had the boldness to advance a little way, yet without quitting the advantage of their post, the approach to which was extremely dangerous. The tenth legion, as usual, was on the right; the third and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary troops and cavalry. At length the battle *began* with a shout.

31. But though our men were superior to the enemy in courage, they nevertheless defended themselves so well by the advantage of the higher ground, the shouts were so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides so great, that we almost began to despair of victory: for the first onset and clamor, with which an enemy is most apt to be dismayed, were pretty equal in the present encounter. All fought with equal valor; the place was covered with arrows and darts, and great numbers of the enemy fell. We have already observed that the tenth legion was on the right, which, though not considerable for the number of men, was nevertheless formidable on account of its courage; and so pressed the enemy on that side, that they were obliged to draw a legion from the right wing to reinforce the left, and prevent its being taken in flank. On this motion, our cavalry on the left fell on Pompey's right wing, weakened by the departure of the legion: but they defended themselves with so much bravery and resolution, as to stand in need of no new troops to support them. Meanwhile the clashing of armor, mingled with shouts of the combatants, and the groans of the dying and wounded, terrified the new raised soldiers: for, as Ennius says, they fought hand to hand, foot to foot, and shield to shield. But though the enemy fought with the utmost vigor, they were obliged to give ground, and retire towards the town. The battle was fought on the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were intirely routed and put to flight; insomuch, that not a man could have escaped, had they not sheltered themselves in the place whence they advanced to the charge. The enemy lost on this occasion upwards of thirty thousand men, and among the rest Labienus and Attius Varus, whose funeral obsequies were performed on the field of battle. They had like-

wise three thousand Roman knights killed, partly of Italy, partly of the province. About a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, partly horse; and five hundred wounded. We gained thirteen eagles and standards, and made seventeen officers prisoners. Such was the issue of this action.

32. The remains of Pompey's army retreating to Munda, with design to defend themselves in that town, it became necessary to invest it. The dead bodies of the enemy, heaped together, served instead of a rampart, and their javelins and darts were fixed up by way of palisades. On these we hung their bucklers to supply the place of a breast-work, and fixing the heads of the deceased on swords and lances, planted them all around the works, to strike the greater terror into the besieged, and keep awake in them a sense of our bravery. Amidst these mournful objects did they find themselves shut in, when our men began the attack, which was managed chiefly by the Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped to Cordova with some horse, informed Sextus Pompey of what had happened; who on receipt of the mournful news, distributing what money he had about him to the troopers, left the town about nine at night, under pretence of going to find out Cæsar, to treat of an accommodation. On the other side, Cn. Pompey, attended by a few horse and foot, took the road of Carteia, where his fleet lay, and which was about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Cordova. When he had arrived within eight miles of the place, he sent P. Calvitius his camp-marshal before, to fetch a litter to carry him to the town, because he found himself out of order. The litter came, and when he entered the town, those of his party waited on him privately, to receive his orders about the management of the war. As they

assembled round the place in great crowds, Pompey, quitting his litter, put himself under their protection.

33. Cæsar, after the battle, seeing the circumvallation of Munda completed, marched to Cordova. Those of the enemy who had escaped the slaughter, possessing themselves of a bridge, on the approach of our men called out to them with an air of derision, 'What! we are no more than a handful of men escaped from the battle, and shall we be allowed no place of retreat?' Immediately they prepared to defend the bridge. Cæsar passed the river and encamped on the other side. Scapula, who had stirred up the freedmen to a revolt, escaping after the battle to Cordova, when he found himself besieged, assembled all his followers, ordered a funeral pile to be erected, and a magnificent supper served up; when, putting on his richest dress, he distributed his plate and ready money among his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed himself once and again, and, last of all, ordered one of his freedmen to despatch him, and another to set fire to the pile.

34. Cæsar had no sooner encamped before the place than a division arose among the inhabitants, between those who favored Cæsar, and those who were in the interest of Pompey, attended with so rude a clamor, that it reached our camp. During the contest, some legions, composed partly of fugitives, partly of slaves manumitted by Pompey, came and surrendered themselves to Cæsar. But the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the place; and with that view possessed themselves of the walls and some towers, in spite of all the opposition they met with; which obliged the other party to send deputies to Cæsar for aid. On this, those who had escaped out of the battle set fire to the place, and our men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them, besides those who

were slain without the walls; and thus became masters of the town. Whilst Cæsar was employed in this siege, those who were blocked up at Munda made a sally, but were driven back into the town with considerable loss.

35. Thence Cæsar marched to Hispalis, which sent deputies to sue for pardon, and obtained it. Though the citizens assured him that they were able to defend the town with their own forces, he nevertheless thought proper to send Caninius his lieutenant thither with some troops, and encamped himself before the place. There was in the town a strong party of Pompeians; who, displeased to see Cæsar's troops received within the walls, deputed secretly one Philo, a zealous partisan of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to beg assistance of Cecilius Niger, surnamed the Barbarous, who lay encamped near Lenius, with a strong army of Lusitanians. These approaching the town towards night, got over the walls, surprised the sentinels and garrison, shut the gates, and began to defend the place.

36. During these transactions, deputies arrived from Carteia, with accounts of their having secured Pompey; hoping by this service to atone for their former fault of shutting the gates against Cæsar. Meantime the Lusitanians in Hispalis still continued pillaging the town, which, though known to Cæsar, did not yet determine him to press it too hard, lest they should in despair set fire to the town, and destroy the walls. It was resolved in council to suffer the Lusitanians to escape in the night by a sally, yet so that the thing might not appear designed. In this sally they set fire to the ships that were in the river Bætis; and while our men were employed in extinguishing the flames, endeavored to get off; but being overtaken by the ca-

y, were mostly cut to pieces. Thence he marched
sta, which submitted. Munda having been now a
while besieged, many of those who had escaped
of the battle, despairing of safety, surrendered to
and being formed into a legion, conspired among
nselves, that on a signal given, the garrison should
y out in the night, while they at the same time
uld begin a massacre in the camp. But the plot
ng discovered, they were next night, at the changing
he third watch, all put to death without the ram-
t.

7. The Carteians, while Cæsar was employed in
ucing the other towns on his route, fell into a dis-
sion about young Pompey. There were two parties
he town; one that had sent the deputies to Cæsar,
another in the Pompeian interest. These last pre-
ling, seized the gates, and made a dreadful slaugh-
of their adversaries. Pompey himself was wounded
he fray; but, escaping to his ships, fled with about
ty galleys. Didius, who was at Cadiz with Cæsar's
t, hearing of what had happened, immediately sailed
ursuit of them; stationing at the same time some
alry and infantry along the coast, to prevent his
ting off by land. Pompey had departed with so
ch precipitation from Carteia, that he took no time
furnish himself with water; which obliging him to
p by the way, Didius came up with him after four
s' sailing, took some of his ships, and burned the
t.

8. Pompey, with a few followers, escaped to a place
ngly fortified by nature; of which the troops sent
pursuit of him having certain intelligence by their
uts, followed day and night. He was wounded in
shoulder and left leg, and had besides strained his
le, all which greatly retarded his flight, and obliged

him to make use of a litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the place of his retreat, he was quickly surrounded by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing himself betrayed, he took refuge in a post naturally strong, and which could easily be defended by a few men, because the approach to it was extremely difficult. We attempted to storm it, but were repulsed, and vigorously pursued by the enemy; and meeting with no better success after several trials, we at length resolved to lay siege to the place, it seeming too hazardous to force it. Accordingly a terrace was raised, and lines drawn round the place; which the enemy perceiving, thought proper to betake themselves to flight.

39. Pompey, as we have observed above, being lame and wounded, was in no condition to make a speedy retreat; and the rather, because the place was such, that he could use neither horse nor litter. He saw his people driven from the fort, massacred on all sides, and himself left without resource. In this extremity he fled to a cave, where he could not easily be discovered, unless he was betrayed by the prisoners. Here he was slain, and his head brought to Cæsar the twelfth of April, just as he was setting out for Hispalis, and afterwards exposed to the view of the people.

40. After the death of young Pompey, Didius, proud of his success, hauled some of his vessels ashore to be refitted, and retired himself to a neighboring fort. The Lusitanians who had escaped from the battle of Munda, rallying in great bodies, found themselves strong enough to make head against him. Though the preservation of the fleet was what principally engaged his attention, he was yet necessitated to make frequent sallies, to check the insolence of the enemy. These daily skirmishes gave them an opportunity of projecting an ambuscade; for which purpose they divided their troops *into* three bodies. Didius sallied according to cus-

tom; when, on a signal given, one of the parties advanced to set fire to the fleet; and another counterfeiting a retreat, drew him insensibly into the ambuscade, where he was surrounded and slain with most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some escaped in boats which they found on the coast; others made for the galleys by swimming; and weighing anchor, stood out to sea. A great many saved themselves in this manner, but the Lusitanians got all the baggage. Cæsar meanwhile returned from Cales to Hispalis.

41. Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to continue the siege of Munda, carried on the approaches with great success; insomuch, that the enemy seeing themselves shut up on all sides, resolved to attempt a sally: but were repulsed with great loss. Our men seized this opportunity to get possession of the town, and made all the rest prisoners. Thence they drew towards Ursao, a town exceedingly strong both by nature and art, and capable of resisting an enemy: for there is not so much as a rivulet within eight miles of the place, nor any spring, but that which supplies the town. Add to all this, that the wood necessary for building towers and other machines was to be fetched from a distance of six miles; because young Pompey, to render the siege more difficult, had cut down all the wood round the place; which obliged our men to bring all the materials for carrying on the siege from Munda.

42. During these transactions at Munda and Ursao, Cæsar, who had returned from Cales to Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and made the following speech: 'That when he was advanced to the questorship, he had chosen their province preferably to all others, and during his continuance in that office done them every service in his power: that, during his pretorship, he had obtained for them of the senate the abolition of the

taxes imposed by Metellus, declared himself their patron, procured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and made himself many enemies, by undertaking the defence both of their public and private rights. In fine, that when he was consul, he had, though absent, rendered the province all the services in his power: that instead of making a suitable return for so many favors, they had always discovered the utmost ingratitude, both towards him and the people of Rome; as well in this last war as the preceding. You,' said he, 'though no strangers to the law of nations, and the rights of Roman citizens, have yet like barbarians often violated the sacred persons of Roman magistrates. You attempted in open day, in the public square, to assassinate Cassius. You have been always such enemies to peace, that the senate could never suffer the province to be without legions. You take favors for offences, and insults for benefits, are insolent and restless in peace, and cowardly and effeminate in war. Young Pompey, though only a private citizen, nay a fugitive, was yet received among you, and suffered to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After putting many citizens to death, you still furnished him with forces, and even urged him to lay waste the country and province. Against whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be ignorant, that on the supposition of my overthrow, the people of Rome have still ten legions, capable not only of making head against you, but of bringing the whole earth under subjection?' * * * * * * *

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
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